14/07/05
U.T.Place
OK consciousness as a brain process -
even so - need it be like other - all other processes of the brain?
perhaps it is unique
physical - but unique
unique in that it is a process
that creates internality
the sense of an inside
the point being physics is not just about the outside of things
the inside though is not known - as is the outside (by observation)
knowing - the inside is gained via reflection
we don't need to be dualistic in a Cartesian sense
the dualism is physical
the physical world is not one dimensional?
19/07/05
knowing as two dimensional
our knowing is two dimensional -
we know the inside
we know the outside
all our knowledge is limited internal / external
our knowledge of ourselves our knowledge of the world
our vision in / out is always limited
my point is that consciousness always knows the inside and outside
knowing is never just a matter of observing
never just a question of reflection
always the vision is two-dimensional
I know myself as I appear
I know myself as I do not appear
I know myself as non-appearance to the world
as an internality
as an experience - if you wish
(traditional empiricism conflates - attempts to reduce - the outside to the inside and
then to construct the external - from the internal - it's a cat chasing its tail)
the point is we begin - we are - in the centre
consciousness is the centre
the meeting - the inside and the outside
the inside and the outside are real - they are not constructions
however the moment of knowing is never divided
thought - language - breaks down the unity of consciousness the unity of experience
(subjective / objective)
20/07/05
the world as unknown
the world (everything) is just simply what it is (appears)
there is no explanation
all our ideas - theory etc. - ways of proceeding in the face of the unknown (just one
step back from the obvious)
21/07/05
philosophical analysis
the point of philosophical analysis is to reach the point of no deception
it is to see the final untenability of all conception - all theory
this is a position of understanding
the world and everything in it - you included
nothing is changed
everything is as it is
but your place of knowing is empty
any view - is - becomes just that
a possibility
the real world per se is featureless
the world is full
but the understanding of it -
the prime position - is empty
possibilities - come and go
23/07/05
J.J.C. Smart
'all it claims is that in so far as a sensations statement is a report of something, that
something is in fact a brain process.'
'it is that, in so far as 'after image' or 'ache' is a report of a process it is a report of a
process that happens to be a brain process'
'sensations are nothing over and above brain processes'
(1)
a scientific explanation - i.e. - identification of sensation (consciousness perhaps) with
a brain process - is neither here nor there - it's a no brainer
it is simply placing an event - or understanding the place of an event - in the place
of events
it's like putting a snap in a photo album
or just locating a number in a sequence
it is just that this is not a straightforward issue
consciousness / sensation is a questionable matter
it's not clear that it's a snap at all -
or that it's a number
but - if it is assumed that it is
this or that - it has a place
as Smart represents it - it's a question of placement
and he makes it clear there is only one place
we have to make it fit
(2)
but the thing is - we will never know really if it does fit
even if a sensation - and identifiable
it will never look - as observed - scientifically -
a sensation - will only be seen from the inside
it will never look like a brain process
may well be
perhaps an argument against Descartes yes -
or maybe just an assertion against Descartes
in any case
where's the plus?
27/07/05
should
now if I say - 'I should do x'
how is this different from - 'I do x'?
one - there may in fact be no difference
i.e. - when what I do is what I should do
but in such a case - why the 'should statement'?
it is redundant
'should' it seems - refers to a possible - but unrealized state of affairs
still the question - how does 'should' arise?
if I am a smoker - why would I think I should stop smoking?
to avoid health problems (let us say)
(as a possible though not realized state of affairs)
ultimately - this question comes down to how you see yourself in the world
in the case of smoking perhaps a conflict between hedonism and the claims of medical
science
your views on smoking will be defined by which way you jump here
so - 'should' arises as an expression of conflict about possible - unrealized but
(realizable) realities
here realities are factual realities
the language of 'is' - is the language of actual reality
when we question - (actual) reality - with an 'ought' we are talking about a possible
state of affairs of the given reality
we are not invoking non-natural phenomenon in so doing
it's about wanting a change to ourselves - our world - or relation to the world -
it is to say e.g. - given what I know or think or hold to be true etc. - I want a different
state of affairs
'should' may appear to be intuitive - it is in fact an expression of a world view - that
has not come to be but is desired on the basis of perceived or reasoned inadequacies -
or absences or failures - in the present
the imperative is a wish in the midst of metaphysical conflict
the statement of this:
'I should do x'
'you should do x'
is on the face of it virtually metaphysically illiterate
for it is non-explanatory
it appears to have no content
(and this is never the case)
it is as with all demands - a conclusion - without an argument
this form should not perplex us
27/07/05
should II
the conception of a possible state of affairs - effectively a possible world - that is
behind any 'should' - is to conceive of a state of affairs - that is - at the time of
conception - unknown
it is only in the bringing about - the actualization that such is known
and with that the 'should' of morality - disappears
what I should do - only exists as an unknown
to say - 'I should....' - 'you should....'
is to project an idea
of a particular state of affairs
which implies a world view
(the world is to be made different)
you may say - is imagined
it can only be known as an actual state of affairs
29/07/05
virtue and vice
just an idea here - when we speak of virtues and vices - i.e. - courage and cowardice
there is no distinction between natural and non-natural qualities
a courageous act is an act - and a good act
but this is not what we say
we don't say -
x is A and x is G
it is a 'courageous act'
the report of such an act makes no distinction
no distinction between fact and value
such an act is a moral act
it really seems beside the point to analyze into act - plus courage
such virtue predicates as 'is courageous' are peculiarly human
on the other hand you have natural predicates - that apply to all natural things
including humans
so we have n-predicates (natural predicates) and h-predicates (human predicates)
the h-predicates are a class of n-predicates
so there is no question of the naturalistic fallacy
and I would say - to understand - the concept of a h-predicate - you need to observe
(behaviour) and reflect (think) -
the same applies to n-predicates
there is no gulf - only specialty
29/07/05
dreaming
I don't think we can capture the nature of reality in thought
this is not to say we dispense with reality
(our existence is its sharpest manifestation)
we need though to understand the limits of description
if you have ever experienced lucid dreaming you will have a metaphor -
you know you are in the dreaming - and you know there is a waking -
waking is just a fact - the limit of the experience of dreaming
so too objectivity -
a logical fact
- the limit of the world
a primitive undefined horizon
and in terms of the way we operate as human beings -
it is entirely indispensable
and completely unknowable
it is a reaching towards
or
an ever presence never grasped
29/07/05
natural
I speak of the natural world
one needs to characterize not out of truth but avoidance
the world as such is conceived in many ways
'natural' for me is something like - pre-cognition
this is only a starting point and of little help
to understand (and that is not an optional extra - rather a necessity of survival - at the
least) we must go beyond the presentation
and to the question of definition -
any idea of strict definition - essential definition - for all its intensity and hope will
only be a 'reflection on'
(a phantasm - if you will)
ideas about reality never quite stick - never quite hold
why?
perhaps consciousness just can't get it right
some say - any idea (from fundamental to superficial) contains its negation
so it's the nature of the thing to never see straight
also -
it can be said - there is nothing straight to see
- but what is -
definition of this is strictly redundant
and any attempt must fail -
for a definition cannot include itself
(it is always a 'definition of ___')
for specific purposes we may need to draw some lines
any lines drawn can only be inside the world
to picture the world absolutely - objectively - one would need to be outside - a logical
impossibility
(hence God as so conceived is impossible - God is either in the picture or not at all -
and no one I think proposes the idea of God being limited in the world - so if we are to
retain the idea there is no choice - God is the picture - or just another name for it -
and they say what's in a name? - everything - it would seem)
what we see (know) we cannot definitively describe (you can't get your hands on it all)
if it wasn't for necessity - who would try?
you just can't get past reality - or capture it - it is not an option
the illusion of explanation - of whatever kind - is a real fact of functioning human
beings
as real as any event in space-time
the point of such illusions is that they are enabling
their value is thus determined -
true or false
30/07/05
no background
how can what has happened - at another time - be relevant to the present - unless a
decision is made that it should be so?
any such decision is a meta decision
it makes sense as a strategy for action
as a principle that gives psychological security - a sense of substance to the next move
- a basis to the next act
there is no reason for this beyond its psychological and pragmatic value
strictly speaking there is no connection between events - only an association of ideas -
and hence to the notion of causation
we can question this association - look for a basis in thought - as distinct from habit -
or instinct
but what is it to examine such notions? - they do not thereby change - or disappear - or
fall apart (the fact of such is not altered in anyway)
we learn - perhaps there are no necessary relations here
and contingency - is always - on whatever level - a connecting of dots
for what reason
only necessity - a necessity of action
to see action in itself - is to see no background - no reason - pure novelty is the best
we can say - a novelty that is by definition - unexplained
01/08/05
identity
identity - is an objective relation - that manifests itself in multiplicity - 'relata' are
logical points of a necessity - the world - experience - flows through these posits -
they are as manifestations of a necessity - they exist as an expression of this in
contingent form - these forms have a life - a space-time presentation - diversity of
content - is conceiving within the one - there is no reason why this should be - it
simply is - it is the nature of energy
01/08/05
the inside of the world
consciousness is defined - given definition - given form by matter
if you could subtract the physical world -
you would have only spirit undifferentiated - and with no sense of self -
in fact it is clear - it would not actually exist -
there would be nothing to define it
the same cannot be said of matter without mind
matter defines itself - its forms - independently of the existence or not of
consciousness
consciousness is an interloper on the scene - in one sense
it comes though - not from outside the physical world
it appears as the inside of the world -
we are not here committed to pan-psychism -
though logically speaking - it would be neat
we have instead an asymmetrical relation
the inside of the world is not as it were quantitatively equivalent to its outside
and for this reason evolutionary thought has seemed to be sensible -
consciousness as an emergent property
however if you go with the idea of mind as the inside of substance - you're left with
Cartesian problem regarding its relation to the outside of itself -
how does an inside emerge from an outside?
perhaps the inside / outside notion does not get us too far
is it an explanation - or what is to be explained?
the simplest notion is that mind is an expression of matter - in a particular form
it is the event of matter reflecting on itself
it is not an observable event
it is the observing event
and here is the limit of science
explanation - further description of the observing event will not be found in observing
the world - no matter how precise you get - how infinitesimal your calculation
the point is - understanding - knowledge - here - is of a different kind
it is to be found not in observation - rather in reflection
and reflection on what?
reflection - can only be the answer here
reflection on reflection
so you say - what's to be found or gained here?
here is the unknown - fair and square - as a reality - that is not categorically -
definable - reducible - it simply is - what is unknown
however we - create in terms of this -
our language here is not the language of science - of the outside - rather the language
of art - here is to be found the metaphysics of consciousness
just where you didn't expect it
its defining property - its aim - is not truth - rather beauty
and this is the best we can do
02/08/05
ethical intuitionism
it is not that we intuit goodness - the quality of goodness etc.
it is not as if there is some intuitive apprehension of a moral property or reality
this is the sense in which intuitionism is on the wrong track - as it were goes astray
I think though there is something to be said for it
it is just understanding where it is properly located
and I think it is about this -
when I say 'that is good' - I identify x as good
now what does this mean?
here I think 'good' is an intuitive description
and by that I mean the term 'good' is a shorthand description
now you will ask - of what?
and this is the thing -
we expect a fairly straightforward answer - even at a philosophical level
when we identify x as good -
we are not saying anything simple
we are not even saying anything that can be definitively explicated
and we are not saying anything that will be shown to be a neat little package
what happens in moral philosophy is that we explore possible definitions
understandings - explanations
the state of philosophical discourse gives us an idea of the possible content of a term
like 'good'
we need to understand philosophical discourse as a range of possible meanings -
so my point is -
when I say 'x is good' - and you ask 'what do you mean?' - well - for one it is not
likely I am going to give you my most comprehensive and deepest analysis of my
thinking on the issue - all matters relevant - theoretical - empirical - whatever etc.
such an analysis is technically endless - or incomplete
this is not to say - when I say - 'x is good' I don't know what I am talking about -
rather the full explanation of what I mean at the time would be very complex
I say - 'x is good' - I am intuiting - or just referring to my ethics - my incomplete - ever
changing and developing idea and practice of morality - to the matter in question
and if you were to say - look I don't want your life history - or the history of the
universe - I just want to know - why you say 'x is good'
I say - 'OK - I just think it is'
in terms of any definition - simple clear cut explanation - if that's what you want I
have to say 'I don't know'
and finally of course that is the truth
so the above is not just an argument against ethical intuitionsism - the same points
would apply to any ethical theory meta or normative and for that matter any
philosophical theory whatsoever
p.s.
philosophers have to understand they work from the inside - not the outside of the
world
all philosophical theory is a possible explanation - a response to the unknown
ultimately a philosophical theory is a possible account of how someone might be
thinking - on a particular issue at a particular time
it's a deep look at the obvious
and there is no single theory - no one approach -
philosophical creativity is finding new ways
new ways that add to the great variety of understandings
03/08/05
the unknown as the object of knowledge
I take the view that the object of knowledge - of the question of knowing - is the
unknown
we do not begin at this understanding -
the world as is - as presented is on first impression without question
it is only upon reflection that doubts emerge
this can come from any direction -
and we need to understand that the empiricist and rationalist idea of some sort
of clean slate - or clear and distinct position - is not what we are born into
we come to a very different world - one in which different systems of thought are
operative and ingrained
and it becomes intellectually apparent that not everything put to us can be true
investigation of this leads one way or another to something like first principles -
different ideas about the basis of it all
and those who take on these matters in a fundamental way will be led to question
the very basis of knowledge itself -
sceptical arguments at this level of inquiry - can be quite devastating - Descartes for
one never recovered from his own inquiry
usually we see a desperate pulling back from the abyss - God has always been useful
if not convincing on this issue
but the real thing about getting to the point of serious scepticism is just what it tells us
it tells us that what we face finally is the unknown
the unknown is the object of knowledge -
and I want to make a further point here -
the unknown is true objectivity
everything before this point - all our ideas - theories - understandings - knowledge
in short - are attempts to defy the one common final truth
our subjectivity consists in everything we know
our objectivity is the unknown just beyond every conception - and the final reason for
the first and last thought
06/08/05
the reflexivity of consciousness
the reflexivity of consciousness
where do we begin?
the mind sees -
but only on reflection can we begin to speak of knowledge -
(even if we say what is seen pre-reflection is knowledge)
and reflection -
what is it we reflect on?
if the initial position is pre-reflective -
'awareness of awareness' is?
reflection on reflection?
still I wonder if it makes sense to speak of an initial position that is pre-reflective?
is not such a suggestion artificial?
is not all awareness - 'awareness of the object of awareness' and 'awareness of the
awareness'?
can there be one without the other?
can we know - without knowing that we know?
granted the 'knowing that we know' may not be the focus though it could be
so I am suggesting mind is just this - reflexivity
mind is this relation
the knowing that you know
self awareness - is perhaps a better way to put it
but 'reflexivity' is the sharpest
mind - on this view is a particular relation - a unique relation
I want to say 'relation' here to really sidestep - (solve?) - the traditional arguments here
- that all centre around substance - i.e. - mind as matter - mind as a non-material
substance - mind as some variation of both
the substance question - is something we need to move on from
all this needs to be fleshed out and thought out in some detail
I just want to make some initial points - forays if you will -
it seems we can only really talk about reflexivity in relation to consciousness -
consciousness is such that we can speak about it - from the inside - as if - it is an
objective reality
it is not - but in so far as it 'holds' the world we naturally accord it a quasi- objectivity
the fact that we can speak of consciousness in an objective way is simply a function of
consciousness' reflective capacity
and this is a little off my point
I want to say the relation of reflexivity can only be stated - come into being in
consciousness
it makes no sense to speak of it existing outside of consciousness
it is consciousness
08/08/05
mind as relation
continuing on with the idea of mind as relation -
consciousness - relates - to the world - the external world - and to itself
that is the relation is 'di-mensional'(?)
an external relation
an internal relation
on this view consciousness - we can say is the focal point
that is consciousness in itself is the centre point
the pure point
which is explicated in its relations (?) external / internal
so the reflexivity of consciousness
is this a defining characteristic - the defining characteristic - or an attribute of
consciousness - of mind?
Janus - the looking - the seeing both ways - two faces
reflexivity - really a characterization of - self-consciousness
it is the internal relation?
the thing as internally defined?
so do we have - self-consciousness - and consciousness of - the other - the non-self -
the world
the two dimensions of consciousness
consciousness in this sense - the centre - in a mathematical sense - as the
'substanceless point' of the world -
perhaps the ideal point
it is clear
that - outside of this - there is no knowledge
and this is virtually analytically true
consciousness is knowledge
- beyond knowledge - the unknown -
and the great difficulty for epistemologists is
what can you say further on these matters?
we have self-consciousness
- consciousness of consciousness
consciousness of - the non-conscious - i.e. - the world -
and still we want to ask - what is it?
- we know it - experience it
- can distinguish it from the non-consciousness
beyond this?
we want to say it is something -
because it is -
but what?
it is just as if you can only say here
it is what it is -
and at the moment I find this line of inquiry - the substantial theory of mind - tiresome
the idea of thinking of mind as relation - (though I haven't quite got a handle on it yet)
has just the hint of liberation
09/08/05
mind and relations
can we speak of mind in terms of relations?
I mean drop - or perhaps better - suspend - the issue of substance - mind as matter -
mind as spirit
the idea would be to develop an account of mind - that could apply to whatever -
metaphysics - a theory of mind - that would fit the materialist metaphysics - or the
idealist
just a thought here -
Spinoza's account -
substance (God or nature) expresses itself as extension and mind
on this view - mind and matter are attributes of substance
is it too big a step to go from this to - relations of substance?
in Spinoza's term these relations would be internal
different from my proposal - where mind is the internal relation - matter - external
but it's an externality - relative to mind
and we could still speak of a totality
being or existence - that contains mind and matter
(I would think of such - not as substance - but as the unknown - and frankly I would
argue Spinoza's substance - is just this - the unknown)
anyway
I think the real question here is - can we avoid ontological commitment - suspend it -
and still have something interesting to say?
and move the issue on -
it's quite a bizarre notion - to speak of mind - and leave the question of its substantial
nature - open
but you only see it is as odd if you assume - that mind is substantial -
perhaps 'it' is not
perhaps mind is not thing - or indeed process - but rather - relation
a relation that holds regardless of ontological commitment
when I speak of mind as internal
and the physical as external
my focus is not on the stuff - of internality - of externality -
rather that such ontological categories exist -
in fact are necessary
the outer and the inner - and relations - between and within
10/08/05
the moral life
the human characteristic - of moral behaviour - (and I don't mean this in a
behaviouristic sense) can be looked at from two points of view - from the inside - the
activity - mental - of the moral agent - or objectively - in the sense of - description - of
what people do - and psychology goes a little way to this end - but to get the real
picture you need - moral philosophy - for here you have the maps and pictures of
moral states
this is what I think happens in moral philosophy -
from the inside - the moral philosopher is just the moral agent (writ large as it were)
and the kinds of questions asked - are peculiarly moral questions
what is good - what is right -
these are questions that have a particular form - logical form -
firstly - any answer given to such a question - is what I will call open - it is not closed
- in the way that we say an empirical question is -
secondly - any such answer has the character of necessity
if I think x is the good - 'y' the right thing to do - in general - these conclusions
demand assent
they are not optional -
so we have a curious state of affairs -
the answer demands but the question stays open
therefore
morality
what this means is that we live in - as moral agents - an open necessity
and it is this that accounts for the fact that moral agents operate with an indeterminate
definitiveness
what I mean is this -
we have to address ethical issues in a definite manner - but the questions (moral) are
never closed off
and this I think goes some way to accounting for the fact that a typical moral agent
will in the course of a moral life move through a series of necessities - a number of
moral views -
and not regard himself as - contradictory - or afflicted with paradox
such is the key characteristic of the moral life - to be free (not closed off) and
definitive
just to return for a minute to what philosophers do
like moral agents they carry on - as if they are solving problems -
this is an archetypal form of moral behavior
in fact I think what philosophers do here - is elucidate and describe - decisions made
this is what the whole of moral theory - meta and normative - is to the service of
and what we in fact get - in moral theory - is possible accounts of decision
- maps if you like - one territory - many maps
11/08/05
consciousness and indeterminacy
consciousness brings indeterminacy to the world
this has great implications for the bearers of consciousness - nothing for the world
consciousness is - if this is so - a secondary feature of reality - it is not fundamental
whatever your view of the nature of consciousness - it is 'brought to' reality
if you like you can think of it as imposed upon - non-conscious reality
a secondary quality
you may wish to see it as specific to a class of existents
what I want to say is morality is consciousness' response to itself
morality - the realm of morality - if you like - is consciousness' response to its
indeterminacy
'what I should do' only arises because of indeterminacy (because of consciousness)
putting it crudely - consciousness brings choice to the world
morality - the theory - the practice - is the mind's response to this - to this fact of itself
it is as it were - the mind's attempt to resolve itself - or even to defy itself - deny - you
could say - (depending on which side of the bed you up wake on)
what we know though is that the point of this indeterminacy (from consciousness'
point of view) is resolution
I suspect consciousness understands itself as an indeterminate state in a determinate
world - the natural instinct here is to resolve into the determinate totality
this though - is never possible -
hence we have an unresolvable tension - between consciousness and the world
it is this that is the dynamic of conscious life
11/08/05
moral thinking
the focus of moral thinking is the indeterminacy of human behaviour
you could say 'action' here - but I want to speak specifically about that class of action
that is interpersonal - between people - in relation to others - this is what I mean here
by behaviour
also action - is something of a stripped down version - of a more complex picture
behaviour here - not only entails action - but it presupposes thought - and also
patterns of action which we would term - unconscious - or just habitual - in short -
the thought and act of individuals - and I would say socially understood patterns of
action and thought -
I'm looking for a broad understanding here -
how to act in relation to the other?
what line of thought to take - what series of moves?
the thing is we need a way of focusing these issues - otherwise - the questions yield no
definitive answers - or - we give up looking at variables - and just make the
decision to 'act for this reason and in this way' -
this kind of pragmatic resolution is either - ignorant - or highly sophisticated -
but in either case it is not people's first choice of understanding
what we do is ask the question - 'what is the right thing to do?' - or some such variant -
the point of such a question is to resolve the issue of procedure - to create a focus -
that can accommodate all variables
look - if it was just a simple case of understanding cause and effect - no question
what we need to understand in such matters is the total picture
now strictly speaking this can never happen
however contingency - actually demands it
'I don't know what to do here - what am I going to do?'
this translates to - what is the right thing to do?
the question - presupposes - the end of indeterminacy - and this is the secret
it proposes an alternative to the reality of indeterminacy
now - religious people have explained this by positing an alternative reality
we don't need to do this
we just need to know this about ourselves as functioning conscious entities - we are
set up to demand - require definition
in interpersonal relations - such is the function of moral thinking
the fact that no definition holds is reality's eternal assertion -
in your face - so to speak
hey - keeps us on our toes
p.s.
therefore no great surprise that the language of morality is not naturalistic - in the
sense of physical science - how could it be? - the whole point - of it is to defy - to
super-impose on the natural state of affairs
and if what I suggest is so - there is no question of deducing an 'ought' from an 'is'
this is not the game - not what it's about
rather - it has more to do with establishing a model - a framework in which to define
the 'is'
an 'imposture' if you wish
one that goes beyond the simple - observation of the external (science)
one that puts internal realities into the mix
and demands resolution - definitiveness
no simple matter - but one that has all the force of necessity
11/08/05
Santayana
scepticism and animal faith
there is no first principle of criticism
some thoughts -
Santayana clearly takes the view that the function of philosophy is critical
that is what is left of facts - the facts of empirical science once you strip away the
presuppositions - the uncritical assumptions - and he sees Kantian Transcendalists as
those who have used sceptical methods to foist unskeptical presuppositions on to or
under the facts
if we begin as he says - we can only do so - 'in the middle' - there are no first
principles to begin with or from - for they are logically of the same status as any other
sticks of metaphysical furniture - what can we do - where to go - what is the task?
it's a good question - and yes he is right here we do only begin where we begin ('begin
the begine'?) - yes
well we describe what we see - where we are - we describe - map out the territory -
and yes - inevitably - we paint a picture
as to other pictures - i.e. - the old masters - of empiricism and transcendental idealism
what can we do?
what do we do?
yes question - investigate - look for what you might call first principles - check for
consistency
but just pictures in a gallery actual and possible
a possible infinity of first principles - if that is how you want to go
the sceptic points to the arbitrariness of any description
sees between the frames - to the wall - the blank on which it all hangs -
to the unknown
to what purpose?
I think the purpose is the result of such an inquiry
it shows the freedom of interpretation beyond the obvious
which we must describe - to begin with
(so we define the world - to begin the question of definition)
anyway
what this points to - leads to - is the unknown 'in medias res'
the scepticism I argue for here is not just methodological - Socratic
it is God forbid - substantial
and this the source of freedom -
the nature of consciousness
12/08/05
scepticism
scepticism is an understanding of relationship of subject and object
the subject is contained within the object
this is a given
how we explain it is another thing
it is a given -
because - to speak of a subject - the category
presupposes a definitiveness
the subject is 'a something'
what?
well at the very least we can place it within the object
we must - for it is the object - the world - that defines the subject
the subject is within
the question is - can the subject - define the world
its context
the domain beyond its boundaries
the answer is yes and no
the subject can describe what it 'sees' - what it knows -
this knowledge though - by definition is strictly limited
the subject can never transcend the object
(if it did so - it would by definition cease to be what it is - at the very least - 'within')
it is the subject's awareness - consciousness of its definition -
that leads it to the quest for definition of the totality
it is the assumption that - as the totality - the object defines (and this is to speak
metaphorically) - so it too can be defined
this is not so
for definition requires containment
to be defined - x must be within - that is its definition - or the ground of its definition
anything specific you say on top of this - what we normally call definition is prefaced
on this ontological fact
the world - is not - cannot be within
it is by its nature - not within - hence - its status as object
the world cannot be defined
the illusion that it can be - is an illusion - or a mistake of the subject - a wish - if you
like - that the object - is not an object - but in truth - a subject
God as you can see slots in well here
our knowledge - our descriptions - of the world itself - i.e. science - other
metaphysical descriptions - are but imaginative constructions
deep fantasies of the subject
subjectivizations of the object
in saying this though I am not devaluing such projections
it is clear
they are necessary for the human being
it is the nature of consciousness to project itself onto the world
to imprint the object with subjectivity - to thus identify it - know it if you like
for what reason?
the reason is - the emptiness of the object
here again
the object - the totality is without definition
the primary function of consciousness is to give definition to that which is not defined
the relationship is perfect
the object defines the subject
the subject gives definition to the object
knowledge is just this
as it were - the rush of being to nothingness
the act is futile and necessary
it is without reason
it is just what happens -
and no different to any other happening in the world
you need to understand the world as mindless to see its purity
12/08/05
Santayana II
doubt and dogma
Santayana in this chapter takes the view that nature is in some sense the true reality
dogma he regards as accepted opinion - really a fantasy of explanation
'what kills spontaneous fictions... is the angry voice of some contrary fancy'
'Nature, silently making fools of us all our lives, never would bring us to our senses;
but the maddest assertions of the mind may do so, when they challenge one another'
scepticism is a suspicion of error about facts
because a sceptic's assertions may be well grounded - scepticism is a form of belief
dogma cannot be abandoned only revised
hence all scepticism rests on some dogmatic presupposition
intelligence is veridical
the need to believe something does not justify any particular belief
given all the above -
how does 'nature' as Santayana describes reality - or what is fundamental - speak to
human beings?
it's all well and good to say it is there - but how is it knowable on this view?
the impression I have is that Santayana takes the view - what we have in knowledge is
just dogma and it's conflict - the possibility - inevitability of a conflict of fantasies
over what - nature? - we may as well say - x - i.e. - whatever it is -
scepticism he says is a suspicion of error regarding facts - but what is the origin of this
suspicion - there seems at this stage no reason to think it has anything to do with truth
- isn't it just different dogmas clashing?
you may presume a truth at the bottom of all this - but so far no particular reason to
do so
what is a fact on this view but a reigning dogma?
and the sceptic is just one who has an opinion that is not the same as the one he
challenges
Santayana says a sceptic's opinions may be well grounded - how could this be possible
- well grounded on what?
is not scepticism on this view just the conflict of difference - conflicting dogmas -
opinions?
we will need to wait for further elucidations of his thought before jumping to any
firm conclusions
so far I wonder if Santayana is just proposing a kind of Hobbesian reality of a war of
dogma against dogma - with a detached sovereign - who may be watching - but has no
impact on events
this is not a criticism
(it may be just the true picture)
but is it an argument really for anything?
we begin as it were with conflict - can it be resolved and does scepticism have a
positive role here?
and is a fact something different from dogma - if so how do we know it?
and he speaks of nature - as the touchstone but here again - can we understand it
outside of what he calls dogma?
I tend to think that outside of opinion what we have - the only objective description of
what is beyond description - is the unknown
now the question - what is this - an objective reality - or a subjective reality?
my answer is that at this point - we have gone beyond such categories
and the answer is - fair and square - without any tricks - unknown
we'll see
13/08/05
Santayana III
wayward scepticism
here Santayana is concerned to point out that a sceptical analysis of dogma or
accepted belief - can lead to a solipsism - that is effectively a dogma - a compensatory
dogma - and this he suggests misses the point of real or proper scepticism
i.e. -
'The postulates on which empirical science and inductive science are based - namely
that there has been a past, that it was such that it is now thought to be, that there will
be a future and that it must for some inconceivable reason, resemble the past and
obey the same laws - these are all gratuitous dogmas. The sceptic in his honest retreat
knows nothing of a future, and has no need of such an unwarrantable idea . He may
perhaps have images before him of scenes somehow not in the foreground, with a
sense of before and after running through the texture of them; and he may call this
background of his sentiency the past; but the relative obscurity and evanescence of
these phantoms will not prompt him to suppose that they have retreated to obscurity
from the light of day. They will be to him what he experiences them as being,
denizens of the twilight'
and
'The solipsist thus becomes an incredulous spectator of his own romance, thinks his
own adventures fictions, and accepts a solipsism of the present moment'
he goes on
'Scepticism is not concerned to abolish ideas; it can relish the variety and order of a
pictured world, or any number of them in succession, without any of the qualms and
exclusions proper to dogmatism. Its case is simply not to credit these ideas, not
to posit any of these fancied worlds, nor this ghostly mind imagined as viewing them'
and on ideas -
'Ideas become beliefs when by precipitating tendencies to action they persuade me
they are signs of things; and these things are not those ideas hypostatized, but are
believed to be compacted of many parts, and full of ambushed powers, entirely absent
from the ideas. The belief is imposed on me surreptitiously by a latent mechanical
reaction of my body on the object producing the idea; it is by no means implied by any
qualities obvious in that idea. Such a latent reaction, being mechanical, can hardly be
avoided, but it may be discounted in reflection........'
and back to solipsism - Santayana says -
'The difficulties I find in maintaining it come from the social and laborious character
of human life'
and latter -
'But identity....implies two moments, two instances, or two intuitions, between which
it obtains. Similarly, a "present moment" suggests other moments, and an adventitious
limitation either in duration or in scope; but the solipsist and his world (which are
not distinguishable) have by hypothesis no environment whatsoever, and nothing
limits them save the fact that there is nothing more.'
I think Santayana is right here - solipsism is really a result of a quest for certainty -
and one that is not logically sustainable - the self is only a self relative to non-self and
if we were to drop the idea of non-self - it would be no solution for the solipsist - for
the result would be - on paper - as it were - that the self has disappeared into the
totality - it actually no longer exists - the totality is self - and this makes no sense for
the whole point of self is its definition - its distinction - and there is no distinction in
everything
so this kind of a quest for certainty - really results in denial of the subject - and leads
to an ontology - a world view where no thing per se exists - let alone a peculiar thing
like the self -
and we ask what is the point of such a quest - even if we don't end up in the paradox
of solipsism - why certainty?
where does the idea come from - what is its use?
my gut feeling is that it is a retreat from the world - a desire for an alternative reality
one that is unchanging - Plato knew this and was up front about it -
and who has not been thwarted by the vicissitudes of life - yes
nevertheless it is still a retreat - a denial
but I suppose a denial with hope - the hope for something better?
even so - whatever one comes up with as a better reality - is no more than a fancy
defeated in every moment
perhaps at the very least it is safer to acknowledge the uncertainty of life - of existing
at the best the idea is to see uncertainty as the very basis - the ground of possibility -
and hence the source of all human freedom and creativity
this is not a natural reaction - and not a common one - let alone an easy one - I think it
only comes from deep experience and /or deep thought -
it is a position you can arrive at via a healthy and positive critical approach to life - it
is a position that is hard to maintain - and requires courage in life and thought
the sceptic does not need to deny the existence of anything - let alone the world - the
question is how to regard beliefs - ideas - about the world?
what are they and what is the point of them?
are they not simply companions of action?
and the substance - the qualities - the ground - of the inner life -
a ground never sure - but ever bright
13/08/05
description
what is it to describe?
it is to identify
and to characterize
but what is this?
we can speak in general here and say it is to bring language to the world
putting it this way though suggests a distinction between language and the world
and there is some sense in this
language is not the kind of thing that is out there - like a physical feature - given in
nature
it comes with consciousness
its bearers are human beings
(nevertheless it can be said to be a feature of the world in as much as anything that
exists - is - and any distinction must be in house)
so language is a fact - a feature - a characteristic of a certain class of existents - us
and language - what is it?
a mark - a sign - that has meaning?
the mark - be it the syntax of writing - the 'syntax' of painting - 'the syntax'
of music - etc. -
is out there - it becomes a feature - a fact of the physical world
its significance - its meaning?
what do we say here?
is it a private matter - or like the physical marking - a public fact?
the meaning is public - it can't be otherwise
meaning is a fact of human beings in the world
it is publicly identifiable - it is the significance of the sign
the sign and its significance - are not two different things
a sign - in this sense
just is meaning in the world
people can have meaning in a private sense language is its publication
and let's cut to the chase here -
consciousness recognizes consciousness
there is no analogy going on here
it is direct recognition
conscious entities recognize conscious entities (as conscious entities)
and recognize their expression - language - recognize the fact of it - the meaning of it -
or at least that it has meaning
how does this happen?
I don't know
however I will try and suggest a picture which might give the idea some credence
beware though
it's quite a fantastic conception
imagine
consciousness has that all persuasiveness this materialist age gives to matter - or -
nature
think of bodies as we now think of minds - as separate somewhat alien parts of a
greater reality - in this case mind or consciousness
in such a scheme bodies simply divide up the all pervasive consciousness - get in the
way of the conscious unity
but as we think now of physical forces as transcending - overriding mental -
anomalies - think the opposite case
consciousness - as the totality that overrides the obstacles of physics
I am not a pan-psychist here - though it wouldn't matter really for my purposes of
illustration - or perhaps - frustration -
the thing is - such a conception - a metaphysics - if you dare - would - if we had a
science to go with it - account for the direct knowledge of one consciousness to
another
by the way - you wouldn't have to necessarily throw out physics here
just think in terms of different expressions of matter
your physical object - might be a crude - rather dull kind of physics as contrasted with
thought - far more refined - sublime even - manifestation or development
in fact personally - it doesn't bother me to drop physics altogether I can do it without a
second thought
and I don't think you must then resign yourself to the mumbo jumbo of its competitor
(not to suggest there isn't any mumbo jumbo in physics - they are both as bad as the
other - in this respect - but spiritualism lags in popularity because it can't deliver
toasters or garden utensils)
the thing is either
physics or spiritualism - is finally a description
I am jumping way ahead of myself here -
but I believe we can climb Wittgenstein's ladder - or for the matter of that - go down
Dante's - and then dispense with our journey - the journey of description
OK - on this I have still a way to go
I have here - jumped a few rungs
13/08/05
should III
when I think of what I should do - the 'should' here is a projection of a state of affairs
it is to outline a reality
it is to describe how things can be - will be - if certain actions are taken
it is to imagine an outcome
and indeed a heavily qualified - state of affairs
one that presumes - in short - the world will allow such an outcome -
and the reason for this projection?
in the straightest of terms it is to wish - to want such to come to fruition
the 'want' here - is a moral want
I wonder though if in fact it is in principle any different from any other want but for
the fact that it is more complex
I have in mind here - I want a cup of coffee - no great drama - few variables to control
I want a better world for everyone - simple idea you may say - yes - but you look into
it - the issues are very complex - the possibilities for action are many and varied - the
reasonings necessary to make a difference - to bring about the result or a result
(already issues are defined) - not straightforward - much to think upon much to
depend upon
and why does anyone want this or similar outcomes - frankly it doesn't matter
- the fact is they do
it's a battle of outcomes
and in the event of success - we say 'that's good' -
but - even in saying this - we know it is never finished - never fixed
what was desired at one time - may not be at another -
one's conception of a better life - a better world - however you want to put it - is
rarely stable
that we think in such a way - is not a matter of choice - is not an option -
it is just a fact of human beings
14/08/05
language
so
I said earlier consciousness is the bringing of language to the world
so what is this - that language is brought to?
is it some kind of blank the human mind writes on?
no -
we have no evidence for this - no experience of it
we may imagine a blank world pre-language - but - it's just that - fancy
so
what does this mean?
a description (language) - already there in some form - a fundamental language -
perhaps - we build on?
this does not stack up -
you either bring language to the world or you don't - I think
so
it's not already there and the world is not blank
if this is so -
have we asked the right question?
and the question was - an initial state question -
what is the original set up -
before it all gets going?
a nice metaphysical inquiry -
but the situation the actuality -
is not like this
we describe the world as we live in it
there is no beginning or end to this
it's a kind of spontaneous creation - reality
it's always been here
consciousness and the world -
a perfect fit -
what else could we say -
consciousness brings language to the world
and all we know is the world described by consciousness
beyond this - the unknown -
and I think here Santayana is on the right track - we only - always start - in the middle
- in the midst of it all
origins and endings
are not what we know
what we know is what is here
and what is here is the mind describing this world
and the world described
logicians like to undress the world -
strip it back to bare necessities
can be useful - and indeed a fun thing to do
but - where do you stop?
how do you identify the fundamental?
it's not necessarily at the end of the inquiry -
as the inquiry can go on as long as you wish -
it's not as if it's got a name tag -
'philosopher's stone'
and instructions
'stop here'
the idea of a fundamental - is all we are talking of here
it's the idea that needs to be looked at
what's the reason for such a pursuit - endeavour -
look - I think it's just the perception of causation gone mad
or more charitably
we need to organize ourselves - to establish a focus -
some principle of unity
and some people seek out the source of things -
but if so - that's the only point of it -
dealing with an issue of practice - of proceeding -
so description?
we describe what is there -
what is there is identifiable - therefore some recognition is in place
take for example my black wooden bookcase
black - wooden - bookcase -
appearance - substance - function
you might say - three fundamentals of description
I didn't come into the world equipped with these notions
I had to learn colour - substance - use
but this is about establishing veridical perception
for all practical purposes - 'black wooden bookcase' - does the job -
it's a natural description
and even if I go astray and get seduced by quantum physics - or cubist art - or L.S.D -
the point is - 'black wooden bookcase' holds its ground
is there a more fundamental description?
no -
15/08/05
Janus
we speak of the relationship between consciousness and the world or if you like the
mental and the physical
on a fundamental level you can say the result - the outcome of this relation - the
formation - is language
in language we have a mirror to the mind
a mirror to the world
a mirror that looks both ways
the Janus mirror
language is the point of contact of the mind and the world
it is if you like the 'third reality' -
and when you reach this platform - the categories of subject and object might be
regarded as superseded -
(I have some doubt here - but acknowledge the point - there is much wisdom in non-
reductionist philosophy - the thing is perhaps just to observe)
language is (the focus)
consciousness / (in) the world (no reduction)
where to from here?
is there anywhere to go?
is there any reason to?
language is the world without doubt
just as it is
in all its dynamic vitality
15/08/05
epoche
the suspension of belief -
what role does belief play in action?
is there any necessity here?
are there some acts that you must perform with attendant beliefs for the act to be
performed?
is belief - a mere optional extra - perhaps a luxury?
I just wonder - how different anything would be if we lived in a world without belief
no beliefs
what would be different?
perhaps a more manageable question might be
what acts are belief dependent?
what acts could not would not be performed without a certain set of beliefs?
can we distinguish act and belief as I appear to be suggesting?
is there an act that has not belief?
(in the human scale of things)
perhaps belief is just another dimension of act?
when we are talking about the acts of human beings
and how are we to characterize acts in this sense?
clearly we observe acts - the acts of others -
our own acts?
yes - but this is not so straightforward - for here one is the author as well as the
observer -
we can say - can't we that a belief can be a cause of act
but the act may well have been caused without that belief
and perhaps without a belief at all
so
belief - a sufficient but not necessary condition for - act?
what would constitute a necessary condition for action?
existence - perhaps - but not belief
belief - I suggest is an inherently suspendable commodity
is it necessary to have some belief to act?
here you would need to have a view on what counts as belief
as i.e. - distinct from idea - parallel mental event
a belief is generally a well formed thought - not a stray
and I know this is not the most detailed analysis -
but even - at this level with this definition - it's clear I think
not every mental event that accompanies action is a belief
a belief in short is an interpretation of the world or a part thereof
one may have some belief going in - with whatever one does - (if one reflects on the
matter) -
but perhaps - logically speaking - this is just a matter of habit or coincidence
I suspect most of what human beings do (logically speaking) is - suspension of belief
to act definitively - on the basis of a belief - is perhaps the exception rather than the
rule
and indeed the same act I suggest could have been performed - without belief - or -
with any number of other beliefs
it's a wardrobe issue
16/08/05
Santayana IV
doubts about self-consciousness
'It might seem for a moment as if this pressing actuality of experience implies a
relation between subject and object, so that an indescribable being called the ego or
self was given with and involved in any actual event. The analysis, however is merely
grammatical, and if pressed issues in mythical notions'
'this pressing actuality of experience'
- or the simple fact of it - can imply a relation between subject and object - can imply
this is just to say a subject /object distinction - can be used to account for experience
as an explanation of it - if such is called for
and yes - you can characterize 'subject' further - and this maybe just poetic - but that's
not important
but the whole business is to step out from the experience - and give it a logical
characterization - hence - subject and object - the experience is seen as the product
of the relation between the knower and the object of the knowing
some description - of experience - per se is demanded - by what?
this is where the subject /object distinction suggests itself - quite naturally
and it is clearly not the object - the world that demands - requires - asks for
description of itself
we come to the idea of subject - not just because - it is quite naturally suggested - but -
it is needed to account for the question of experience
we see - experience - the world
what is this - what does this experiencing of the object?
surely it makes sense to speak of something - the world itself (as object) - does not
issue forth experience -
(short of consciousness the world is unknown - that is its final status
the world is known - knows itself - however imperfectly - given - only given
consciousness)
experience is a possibility - an actuality - only given a subject -
so to come to this idea - the subject / object distinction
how does this occur?
it's the stepping out here that's crucial
I think - such a process is to begin with nothing - the unknown - in this case
experience - is without definition - explanation
(this is an intellectual choice - to do this - to regard x in such a way
does it matter how we make this move - what it is - how to describe it?
not particularly I think - there's any number of ways to do this - to describe what's
going on here - the fact of it - is what is important
I think it's consciousness reaching for understanding whatever this means)
the thing is we can do this - suspend judgement - ontological and epistemological and
look for answers - for questions - create pictures
pictures - that give a sense of fundamental co-ordinates
16/08/05
Santayana IV (ii)
'Analysis can never find in the object what, by hypothesis, is not there; and the object
by definition, is all that is found'.
first point - Santayana while he is attempting to debunk the notion of subject as a
grammatical fantasy - still speaks of what 'analysis can never find'
what is this analysis - might it just so happen to be what a subject does - (and is aware
of doing)?
I grant you from God's point of view - here thinking of God as some mega subject
apart from the world - all else - including the consciousness of people would be
regarded as object - objective
and indeed you don't have to be God - to understand this - or think this way -
we can adopt such a stance - choose to regard - everything from the outside to see the
world as surface
the point here is - if you choose such a perspective - begin with it - of course 'the
object by definition, is all that is found'
you may be able to isolate certain brain process and say that's it - that's what happens
in the brain when someone experiences the colour red - that read-out - that picture -
'is the experience of the experience'
good -
we could accept such - but who is going to go 'wow'
an artist's creation on canvas might be more interesting - or a poet's portrayal in verse
and the thing is how would you ever know that the brain picture was a picture of the
experience?
all this assumes that what is observed of the surface of things corresponds to the
inside - that the inside and the outside are two aspects of the one thing
a fair enough assumption I guess
but as the angel said to Mary - 'assumption is all we have'
16/08/05
Santayana IV(iii)
Santayana regards the subject / object distinction - a fiction of grammar
still he has no qualms arguing against solipsism - a subject - only view of reality
I think - just as ridiculous and dangerous - a purely objective argument
true the world is one - 'objective' if you wish
but within this object (the world) is consciousness
consciousness is not just another fact of the world
it is a quality - a dimension
the internal dimension of the object
the relation here - internal / external is not universal -
not all things have an internal dimension - some do -
and this you can call objective if you wish
but the thing is we need not look at this only in an objective manner
consciousness gives us choice - the choice of an inside view
and it should not be forgotten - an surface view
(without consciousness there is no view - whatsoever)
in fact the two run together
it is only analysis that divides
but apart from all this
we need to see a purely objective view - one that denies the reality of the subject - as
false and dangerous
in the wrong hands - such a view has been the first premise - (the logical) cause of
much human suffering
it is also the argument of science
dispassionate - observation of the world - with no regard for the subject - only for its
category - class
OK
but you need to watch it
science should always be subjected to the human test of morality
let's not forget what we are
who we are
16/08/05
Santayana IV (iv)
Santayana goes on:
'But there is a biological truth, discovered much latter, under this alleged analytic
necessity: the truth that animal experience is a product of two factors, antecedent
to the experience and not parts of it, namely organ and stimulus, body and
environment, person and situation. These two natural conditions normally come
together, like flint and steel, before the spark of experience will fly.'
Santayana is here arguing for a non-subjective account of experience
science uncovers the relation - physical - objective - which is subjectivity (if
understood properly)
this in short is a physicalist analysis - explanation of the appearance that is
consciousness
an 'experience' we mistakenly believe to be subjective
OK - first off - 'the truth that animal experience is a product of two factors....'
this is an account of behaviour - based on - observation and theory regarding the place
- the significance of such observation -
we are not presented with this truth
it is made - and within the edifice of science - the science of the day
in general this is what science does - account for - explain - the object - objective
reality
and why does this ever occur - what is the reason?
you see - what is - presented - what is the object - is not as is - known
most of what we are presented with - in the world - we can place - already within
some scheme of understanding - hence at the most basic - almost intuitive level - we
know what we are dealing with
but if you were to strip away all this background knowledge - the observer would
come upon something - yes - but it would be simply unknown
in this sense - the object of knowledge is - the unknown -
perhaps one of the first ways we learn to identify what is before us - is in making the
distinction between subject and object - a fundamental ontological distinction - which
is validated by the world - and necessary for our understanding
the next point I want to make - more to the point of the above quote - is that
Santayana's idea of these two 'natural conditions' accounting for consciousness
is at best a hypothesis based on the assumption - the metaphysical assumption of
materialism
on that assumption - of course it makes sense
but what can it explain?
a relation between two physical dimensions - i.e. - stimulus and organ - body and
environment - yes
that there is a relation - yes - under certain conditions - results - behaviour - as a result
of the interaction - is observed -
so far so good
and the further hypothesis that - that what?
that such behaviour is - consciousness -
is an expression - of it
and it is here another physical state - i.e. - brain process - perhaps
from an objective point of view - all this is fine
but the thing is that all this - all the above is premised on the existence of a subject -
or if you like an observer
and perhaps it is too much to expect that an observer can explain his observing - as
distinct from what is observed
still this is where we are at - it's what we are talking about
what you have here is a simple mistake
it is confusing the observed - with the observer
it is assuming we can deal with the act of observing in the same way as any other
physical event - that is to be observed - i.e. - that it is out there
well it's clearly not - so though you may make some lovely co-relations that appear to
be in the vicinity - i.e. - organ stimulus - body - environment - they do not - cannot
address the issue of consciousness
simply because consciousness - is not out there to be observed -
this is just to say - on this kind of matter - the best science can come up with is an
analogy
and while I understand philosophical thinking can turn you inside out - you may in
search of truth become something you did not expect -
it suggests a severe lack of character at least - to actually argue that what your
experience is observable - and then - to pretend to hold to - such a blatant lie
who would you like to convince?
17/08/05
Santayana IV (v)
'Experience has no conditions for a critic of knowledge who proceeds
transcendentally, that is from the vantage of point of experience itself.'
to argue this is of course ridiculous - experience is conditional - just as that which is
experienced is conditional - and that which does the experiencing is conditional
I think the point is rather that we begin with experience - and to know it - understand
it - we at least place it in some kind of ideational context
'To urge, therefore, that a self or ego is presupposed in experience or even must have
created experience by absolute fiat, is curiously to fail in critical thinking, and to
renounce the transcendental method.........this backsliding of transcendentalism...might
have no serious consequences, if transcendentalism were clearly recognized to be
simply a romantic episode in reflection, a sort of poetic madness and no necessary
step in the life of reason.....'
indeed a self or an ego - such terms are poetic - the inner dimension of experience
by definition is not susceptible to objective - scientific account - the categories which
come with such analyses - are not applicable - and so we need different categories - a
different language to describe such experience - and so - art - aesthetics is the
language - the 'science' of the inner experience
consciousness stands dead centre (another poetic image) - it can look out - it can look
in - there is no one language - there is the outer language and the inner language
this is not to say anything extraordinary
but it does point to the origin - the reason for art
and once this is appreciated - the lopsided view of the objectivists (that there is only
objective reality) is seen for what it is - the product of stunted if not deformed growth
- and very sad
'But the delusion seems troublesome to the serious critic of knowledge when it
perhaps inclines him to imagine that, in asserting that experience is a product, and has
two terms, he is describing the inner nature of experience and not merely its external
conditions, as natural history reports them. He may then be tempted to assign a
metaphysical status and logical necessity to a merely material fact.'
It is not necessary to go off the edge here - it need not follow because one recognizes
an inner experience one is committed to a metaphysical status and logical necessity
the inner experience - is contingent
this is what confuses the objectivists - they think - yes because - it is in a state of flux
it must - like the outside world be subject to - objective analysis
the thing is - though not outside - yes it has some characteristics of what is observable
how do you define a box?
is it - the external conditions - let us say it's wooden structure - that defines it or is it
'the space inside'?
you see it all depends where - where - you are
you can't have one without the other
but you can mistake one for the other
it's a question - here of metaphysical geography
'Instead of the body, which is the true "subject" in experience, he may think he finds
an absolute ego, and instead of the natural environment of the body, which is the true
"object", he may think he finds an illimitable reality; and to make things singular, he
may proceed to declare that these two are one: but this is a myth'
yes - we can forget about the absolute ego
and the body as subject - OK - so long as you understand - the body - is not one
dimensional - yes it is observable - but it is also known from the inside -
the 'body' if you wish to use that term - and why not - is philosophically speaking -
two dimensional
scientifically speaking - only one dimensional
(and here - if anyone needed to know is the difference between philosophy and
science
science - is the useful with one task
philosophy - understands and surveys - looks at possible responses to any one issue)
the natural environment - the true object?
the body - here - too is part of the natural environment
a human being is both subject and object
to speak of what this unity - amounts to
is indeed to get metaphysical
it is to go beyond - the realities of subjectivity and objectivity
you must go beyond these categories - if you are to explain them
and really this is where mysticism enters the story
and mysticism is I think just - poetry - thinking above its station
but nevertheless quite harmless in itself
it answers some need
my own response at this level - is to say beyond the subject and object - we have no
knowledge
you can reify - or romance this into 'the unknown'
as some mystics have
17/08/05
Santayana IV (vi)
'Anything given in intuition is, by definition, an appearance and nothing but an
appearance. Of course if I am a thorough sceptic, I may discredit the existence of
anything else, so that the appearance will stand in my philosophy as the only reality.
But then I must not enlarge nor interpret nor hypostatise it: I must keep it as the mere
picture it is, and revert to solipsism of the present moment.'
the thing is there is scepticism and there is scepticism
there is the sceptical method employed by all critical philosophers
and there is the sceptical stance - a much more radical view of it all
the idea that we should suspend belief - per se
and this is not to say that such a sceptic cannot act - or act with beliefs - it is rather to
make the point that any final commitment - epistemological or ontological is not to be
countenanced
it is a position of no final commitment
now it may be objected - is not such a view itself - a final commitment?
and therefore self-contradictory -
leaving the windows open is not the same as shutting them
your choice here
is a choice of action regarding windows
the equivalence is at the level of choice
not at the level of action -
and
the extraordinary thing is just this -
the view is the same
17/08/05
Santayana IV (vii)
'One thing is the feeling that something is happening, an intuition which finds what it
finds and cannot be made to find anything else'
the idea here is that in such an intuition - the view is from the inside - (if there is a
view) - i.e. - it sees what it sees
look we can understand this -
but it's not a terminal position -
we are not just captives of our intuitions
consciousness is not exhausted by it's experience
far from it - beyond this basic level of conscious behaviour - is the higher - or at least -
post-immediate level of - reflection
so what we experience may be one thing
how we regard this - what kind of place we give it in our understanding - quite another
and this is the key to understanding scepticism -
the capacity to step back and look
and to step back again -
your back is never against the wall
now when Santayana says - 'it finds what it finds'
this is on the money
what it finds in a pure sense - is just so - undefined - unknown
we of course always bring to experience all our knowledge
but what we find is - for our purposes - dependent on what we know
and so - is only as stable - clear or sure - as our state of knowing
scepticism is - the conscious process of reflection - without restraint
what consciousness finds - depends on - when it looks
17/08/05
Santayana IV (viii)
'One thing is the feeling that something is happening, an intuition which finds what it
finds and cannot be made to find anything else. Another thing is the belief that what is
found is a report or description of events that have happened already, in such a
manner that the earlier phases of the flux I am aware of existed first, before the later
phases and without them; whereas in my intuition now the earlier phases are merely
the first part of the given whole, exist only together with the later phases, and are
earlier only in a perspective, not in a flux of successive events.'
we may have an intuition that something is happening and an intuition that something
has happened
Santayana's point is that - this - or these intuitions - do not tell us - the nature of
substance - or - the reality of change - of time
one's sense of things - is no guide to the actuality of things or events
'actual change if it is to be known at all, must be known by belief and not by intuition'
belief - here - based on observation - of the objective reality
OK
let us accept that to know objective reality - one must look out - not in
observation presents a different picture to reflection
the same object known differently -
as a thing outside of consciousness
as an image - in consciousness -
different ways of seeing -
Santayana really sees transcendentalists as prisoners of transcendentalism I mean once
in - how to get out - or does he just like imprisoning them - to show they can't get out
?
anyway he says 'doubt is always possible regarding the existence of actual change'
but his own work shows one can doubt - in fact one must doubt one's intuitions -
certainly if one wishes to operate on the street
the thing is we can think beyond what we see out there - what we know inside - we
can as it were step outside of the subject and the object
('and where are we' you ask? - 'the unknown' I say)
we can always step back
this is the essential feature of consciousness
it is not bound
my point is doubt is never out of the question
doubt is without condition
p.s.
I said above 'as an image - in consciousness'
the thing is 'image' here is but a description of what?
I think it's an example of an attempt to identify an unknown with a name
and the name - is really a metaphor - a metaphor for object
I think it's a translation of an observed entity - to a reflected entity
or the attempt to give the reflection - an object like meaning
and if you say well this is all a bit 'how's ya mother'
I would say yes - it is
and it's the way of it -
to understand the language of the inner life you need to appreciate poetry
it's the language of poetry - metaphor
and yes - in this sense it is all very - non-objective
language is public
but we need to bring it home
welcome it inside
at the close of day
18/08/05
Santayana IV (ix)
Santayana in doubts about self-consciousness
Santayana sees self-consciousness as 'animal experience' - 'the product of two
factors...body and environment....These two natural conditions normally come
together like flint and steel, before the spark of experience will fly'
he then argues against transcendentalism - the view that 'the spark itself is my point of
departure'
he goes on
'But the delusion becomes troublesome to the serious critic of knowledge when it
perhaps inclines him to imagine that, in asserting that experience is a product and has
two terms, he is describing the inner nature of experience, and not merely its external
conditions as natural history reports them'
just another point here -
external - objective conditions - relations between body and environment will - have -
existed - with or without a conscious observer
now you might also want to call knowledge an objective feature of the world
but knowledge requires a knower -
and between the knower and the known
is a relation
knowledge is only known - because of a knower
a knower is - only because - knowledge is known
the relationship is reflexive
hence - consciousness
and to understand this you do not have to posit a transcendental ego
(no great drama if you do though)
19/08/05
where we begin
we begin
with what is
this may appear (on reflection) to be something or everything but it is to say nothing
we start that is in the unknown (as an unknown)
knowledge
is what happens at the beginning
we know because we see
and we see that we see
hence we know that we know
anything beyond this basis is construction - description - analysis -
this basis has no foundation -
and doubt of this basis
has no foundation
there is no foundation
you find yourself somewhere and you go from there
19/08/05
the beginning
I said before 'we begin with what is'
we need to be clear here -
there is no knowledge - before knowledge
knowledge - or some basic platform of it and for it - is the beginning
so the statement 'we begin with what is'
is fair enough but not strictly accurate
it comes - it is made or can be made - only after the fact - on reflection
it is to say we can only make such a statement - post awareness
and such a statement is existential
which is to say - pretty crudely - awareness - consciousness - precedes any existential
statement
you might ask here - are you saying awareness - precedes existence?
it's a question of what you can know
the knowing - as it were sheds light on existence
we can then reflect - a double tracking - a reflexing - to a view that existence precedes
consciousness
but it is only in the moment of consciousness that existence - can be stated
consciousness - is we discover (again on reflection) - always - of -
and this 'of' - is existence -
self-consciousness is essential here for it gives place to consciousness per se
so I am - conscious of (existence) - and I am aware of the bound nature of this
consciousness - what is beyond is (relative to consciousness - my consciousness) -
boundless
and this is to say - 'I may well exist' - but my knowing this - is premised on - and
entails - greater existence - of which I am apart of - and a light to
if you were to try to explain to someone - what all this means - this knowing -
and the fact that existence is both a function of knowing - and then - it's
ground - that there is no contradiction here - that it has to be this way -
you would be best to set them the task of building a house from the inside
the action of building - is what makes the house - once made - you can step outside
and see it for what it is - and you can see that the action of building is not the house -
but what revealed the house - and the house stands as a testament to the act of
building
19/08/05
describing
what we are aware of in an initial sense - we learn soon can be - must be variously
described
the language - N - we develop - only has content - in terms of a meta language
the language we use to define it - let us call it N1
N1 is the meta language - and it too requires definition - hence a meta-meta
language - N2
in principle - there is no end to this
a language is defined - has meaning - only in terms of - a meta language
so you might say - it is an infinite explosion of language - a vortex of languages
and what is it all based on - where is the meaning?
the thing is - it is based on nothing -
but consciousness reflecting - and reflecting on its reflections - any one of these
reflections can issue forth a complete ontology
a complete statement of what is - and how it is - even how it is known
we begin with language and reflect upon it
your choice of language - is not like - will I have another cup of coffee or not?
you come into a ready made world -
wherever you are
i.e. - in a primitive aboriginal tribe -
or middle class Australia
you have something to work with
there was always something to work with
your decisions about what you believe
and how you think
are questions of ontology - definition - meta language
and it's not as if you are sucked into an infinite regress or digress -
we make decisions - about when and where to stop - and what to stop with
these decisions are not fanciful - or for that matter intellectual - they came as hard
won imperatives of action - of the market place
they have dirt in them
they are made in necessity - the necessity of contingency
(and these decisions can have reasons - reasons as complex as any metaphysical
system if you want to track 'em down)
logicians - abstract and quarantine
we humans work - operate as scavengers in a tip
natural language is no one consistent - clear ontology
if you want that - you could look to mathematics
natural language is a mongrel - a hybrid
consistency is generally not the issue -
need - is more to point - and need - usually in an immediate sense
you have to go to an event - you are in a hurry - you need to dress and you don't have
time to think - you grab this article of clothing - that article - in short throw yourself
together - of course it's not perfect and you have second thoughts as you walk out the
door - but the main thing is you are on your way
24/08/05
J. L. Austin
Austin -
thoughts around 'A plea for excuses'
excuses?
a reason given when asked for - called for - demanded by the context
is there any definitive description of any action?
and if so what is the logic of this?
language may appear from some perspective to be its standard - but this is to objectify
it - to make it so
it is to separate it out as an object of study
we could ask - why does this happen?
in short it happens because language is no fixed set of meanings
what I mean when I say - X is a - you may question - and argue for different
understanding of - X
meaning here is a focus -
strictly speaking - meaning - is an empty form - language moves through
it is circumstance that halts the flow
stops - on the journey
so here meaning is an ideal - language approximates - reaches for -
language is the worker
meaning is unreachable in any necessary sense
this is not a failure
this is the reality
the strength
this view of language is a consequence of objectifying language - and further
objectifying meaning
we don't need to regard this as anything other than what it is - reflection on
phenomena
certain questions can lead to this kind of inquiry
this is not ordinary language
this is reflection on - analysis of - issues that ordinary language has no interest in
what we are dealing with is extraordinary language
it is that dimension of thought and language that is particular to an extraordinary
discourse
what I am suggesting is both a meta and normative analysis here
ordinary language is just what it is
if you start questioning meaning and this leads to the objectification of language - and
to the concept of meaning - what I say you are doing is looking for a meta language
for ordinary language
and normatively - what I mean is - the concept of meaning is an ideal - empty of
content -
here we can go in a number of ways: -
- we can say there is no meaning as such
- everything is meaningful (no meaninglessness)
- the issue has nothing to do with (the actual) meaning of language usage
so the questions of the nature of language and meaning
are not to do with what goes on - what happens
it's about placing language in a theoretical context
it's about creating a background picture - a backdrop - for the play of language
philosophical theatre?
the great value of an ordinary language view - at least this is the idea - is the beauty of
- the clarity of - action and reaction in empty space -
24/08/05
theory of language
it must be understood any theory of language
comes from within
it is language within language about language
what is this?
how can it be that - a theory of language is about language?
to be blunt
it's makes no sense to suggest language can define itself
language - is space
you can use regions to identify regions
you can create a perspective to look at a particular domain - and this domain you have
to first define - separate out -
one way of looking at it is to say we operate with many languages -
what is the relationship between these languages?
is there an hierarchical relationship from natural to abstract - different levels -
different languages?
or perhaps
simply language -
different regions different populations?
or indeed
language - forever being made (remade)
with no overriding logic
but that which we imagine from the inside
language as - indefinable -
but this needs to be looked at
reflection never leaves language
never looks at - from the outside
it posits the object - (in this case) language -
from the inside -
imagines if you like - looking from the outside -
this is - though - strictly speaking - pretending the impossible
except for this -
we do it
we must understand it as a fact of consciousness
consciousness - quite simply creates - objectivity - within itself
this is all objectivity is
- the fact of reflection
realities follow
and yes - you say - on what do you base this on?
reflection?
indeed
beyond reflection?
outside reflection -
nothing to be known
end of discourse
go back
you begin at the beginning at the absence of - the suspension of - thought
the world begins
with the next thought
always we are between the world and its absence
thought is our continuous creation
25/08/08
philosophical theories
yes
how to view philosophical theories - their status
their relationship to the theories that become their subjects
there is the idea beginning with Plato - that such theories - that philosophy is the
queen of the sciences
i.e. - more fundamental theory - or level of theory
putting aside - for the moment - the question of the logic of this - what it means for
one theory to gobble up another -
we can begin by asking e.g. - Plato's theory of forms - why should we - why do we
regard such a conception as more fundamental - than say biology - or zoology?
what I have in mind in general here - is the status of philosophical theory
is philosophical language - just another peculiar language or set of languages -
outgrowths of ordinary language?
so what are philosophers doing when they elucidate a concept?
clearly - it's a sharp focus - and the revelation of 'space' - in an area of discourse that
presents as 'closed'
but the doing of this is just another form of reflecting
I want to suggest here the philosopher is just another worker in the vineyard - he is not
the wine maker
(there is no wine maker?
perhaps this has implications for theology?
no God - rather creation a work in progress - never began - always beginning
and the idea that all facets of reality are involved in its realization
at whatever time and place
no central point of origin
everything is the origin
but to understand this you would have to give up the idea of nothing or non-existence
- well you can't have everything - or is it quite the opposite?)
25/08/05
perspectives
problems surface -
in whatever area -
we bring perspectives to these issues
these perspectives - have a history of use and application
they fulfill certain needs
in general the logic I think is this
think of reality - as an undefined objectivity
consciousness sees it this way
and in the process of knowing
within this primary - if you like - objectivity
secondary objectivities are created
new foci if you like
such would be when i.e. - someone asks a scientific-causal question - and in doing
creates a perspective - i.e. - a class of entities is separated out (in his perspective) and
regarded as the focus of thought - the object of the perspective
such is an object of thought - and within these secondary objects - questions - further
questions can be - are raised
new objects are created
an object here is just a matter of logic - it is logical focus - the separating out -
conceptually of x - from it's context its domain
the question of ontology
the status of the object - is both a before and after issue
sure we begin with ontologies - but reflection and the need for further objectification
suspends the issue
25/08/05
philosophical investigation
philosophical investigation is but another form of objectification
anything created requires a number of skills a range of artisans
philosophy can be useful in what role?
perhaps this
if you are concerned to have an idea or a concept explicated
the philosopher will be of use
and also - how does such a concept fit in the great puzzle?
philosophers are (needed?) of use here
not to say that a physicist or historian couldn't step up to the plate
so what is the distinction in the philosophical perspective?
philosophy is essentially a conceptual study
the philosopher is of most interest when he / she provides conceptual options
different ways of understanding - something - anything - the world -
the detailed working out of one perspective is a good thing to do - but such is a closed
system approach
generally based on the idea that there is but one true view of reality
look - let's not get too upset here - it can be a fun activity and perhaps you need to
think you are on the right track to engage in such
but understanding different uses of concepts - different ways of seeing - is the
philosopher's expertise and gift
I am not convinced though that it is a peculiar gift - the best science does just this -
and too - in the world of art
what is distinctive regarding the philosopher's perspective?
the kind of analysis?
the fact that it is conceptual?
finally - about ways of understanding knowledge -
OK
but if so
what is its knowledge?
is there such a thing?
yes
again - e.g. - Plato's theory of Forms - is a theory of knowledge - that is nevertheless a
claim of and to knowledge
the point is though
such concepts - such perspectives
are really logically no different to the concepts and perspectives of any inquiry
just - different ways and contexts of thinking
perhaps it is just that philosophy is an esoteric game
the object of the game - a unitary theory of understanding
this of course - is never achieved -
the players knows this at the start -
but the playing - on this premise - can be very productive -
very creative
25/08/05
personal identity
personal identity
is the fact of self-consciousness
we can say 'I am here'
and 'here' - the space of me - me in space
is a given
a given - overwritten by time
so space provides us with a sense of place
and we are always 'in place'
time
is the denial of place
a denial we do not sense
one though - we know on reflection
(we are always on reflection - 'out of time')
hence
at the centre of consciousness
the paradox
I am / I am not
any description I make of myself will entail this paradox
it is the paradox of space and time
space is negated by time
'here' - is gone in the moment of it's acknowledgment - from the point of view of time
we are left with the illusion of space (place)
time negated by space
my sense of place overrides the passing of time - place is eternal - hence time the
illusion
consciousness - awareness
transcends this paradox
my awareness of myself
my sense of self
is an ideal posit
of consciousness
a function if you like that - stands apart from its reflections and analyses - in this case
- a meta reflection and analysis - of space and time
27/08/05
personal identity II
let's get straight to it
the self is best seen as a construct of consciousness
it is - if you like - necessary - for the basic function of consciousness
it is a parameter
that on the one hand defines the world - 'not-self'
also - it posits place - in the space of consciousness
the self is a place
a place of focus
- of and for consciousness
the self - is a necessary point
can't we imagine consciousness without this posit -
it would be by definition - undefined
(it would not know itself - or the world - there could be no relation between the two
it would simply be another feature of the world - of the landscape)
I can't see in what sense it would be observable
the idea seems nonsensical
and is thus
an argument by default to the view that - all consciousness - must be self-conscious -
if so then
the positing of self - is but the fact of consciousness
anyway
the self as I am presenting it - is - a logical space
the characteristic of its content I will suggest is - fluidity
we are talking here of conceptions -
conceptions - descriptions - of who I am
this is finally a very particular matter
particular - though - within certain contingent - universal states of being
here is where the whole weight of science bears down
I cannot be anything - have concepts - descriptions that are not of my nature
my nature - though not fixed - in any sense - is defined by given regularities -
regularities that may not persist - in any necessary sense - but have a contingent
stability
so this if you like - the second level of self
the next level - I call personal
conceptions of myself that have sense only given the history of myself -
they may have logical characteristics similar to others - (must have) - but are
particular to my existence in space / time - as unique events
but even at this level - there is no fixity
the characteristic - yet again is fluidity
27/08/05
personal identity III
now just a word on Socrates and the ideal of 'know thyself' -
yes - the point is clear - so long as you understand that such a quest does not find gold
the fact of an individual entails multiplicity -
multiplicity of selves
or to be more precise - conceptions of self
it is not hard to understand why movement in space / time - from birth to death covers
a lot of ground -
there is no stopping
and with this a myriad of experience
definition is a constant constraint
but never fool proof
what I am - how I conceive - one day - is not what I am another
the attempt to deny the multiplicity is perfectly natural
but never successful
and if this fact is not appreciated
can lead to insanity
just as the absence of definition - or the throwing away of constraint - or more likely -
the actual inability to make constraint - definition - has the same result
so -
go with the flow
some will say
yes
the point is though that such a conception - of the self - while it might appear to
accord with the meta reality - of fluidity - is but one of an infinite number of possible
conceptions of the self - normative conceptions - which are subject to the flux of
consciousness - the flux of reality
my point is - in general -
Socrates was a methodological sceptic - and primarily - his scepticism was negative -
he offered no positive position
I am here suggesting an alternative to this
scepticism as primarily a substantive position - that is a positive position
in this connection my argument is we don't know the self - in any definitive sense
we can speak of conceptions of the self - attempts - if you like to give - the self -
content - but this is all that is possible
the self if you like is the place of conception
the self - in itself - a logical space -
content is what we give it
(tertiary conceptions of self)
not what it gives us
finally the self is in an absolute sense free (of content)
it comes as an emptiness (an empty category) to the world
and so remains
despite all the thrashing about
rest in this emptiness
29/08/05
personal identity IV
the way to regard oneself conceptually and in practice - is as a logical space
a place for possible ontologies
epistemology - is a matter of decision - within an ontological context
in the 'initial state' - there is no knowledge
existence precedes knowing
we begin in a world already furnished - but not known ('touched')
knowledge begins with movement
(it is only ever this
action - its expression in the world
knowing made public)
there is no reason beyond all reasons
reason is necessity before its action
be still
30/08/05
radical scepticism
the idea of what is -
we begin with what we observe
that which is object - to our subject
it is clear isn't it that subjectivity is thus a reflection - back from or out of the objective
this reflection reveals mind - consciousness - the internal
(and could you say - reveals mind as self-conscious?)
this revelation is in a sense - the objectivity of consciousness - of subjectivity
consciousness is not observable
(is it any less objective?)
anyway -
it is clear that the objective is but one dimension of the understanding -
of what is
and beyond this?
the unknown
what is - as undefined
so objective / subjective ways of approaching the unknown
this is not arbitrary - at this level - categories have a hard significance to them
we begin - and we do well to begin with these notions
what becomes of such understandings is an open question
it's a matter of hitting the boards - so to speak
and so
mind and matter - posits of the understanding
and the understanding in itself - a logical space -
a pure emptiness
no ontology - no epistemology
a place with no permanent residents
some long term renters
and the odd transient
30/08/05
clear vision
there is no pure position to reach - to operate from
there is only 'here' - this never changes - you can't get out of it
we manufacture - create - conceptions
to organize from - to think from - to assist in clear vision
(a position we never or always achieve - it's just a matter of convention)
we have things to do and we need ways to do them - lines of direction
there is no choice here - it is necessary
every action is a thought or thinking made public
we cannot understand action outside of thought
and we create conceptual schemes for our activity be they tribal myths or the cutting
edge theories of modern science - or for that matter any other scheme - on any other
day
and philosophy is just this - conceiving
it is conceptual activity and it springs from - the haunting of - and the gut feeling of -
scepticism - of not-knowing
if we were certain we would have no reason to think - or for the matter of that -
anything to think about
we can go two ways here
defy this intuition or run with it
the history of western philosophy has really been - the attempt at the former -
and a joyous celebration of madness it is too
31/08/05
know thyself
the self is an ideal category - a necessary construction
it is the ground of identity
on which is based - conceptions - which are not necessary - purely contingent
the concept of self - the pure transcendental concept - is thus - not of any self - per se
(but of all selves) -
in this sense we can regard the self as an objective reality - certainly psychology takes
this view
my conceptions of myself - can only be understood - in terms of my experience and
history - I can make this known to others - but it is not their experience
and these contingent conceptions - will not deliver definitive knowledge - of the self -
only of the experience of the self
the self - here mentioned is - on this view without content - and in that sense not
known
or rather we know 'that' - but not 'what'
and I take it from this that the concept of the self is - the ground of possibility -
possible experience - possible knowledge
and so it seems the way to regard oneself finally is not as the end of actuality - but as
the ground of possibility -
beyond this the self is a pure emptiness
p.s.
the self a necessary construction?
I think it's like this -
we can speak of - as it were begin with - non-reflective consciousness - simply
'looking out'
on reflection - the self is determined - found in consciousness
and with this - the understanding of its necessity - it was always there - it could not be
otherwise
so there is no actual construction - more like an initial revelation
we speak of - perhaps think of the self as an object
really it is consciousness aware of itself - the fact of itself
in the world and inside the world
31/08/05
Santayana V
'But the belief in change, as I found just now, asserts that before this intuition of
change arose the first term of that change had occurred separately. This no intuition
can prove.'
the argument here is that - the fact precedes the intuition of it - but the intuition of it -
is the knowledge of it - and the intuition can only know what it is of - not what it was
of - therefore there can be no knowledge of change
or experience can only know what is before it - so how can you have an experience of
change - based on the intuition (of experience)
so - experience is no basis for belief here - if there is to be a belief in change -
intuition - or experience - (as Santayana understands it here) - will not provide that
basis -
yes
what we have here is an argument against the view that experience provides us with
knowledge of the world - in particular - here of the world as change - or change in the
world -
the idea of experience here is both weak and strong
strong in that it suggests that one's intuition - immediate experience - gives us
knowledge - this idea of immediate experience is powerful - it packs a lot into it
- everything in fact
it's a weak notion of experience in that it is so primitive - it suggests experience is just
data - points hitting the screen
my own view is that we need to step back from such naive empiricism
and understand - at the start - that what we call experience and its relation to the
question of knowledge is not like waiting for the pizza guy to deliver the pizza
this seems to be the traditional empiricist view
but we need to understand here - the question of the nature - and epistemological
status of experience - to begin with - is an open question
I think the empiricist view is helpful as a start to the argument - what is experience -
what is knowledge?
now it's only when you ask this question - that you have doubts about the pizza
problems of time and space - existence and non-existence - only emerge on reflection
my sense of time - of change
is not the same deal as any reflection on that sense
and here - really - it's not time or change that's at issue - the question for Santayana is
knowledge
and we might say - well - if you are going to go with a naive empiricism - there are
consequences - it is a theory that doesn't account for our lived experience
at least this
02/09/05
knowledge and existence
any theory of knowledge - presupposes a theory of existence - at least for knowledge
could we begin an epistemological inquiry without assuming the existence of
knowledge - and characterizing it - in some way - i.e. - as experience - as reason?
and the same applies with any ontological inquiry - to begin the question of the nature
of existence - one must assume a theory of knowledge - i.e. - we must assume that we
know and know in a certain way to say anything about what may or may not exist
so what does this tell us?
we can approach epistemological and ontological issues - but never without
presupposition
it is just a question of perspective - you can begin with either perspective - emphasis -
but you do not begin from a neutral ground
rather you begin - in the issues
and what you do then is explicate - expand the perception
it is working in logical space - giving it form and content
it may even be just recovering presuppositions - again giving them explication -
bringing them to the fore - re-evaluating and stating their logical status
it's possible too that in such an inquiry - quite different understandings emerge
perhaps too
what this tells us is that knowledge and existence - are - two aspects of a single
- unified reality
that our understanding - is of two dimensions
knowing and existence
one thing I think this points to is that we cannot conflate knowledge and existence
in the way that the solipsist argues - or the nihilist
that one can be reduced exclusively to the other
and the reason being just that any theory of knowing - presupposes existence
any theory of existence - presupposes knowledge
either discussion - epistemological or ontological - cannot begin in the absence of the
other - this is to also argue against reduction -
does it make sense to understand knowledge and existence as separate poles - or end
points of being?
I have used this image before - but it is like building a house from the inside
the thing is the foundations (ontology) cannot be decided independently of the aspect
(epistemology) and the aspect is not decided without reference to the foundations
but this is no ordinary construction - for it is never finally determined - changes to the
aspect - entail changing the make up of the foundation
and the building goes on - from the inside - there are constant additions and
subtractions
what once was a cottage becomes a village - a village a city - and then the city
stripped back to a village (of different design) perhaps back to a single room - and
possibly this is dismantled - to just foundations - an open aspect - or indeed the
foundations themselves are removed
and then just as an aspect (solipsism) - but one that has no definition no place -
perhaps this leads to rebuilding - a search for foundations - and idea about aspect
perhaps there are no foundations - and so a structure that is not permanently located
with ever changing aspect
and the point of all this - reason - who's building the house and why?
the thing is - there is no answer outside of what is going on - if there are any reasons
(and in fact there are many - and many changing reasons) they can only be found
inside - inside the structure as it is built and destroyed and built again -
if you hope for a reason - from the outside - take stock of yourself - there is no reason
outside - reason is a property of the inside - of logical space -
03/09/05
experience
the problem with experience
are we to think of experience as an objective reality?
yes - we certainly refer to it as so
and are we to think of it as subjective?
of course
it's my experience
and are we to speak of it as knowledge?
what do you know if not what you experience?
on the other hand - is not experience always in a state of flux?
how can we call such the basis for knowledge?
so
experience - subjective and objective - knowledge - and at the same time just what we
cannot regard as knowledge -
so the problem with experience is that it is everything and comes to nothing
a quick idea here -
the problem here comes with thinking of experience as either substance - or process
and prime facie it seems to be both
the thing is it can't be - in any meaningful sense -
and yet if one - there must be a place for - the other
so perhaps
we should - drop these ways of thinking
that is - to not view experience as substance or process
alright
what then?
I want to float the idea of seeing experience as a relation
that is to say it is a relation - a relation between
and between?
between subject - and object
that is consciousness and the world -
experience - is - if you will - 'the middle term'
that which is - exists - is brought into being
if such a relation holds - exists
OK -
so what then do we say about this -
this middle term?
how do we characterize it?
to cut right to it
I say the middle term is undefined
undefined - that is beyond - the characterizations we bring to it -
clearly - that which results from the relation (experience) can be regarded in a number
of ways
I do speak - and think of it - in substantive objective terms
and again - in subjective - substantive
also - in terms of objective process and subjective process
as a foundation for knowledge
as the absence of foundation
so - I wish to suggest there is a way we can maintain our common intuitions regarding
experience
if we know - understand - that none of these characterizations is a characterization of
experience - per se - as such
rather they are ways of defining - giving definition to an essentially open relationship
between consciousness and the world
our needs are connected but diverse - we require different conceptual schemes -
languages - to deal with the fundamental state - of being - that is - consciousness in
the world
it is this relationship that is the ground of need and its possibilities
experience is this relationship
04/09/05
Epicurus
as I understand it - Epicurus argued for the moral life and the search for truth but did
not regard such pursuits as holding any value in themselves
now this view can be seen - and Epicurus I imagine saw it this way - as an argument
for pragmatism - practical philosophy - in particular - ethics
it could also be seen as an argument regarding self reference
self referential statements
a perennial problem of metaphysics
and - anti-metaphysics
and I think the central problem of rationality
Karl Popper - used it ruthlessly against everyone but himself
Wittgenstein used it ruthlessly - against himself
anyway
let's say meta statements
statements about the status of other statements -
can only be regarded as having the status they predicate - of other statements
if they are covered by - their own meta statements -
a higher order statement - that states their status
and we go into an infinite regress
if - we want to keep determining the status of our status statements
of course we don't do this
we stop - pretty much where we started
well mathematicians don't -
and as a result - to keep from going mad they think of themselves as artists
anyway
what is the problem with infinite regress?
only that it suggests that the argument we start with about the status of a statement -
(whatever that statement is)
finally does not have the status - we thought we were ascribing to it
and so - you might ask - what then can be said?
this though is only one view of infinite regress
perhaps the infinite regress - is not - a strange result - that leads us astray - but rather -
a clearer picture of just how it is
and the original quest for the logical - rational status of the statements in question - is
in fact the flaw in the glass
at this point I think we can go back to Epicurus - and see the point of it -
as incurably practical
needing to get a hold on how to proceed - to act
it's fishing - with a net
and do we need a net for the net?
05/09/05
consciousness is indeterminate
consciousness is indeterminate by its nature - hence the question of choice at the level
of action - the veridical level -
when faced with nature - and its determinism consciousness creates its own reality -
an ideal realm - which accommodates indeterminism - choice
this realm is not extra-natural - i.e. spiritual - it is rather - a concept of indeterminism
that transcends within the natural realm
so concepts like 'goodness' and 'beauty' are not to be analyzed in scientific terms
they are - on this view - better understood as (natural) 'spaces' for possibility
concepts that allow for the indeterminacy of consciousness - they are expressions of
consciousness
consciousness brings these concepts to the non-conscious world - as a matter of
necessity
08/09/05
veridical experience
veridical experience
shows us particulars in universals -
the instability or the relativism of this leads to
a search for foundation - for stability
the mega Platonic Form
or
the final atom
the search for such is not I think based on some knowledge (perhaps in a Platonic
sense of recollection) of the existence of such a state
but rather it is a consequence of
'seeing what is not'
that is - regarding existence - as is - as pointing to something - other than itself
now you can regard this as being the source of all knowledge - or as a sign of the
essential (metaphysical) perversity of human consciousness
on the latter view - knowledge (of whatever kind) - is in fact the affirmation of the
negative
09/009/05
no commitment
to what extent is it possible to speak of - the world - to speak of things - without
ontological commitment?
it depends here what commitment comes to
one would think it is a belief system - underlying thought and action - and one - at the
least accepted - for all intents and purposes
so ontological commitment is thus - in any action - presumed
clearly though - we can see that the same set of events - could well be underpinned by
any number of belief systems
and be clear here - 'belief systems' is a description - that may not refer to anything at
all systematic - systematic belief is not the common way of things
any ontology - as in theory of what exists is clearly a reflection - if you like a
theoretical account of experience
how necessary it is to have such at all is debatable - could one live without a theory of
the nature of things? - I think so
still the question what does commitment come to?
I suspect - not much
it is more like the shadow of a body - than the body itself
my overall feeling is that people do what they do and explain it as they have to or
chose to - that there is no real commitment
in the main just operating with what is available
we don't know what exists beyond the shadows
Plato got that much right
10/09/05
Santayana VI
ultimate scepticism
'Scepticism may thus be carried to the point of denying change and memory, and the
reality of all facts. Such a sceptical dogma would certainly be false, because this
dogma would have to be entertained, and that event would be a fact and an existence:
and the sceptic in framing that dogma discourses, vacillates, and lives in the act of
contrasting one assertion with another - all of which is to exist with a vengeance. Yet
this false dogma that nothing exists is tenable intuitively and, while it prevails, is
irrefutable. There are certain motives (to be discussed later) which render ultimate
scepticism precious to a spiritual mind, as a sanctuary from grosser illusions. for the
wayward sceptic who regards it as no more truer than any other view, it also has some
utility; it accustoms him to discard the dogma which an introspective critic might be
tempted to think self evident, namely that he himself lives and thinks. That he does so
is true; but to establish that truth he must appeal to animal faith. If he is too proud for
that, and simply stares at the datum, the last thing he will see is himself.'
the datum here is a construction or at least the result of a reflection upon - what?
well the point is we cannot say until we reflect - to describe is to express a reflection
and by that I mean (and we can only say this in reflection) consciousness defining
perhaps even objectify in some sense
this is just what the mind does -
so - yes - if he just stares at (posits) the datum the last thing he will see is himself
but the very positing of it entails - the self - the positer - crude - I know - but I doubt
there is any precision to be found here
for we are at this stage - reflecting reflection - it is a meta activity of the mind
the act asserting the actor?
reason - it seems demands this procedure - somewhat backward in coming forward
so we begin somewhere - and build up a picture - a strange theoretical structure - to
live in
and animal faith - well - here I suspect Santayana is having a bet each way -
the idea of animal faith I would say is - like any conception - an ideal construction -
an idea - a reflection
but if he has in mind some pre-reflective state - well I am not convinced that there
actually is such - but even so - if we were to accept such an idea - we'd be speaking of
consciousness - that is not self-conscious - some would suggest this as a pure form of
consciousness - in any case we are not thus speaking of an epistemic state or condition
- so by definition - it would seem to be - not something we could know
and that I suppose would be a picture of ultimate scepticism
what this highlights though is that scepticism - is a theory of knowledge
so the idea that it cannot be asserted without contradiction falls away - once this is
understood
you might be thus disappointed and lament its diminishing
but it's really about placing scepticism correctly
any denial of knowledge (in a total sense) is itself defeated in its assertion
so let's leave it at that
and begin again - and start with the idea that a theory of doubt must -
to get off the ground begin in a context of assertion
and further understand that whatever its slant - it never leaves this context
scepticism - to have any significance at all must be - and is - positive
it asserts
this is the point of it - the reason of it - to assert doubt - the rationality of doubt
in fact the reality of doubt
it is about what we can know
and the conditions of that knowledge
to say we can know nothing
is not to make an epistemic claim at all
and further it is to misplace and confuse existence as the object of consciousness
when it is the presupposition of knowledge
any theory of knowledge presupposes existence
the final task for the epistemologist is to characterize - describe that which is
presupposed
this - if it can be achieved - is a consequence of the understanding of the internal and
external dimensions of existence - a synthesis if you like of the subject and object -
some characterization - a reflection that can accommodate both aspects in a unified
theory - that's the idea -
to say my theory of knowledge tells me nothing exists
is to mistake philosophy for bungee jumping
it's to think you are doing one thing - when you are doing another
it is a confusion
10/09/05
the problem of consciousness
the problem of consciousness - understanding it - is only a problem of conscious - self
-conscious beings
and why a problem at all?
only because - reflection - a conscious function reveals nothing -
nothing that is but the fact of reflection
so there is a sense in which the mind cannot know itself -
(and given that knowing is what the mind does this is puzzling if not maddening)
if by knowledge we mean what?
being able to step out of the process in some way
see it as an object
we can of course objectify here -
but it is of no help - for we only and simply remain within
knowledge is a relation between subject and object -
the difficulty here is that knowledge of the mind can only be the subject describing
itself - and in a very limited way
in terms of it's capacity to reflect
and this is just a logical function with no content to speak of - if knowledge - it is not
substantial
and the crux is - when we come to speak - to think of - to try to understand reflection
what is it?
the dilemma is - to answer this - any answer to this - can only be - a reflection
therefore no movement
we have no possible explication
where to from here?
forget the issue?
take the view that self-knowledge - self-consciousness - is only to be explicated
in terms of - what it does -
that is - its objective expression
what it produces
what it expresses
the thing in itself - for all intents and purposes - does not exist
certainly in terms of the above analysis - it cannot be known
beyond its - function
the function of reflection
which simply is what the mind is
nothing more
there is no internal to this
we can understand the mind as an internality
but we cannot go into this internality
we cannot go beyond - deeper into reflection
to find something else
and for this reason it is quite reasonable to give up the idea
10/09/05
knowing that
what is it to know 'that'?
to know that such is the case
I know that 2+2=4
I know that it is raining
I know that 'it is raining and it is not raining' is a contradiction
indicative -
existential -
statemental -
assertive -
what though does it point to?
it points to a fact
but not in the sense of empirical fact
(though empirical facts are here included)
rather to a fact per se
I would call it - a logical fact
in that what we make of any such fact in epistemological or ontological terms - i.e. -
empirical or ideal - is a secondary matter
whatever the character of any such fact is
to state 'that' - is to assert - what?
a logical space
(already filled but that is not the point)
it is to give place to what is being asserted
and the asserting is the giving - the making of place - and its recognition
its content - what is being asserted - is - a substantial issue -
so - 'to know that' in this logical sense
is to recognize the space of a fact
12/09/05
thought thinking thought
what is it to think about thinking?
on the face of it doesn't seem controversial
it is what happens isn't it?
and it's just what the mind is -
regardless of whatever ontological status we give it
it is - isn't it - in an essential sense - i.e. regardless of whatever else mind does -
thought thinking itself?
or is this just a little too obscure -
can thought be the subject of thought -
and if so -
what does this tell us about the nature of thought?
it suggests - doesn't it - that our favourite distinction between subject and object - at
this level - is not as clear cut - as it seems - when for example speaking of the mind
(as subject) regarding (that outside itself ) the world (as object)
if thought can be the object of thought
are we here - collapsing the subject / object distinction - altogether
or is it - hence - and thus - to be understood differently?
if thought can be subject and object
what does this mean?
thought distinguishes itself into subject and object -
if so - thought per se or mind (and I know this is anything but precise) is in itself
neither subject or object -
it is - in this sense - some kind of neutral -
(a blank unknown?)
that functions can function by positing these categories
yes -
in a sense
but isn't it just this that the mind does?
(i.e. it may be something beyond this - but so what - how relevant is that?)
in any case - the thing is - the positing of subject and object - is one thing - the point is
that the mind applies this to itself
it is - quite apart from the subject object issue - the question of what self reference is -
how it can be - what it tells us - can it be explicated?
I thought the subject / object distinction might help here
it is just another way of stating or referring to self reference
it is clear - I think - this is what the mind does
is this just the end of the matter - like it's the unanalyzable essential characteristic of
mind - ?
yes - it seems so
but I just can't be satisfied here
12/09/05
thought
what are we to say of thought?
what is a thought?
we might think at first sight - not much to this issue
a thought is a thought
yes
but it is only thinking - the determination of a thought - that enables us to form this
question
and what is such a determination?
a thought
so reflective thinking can only uncover itself
thinking is thinking
about thought
thought is all that is thought
when we reflect on this (think about it)
we are only thinking a schemata for thought -
thought in relation to other thoughts
it's as if the idea of the mind as an object - won't do - won't work -
the mind is always within the object
reaching - exploring - deciding -
it's the action in the object - within
it operates in the object
but only knows itself
what the mind does is knowing
and knowing (in this sense) always - knowing (noun) knowing (verb) knowing
(known and verb)
it's the knowing
the so called self-knowledge that is hard to get a hold on
we naturally think and speak in terms of subject / object
but it's clear that such a logic really doesn't cut through here
rather the real picture is
like light seeing light
where the (source - the object) is the vision (the subject)
so to go here
is to go to a pre-language state
it is to point to - a state prior to how we understand mind
language separates the source from the vision
this is to say the mind moves to this level
and can only know (express) itself in these terms - in this form
we can go back - look back - from this level - this platform (subject / object) but
beyond this is - non-differentiation
it is to say - the mind is knowing
that's it -
if we want to characterize it - further
the only option is contrast - that which is not mind
that which does not know
and such is - the body? - the world
or should I say the mind's conception of______
14/09/05
Davidson
mental events
isn't it rather that from a causal nomological point of view - mental events are finally
irrelevant?
Davidson uses the example of the sinking of the Bismarck - i.e.- the perpetrator's
decisions - plans - perceptions - judgments play a causal role in the act
it's a matter of point of view - in this sense
an alien creature watching the event - not knowing of human consciousness - may
well interpret - the event in terms of a series of physical (observable) events - i.e. - a
straightforward cause and effect analysis - in physical terms -
now a human observer of course sees the same thing - but would be likely to
hypothesize mental events - into - or behind the physical
from a strictly - objective - observational point of view - the straightforward physical
cause and effect view - works quite well - it doesn't require supplementation
and of this point of view - external - observational -
the postulation of mental events - is to propose - the unobservable - into the equation
and for this reason - because such is - unscientific - we (if we are scientists) do not do
it - and presumably feel no compunction to do so
mental events from this point of view - this stance - are not anomalies - rather
irrelevancies
(what is the problem with saying physical laws apply only to what is observable?
mental events - are not observable therefore they are not - recognized by physical law
it's not because they are necessarily a different kind of event - rather they do not come
up in a way - i.e. - objective - observable - that science can recognize)
hence we are talking of an objective observer - objective event
the bloke planing the sinking of Bismarck - picturing it - in all its detail - thinking it
out - is a man in thought
his status here is that of the subjective observer - and he is 'observing' subjective
events - a train of thought
on the actual day of the sinking - the bloke who does it - is we will say the complete
observer -
he sees his act from the inside - knows what he is doing and also observes its
objective dimension
will he say that his mental events caused the physical event(s)?
yes
why?
because he sees the act in terms of both dimensions - thus completely - he is not
restricted to either dimension - subjective or objective
his place is central
so causal?
clearly from the central standpoint - not physical-objective - for such analysis only
applies to the position of the objective observer
and causal - mental?
i.e. - in the subjective realm -
and what would we call this - causal?
perhaps - the sequence of thought?
however you wish to characterize it
again
from the point of view of the complete observer
it is more than just that
(though only this from the exclusive subjective position)
if you are accepting of this argument so far -
you would see that 'causation' here is an over wrought term - if not thoroughly abused
causation is not the correct way of accounting for the relation between thought and act
(hence - you could say - philosophy of mind - one wrong step and you have a field of
knowledge)
from the position of the complete observer -
what can we say?
only that - Mi expresses Pi
the expression of Mi is Pi
this complete observer I should mention is weighted to the subjective side of things
that is he will see the act in the first instance as an expression of the subject
(rather than - if weighted objectively - as an objective event - primarily - as it were of
God or nature)
and what might this tell us of mind and matter?
only I think that a complete view here will not be subjective or objective - rather a
neutral position
I want to say we can see both dimensions
and both dimensions as expressions of - or views from
another place - another space
such a position -
philosophers have made the mistake of thinking their characterizations of the
subjective and the objective can be applied to this level
are we to say this base position is physical - the world of matter - or rather mental -
the world of mind -
I don't think these characterizations apply to this ground position
I prefer to leave this place this position - uncharacterized -
it is as it were where mind meets matter - or matter meets mind -
Mi = Pi
= X
so yes - in a sense this comes to a mind-brain identity thesis
but here the physical and the mental - are regarded as expressions of a more
fundamental unity - one that cannot be characterized
14/09/05
Davidson II
consciousness is recognition of an event (RE) - self-consciousness - recognition of the
recognition of RE (RRE)
now we call this 'self'-consciousness -
but there is no self here
recognition of recognition
recognition of an event E
knowledge of the recognition
is the recognition of (RE) - Ei?
and the recognition of RE (RRE) - Eii?
one event of two?
clearly they are not independent events
REE follows RE in human beings?
could RE exist without RRE
no
so two aspects to recognition?
RE
and?
REE - is just as much part of RE (as RE)
is just as necessary?
it is isn't it the knowing - the fact of RE
RE can only exist if known?
yes
so
recognition here is
event - and recognition
recognition
is knowing that E
and knowing that E entails - includes -
knowing that RE
(RRE)
recognition is just this -
RRE
E cannot be recognized unless RE - is recognized
knowing here is just knowing that you know
recognition is knowing that you know
so
it makes no sense to just speak of consciousness per se
consciousness is - 'awareness of the awareness of ____'
so
can we just speak of awareness here?
such is awareness
(a light that uncovers the light in uncovering the world)
and really here we are just speaking of states of awareness
you can call this mind if you wish
but - awareness is not a thing
a 'series of awareness' is not a thing
if anything -
and I mean if anything
we are just talking here of events
and perhaps if confident -
'sequences'
we perceive the body as body - as an object
object here therefore is a function of perception
we don't perceive a mind (it is not out there)
we conceive perhaps - mental events
we witness mental events
and the 'we' here is what?
the witnessing is what?
the witness is just the event of recognition
just the event of a thought
recognition of the event is knowing - is all - all - the self is
and so?
there is a self in every mental event
a mind in every thought
14/09/05
consciousness as sui generis
consciousness as a self-creating entity?
we think in terms of cause and effect in trying to explain how things come to be
now I'm wondering if another conception might work better for understanding the fact
of consciousness
namely - a sui generis model -
the idea - the act of consciousness - brings consciousness into being
strange I know
a self-creating - what - entity - process - state?
and to explain - its - persistence and continuity - posit - a function
a function - a brain function - that is constantly triggered by?
interaction with the world -
15/09/05
Davidson III
Davidson again (barely)
knowledge is not experience
if you forget for a moment - western science - what would your experience be?
well this is to ask a theoretical question - a reflective - question - it is to seek
explanation -
outside of explanation - or in the absence of it - we can say quite - logically -
we don't know
physical events -
are public - observable objective
mental 'events' (if we can still really use this term) are not public or observable
there is a gulf here
the gulf is between the conscious and the non-conscious
now the thing is the conscious exists in the non-conscious
and I mean 'in' - inside
we could say here that consciousness only knows itself - as the solipsist does -
but this cannot be maintained - for consciousness - recognizes itself - and itself in the
non-conscious
without this recognition there is no consciousness
even so consciousness divides - this is no theoretical reflection - it is - a recognition of
ontology - its experience - into objective and subjective
objective - that which happens outside of consciousness
subjective that which happens in consciousness
the facility of consciousness to see its own categories and functions -
i.e. regard its subjective and objective dimensions
is to say - to speak of its capacity for endless reflection
consciousness in this sense - exists in a logical space of which the subjective and
objective are but possibilities
and as long as consciousness exists - real
consciousness recognizes physical events - as outside itself (as existing independently
of consciousness) and mental events as inside itself - as subjective events
(although I'm not sure about the term 'events' - serious young physicalists need events
- 'figments' too suggestive of a career on the stage - perhaps that's what happened to
Feyerabend - lost his bearings and found his boogie)
for consciousness (if I can be so bold as to speak on its behalf)
the 'mental' and 'physical' are theoretical descriptions of the inside and the outside
a mental event may precipitate a physical event
in that - the internal expresses itself externally -
the mental event expresses itself
the fact that its expression is a different form i.e. physical - is that it is expressed in
another domain
the external -
(external to consciousness)
and if you wish to get metaphysical
and ask - well what is real?
the inside or the outside?
the answer clearly is neither -
a dimension is just that -
it is not that - of which it is a dimension
so the totality -
(formerly known as 'substance' - formerly known as 'essence')
will not be exhausted by its dimensions - or any number of -
it can be defined in terms thereof -
but finally only in these terms -
we - recognize it - as a thing in itself - finally on purely logical grounds - i.e. - it has to
be
however there can be no complete description
in terms of a total description -
the best we can get is the view from the inside
it may be a room with a view but there is no door out
15/09/05
following on......
Pi - physical event
Mi - (mental event) - idea of Pi
?
Mi expresses Pi
Pi expression of Mi
Pi contained in Mi?
an outcome?
yes
Pi an expression of Mi -
in that Mi is translated to -
the outside of Mi
Pi the outside of Mi
and action here
the middle term
action - here - its status?
the action underlying - necessary to the expression of Mi to Pi?
expression = action
the expression is the action of transformation
changing - a mental event - to a physical event
is there a great mystery here?
is it not the organism functioning -
functioning - in the world?
a function anyway
fundamental though
15/09/05
mental and physical
objectification
subjectification
two events?
yes - Mi a thought that leads to Pi a physical event
and the argument Pi an expression of Mi
so two events
one subjective
one objective
i.e. the thought of reaching for a glass
the actual reaching
one an expression of the other
yes
two events
the thought the act
the connection -
brain activity?
both brain events
an explanation
yes
for a common ground
but different kinds of events still -
one an event of intention - whatever this comes to in brain states
the other an event of action - of movement
and both events - known
the knowing - where does this fit in?
I know I intend
I know I move my arm
both events covered by -
instances of knowing
a third event?
the intentional state is known in its occurrence
it could not be intentional - and not known
the act of movement known too - in occurrence?
yes I think so
the knowing accompanies both events
knowing as a brain state - yes
how though do we characterize it? (brain state of not)
it is an open state
a general condition of any conscious act -
it is not ontologically confined
it doesn't just happen under specific conditions
it is a general condition
this knowing
and further
it is by its nature revelatory
we know - we know
which is to just say we know
such is knowing
it is knowing in a particular sense
but its basis is universal and unbounded
we know
and know that we know
and we know that we know that we know
etc.
knowing as an open state
all inclusive
of the object
of the subject
knowing - cannot be exhausted
there is no boundary
so knowing - or consciousness if a brain state - is the brain state in which all specific
acts of knowing take place
the brain state idea - is really a metaphor for grounding events
giving of common ground to all disparate conscious (and by implication) non-
conscious events
in a way it's rather quaint
for we only know 'in consciousness'
we do not observe it
if a brain state we could never know it as such
we could only place it - alongside some picture of brain activity and argue a co-
relation
this kind of knowledge is hypothesized
and frankly arbitrary - it can be no other way -
for we can't step out of consciousness to see it
it is the seeing
a world outside of this is by definition - unknown -
unknowable -
what we know is what we are conscious of
in this sense we can only be conscious of_________
we are not conscious of what consciousness is
only that it is
and to suggest otherwise is rather absurd
17/09/05
positive uncertainty
empirical evidence for any hypothesis
is the only way to move with clarity
in practice it doesn't require any sophisticated logistics - or theoretical frameworks
to assert that something is so - or is not so
requires evidence
evidence here is no mystery
it is empirical - i.e. - a happening in the world -
objective - and physical -
either in the sense of raw observation
or clear report
intuition may be a basis for hypothesis - fine
it is not evidence
we may well question whether we have good evidence - enough evidence - for belief -
for action - this is healthy
and let us say we do not -
it is this straightforward - don't believe - don't move on such a belief - on such a basis
there is no certainty at any point in this analysis
only uncertainty
uncertainty - as the basis for a reason to proceed
uncertainty as a basis for a reason not to proceed
a positive uncertainty
a negative uncertainty
positive or negative - finally a matter of what does or does not exist
which is evidence or not for
assertion or not
17/09/05
Davidson IV
anomalous monism
Davidson is not a reductionist - he wants to give the mental a fair shake
and he recognizes
'The principle of causal interaction deals with events in extension and is therefore
blind to the mental-physical dichotomy.'
such is accurate - it makes clear what physicalism can accommodate - can deal with
mental events are not public and observable - and therefore not physical - they will not
be covered by physical law
this observation - would be partly accepted by mind-brain identity theorists
the argument being - so called mental events must be brain sensations and therefore
physical
such an argument is really just the assertion of physics over this issue - the underlying
reason being - we cannot allow in the physical world exceptions to physical theory -
even if we can't actually explain them - in principle there is an explanation
and he sees mental events as intentional
or as Russell referred here - propositional attitudes - such events are not public or
observable - I describe them as internal - as distinct from the physical-observable that
is external
the distinction here is ontological - different dimensions
and the point is - to be sharp - if you are going to be fair dinkim about the physical -
(public-observable) you have to be prepared to accept that physical theory applies only
in the external dimension - what happens outside of consciousness
and to the Davidson argument - there are no anomalies - out there - everything is
covered -
so the mental is not physical or physical-anomalous
we are talking here about two distinct ontological categories or realms
it won't do to try and foist the description of one onto the other - for it cannot apply
(and just by the way - this is what I think happens in the argument that the mental
causes the physical - or can - it's a misuse of an objective category - causation
'causation' as it is used in physical theory only applies to the objective
a physical event can be an expression - a manifestation - of a mental event
and this is not to think in terms of causation
it is rather to refer to the action of both dimensions
and the reality of transference from one to the other
it can and does go both ways
the possibility of this is purely contingent
and only finally dependent on the existence of consciousness
without consciousness
there is no mental -
no internal dimension
in fact a world without consciousness is dimensionless)
to describe the totality both realms exist in - are expressions of - is of course a
question
is there such a language?
I suspect not - I think what we know is the inside and the outside of -
of what? - of whatever it is
(we think - we speak from the inside out
to have such an all embracing language we would have to think and speak from the
outside in)
and so I would speak here of an unknown
18/0905
Davidson V
Davidson goes with Brentano in defining the mental as intentional - but clearly in the
full flowering of his argument it is the anomalous character of mental events - that
effectively defines them as mental - or a special case of physical
I think this is ill-conceived
it is their ontology that is characteristic - and by this I mean their categorical ontology
- which is that they belong to - are events of a non-objective - i.e. - non-public - non-
observational realm - the dimension of intentionality - if you like
mental events are in the world
the objective world is physical
the world from the point of view of consciousness - given the existence of
consciousness - is dimensional
we ask what is common to these dimensions?
in what sense are they 'one'?
or in what sense are they expressions of a unity
how to describe this unity?
I argue we can only come at the unity from the inside
that is - if there is a law to govern the physical and the mental - an objective -
or perhaps more precisely a meta-objective law
we cannot know it
and as to the mental - specifically
it is not physical - do not imagine physical laws here
if you do you are just committing a fundamental category mistake
are there laws to the mental life?
(given that by 'law' we generally mean the objective /observational / physical - we may
want to drop the term in this context)
but if we continue with this terminology - they can only be reflective laws -
laws - perhaps generalizations based on reflection
the conscious life human beings clearly operate - is defined within certain parameters
it is in some sense common ground
conceptual psychology - theories of human nature and behaviour - clearly have a place
here - myth has always been fundamental to the understanding of the inner life
and also we develop pictures profiles of the mental life of man in our creative artistic
expression
18/09/05
the mind-brain thesis
where do we get the idea of the mind-brain identity thesis?
I understand its irresistibility - but where does it come from?
what is the epistemological basis of this belief?
such an idea cannot be based on observation
it's not an empirical hypothesis
but it is a view that assumes that scientific theory applies here -
yes
but why -
only - I think - because it is assumed it must - if science is true
or to put the negative - because if there are entities that are not physical - science
misses the point -
or so it is thought
I don't think this is so - but one dimensional thinkers might just get the heebie- jeebies
here
so in a sense - what we have is science as metaphysics
I mean - the argument that the physicalist view is not just an empirical theory - but
must also be - a metaphysical theory -
anyway
apart from an emotional attachment to the brain (?) - to physics - and an even
stauncher belief that if x exists it must be explainable - and in physical terms -
what do we have?
do we have any reason to hold the mind-brain identity thesis -
to believe the mind is the brain?
no
the patriarch may include the prodigal son in his will - for the sake of 'family' unity -
it doesn't follow though that the prodigal is a member - in anything but name - at least
from the point of view of the patriarch - and perhaps even the prodigal
the mind - the brain
seems like it should be the right fit
certainly at this time in intellectual history
a comfortable fit -
frankly though - there seems no positive reason
to make the connection
perhaps the best approach at this juncture - the rational approach is to keep an open
mind - or is that an 'open brain'?
otherwise - bite the bullet and say - we don't know what the mind is
could be the new radicalism
19/09/05
internality
as I see it
consciousness is the internaility of being
how far you want to extend this idea is a question
is all existence to be understood in terms of this internal / external dimension?
do we say i.e. - that the inanimate has an inside - as well as surface?
and of the status of this inside -
conscious?
do we say all the things with an outside have an inside?
you would think so
but if consciousness is this inside - it means everything is conscious (in order to be
whole) or
not everything is - some things are one-dimensional?
OK so there are issues here - ontological issues -
for the sake of the argument - let us accept this internal / external account - and ask -
its implications for the mind-brain identity thesis -
on my view - consciousness is the inside dimension of a human being
the physical - the body - is the external
one could argue if you take the view that consciousness is physical - the internal /
external distinction - as a distinction of ontology - kinds of being - collapses -
(this assumes too that there is no sense to speaking of the physical as being
internal as well as external)
on the other hand - if you regard consciousness - the internality - as qualitatively
different to its exterior - then if consciousness is a brain process - it is the inside - of a
brain process - yes the inside
it is not physical
and not observable
not public
and you could well ask - why locate it - in the brain - does this dimension of a thing -
of an entity - have a specific location?
a specific location relative to externality?
surely it must be co-extensive?
19/09/05
internality and reflectivity
the problem of consciousness is to account for its internality and its reflectivity
consciousness is embedded in the physical world
at least in a class of physical entities
can we account for consciousness with a physicalist analysis?
it would seem not
consciousness it seems is not observable in a public objective sense
so how then to account for the apparent ontological unity of conscious entities?
is consciousness a special case of the physical?
if so we have to drop or modify the above definition of physical
do we want to include the non-observable - private - subjective within physicalist
ontology?
if so what does 'physical' come to?
physicalist analysis is a way to suggest materialism
but what is materialism - but not-spiritualism - as the idea of fundamental substance?
and what is difficult about regarding consciousness as material?
only that - it doesn't present - and present in a material way
and if material - still the question - perhaps now more acute - how to distinguish
conscious from non-conscious matter?
20/09/05
sceptical monism
the reason the issue of the relationship of mind to the physical world cannot be solved
is
our window to the world - the physical world
cannot itself be included in our picture of the world
so where does this leave us?
just where we started
just where we are
we can as it were describe our dilemma (if so regarded)
what then - is the question?
what status - ontological do we give consciousness?
I understand the idea of anomalous monism -
but what does it amount to really?
we say consciousness is physical but cannot be explained by physical law
but this is not satisfactory
it's really an ad hoc theory - the mind is rendered ad hoc
I think we need to say consciousness is within the physical conception - an unknown -
unknown - fair and square
it is also to recognize that physical theory operates fine - given consciousness - but
consciousness is not included in the picture - in the theory
the mind here - consciousness - is a presupposition - to physical theory - to our
knowledge of the world
it is I would suggest - ontologically - an undefined constant
so
we can't say what the mind is
we know though it is necessarily related to the (physical) world
awareness - what I call reflectivity - (I know that I know) is - if you like - the mind as
it appears
(bear this in mind - and the point that we cannot explain it in any final sense)
the question we can ask about the relationship between thought and act is
could the physical world - be (ontologically) related - connected to the non-physical?
on the face of it the answer is no
(short of a very interesting theory we would accept this)
on the other hand we cannot say that the mind - consciousness is physical
we cannot say that it is -
but at the same time because we cannot say what the mind is -
we cannot say - positively what it is not -
the unknown here - cuts both ways
what we have here is a sceptical monism
and back to awareness for a moment -
awareness may not be relevant in understanding the relationship between thought and
action
this is to say - to suggest i.e. - that awareness may accompany - be a parallel
dimension to the connection between thought and act -
this is just a speculation based on the possibilities of the sceptical monism thesis
26/09/05
Santayana VII
nothing given exists
Santayana begins here with the argument that scepticism is the doubting or denying of
the existence of any object
everything he says turns on the meaning of existence
and he says to say something exists is to designate such being as is in flux -
determined by external relations - and jostled by irrelevant events
further - it is only a name - a pointing out - as if by gesture - what the word designates
in habits of speech
the object itself is indefinable but may be described more particularly - by using other
indicatives and indefinable name
the whole realm of being might be described more fully in physics and psychology
OK
the sceptic doubts
why is this in general?
can we say experience presents substantially - but falls away to the insubstantial?
so - doubt from existential and epistemological disappointment -
this is not a prelude to an argument for angst - it strikes me as rather an argument
about realism
in general a sceptic is a realist
and what I am trying to get to here is that it is questionable to tie scepticism so closely
to existence
such an argument - to doubt existence - as I think Santayana is hinting at - is really the
result of an unfortunate reductio ad absurdum - i.e. - it can be said if you take the
sceptical view to its logical (or a logical) conclusion you can end up doubting
existence - Descartes is really responsible for these excesses
but if the sceptic is a realist is it existence that is doubted?
I don't think so -
scepticism - is really about our explanations of - what exists
a thorough going sceptic will take the view that any descriptions of any thing - should
be - held in doubt
that is to say at the level of explanation - one suspends judgement
the reality of living defeats such intellectual purity at every turn - nevertheless there is
place and reason for the reflection that leads to such a view
and such an outlook may well prove very useful in the twists and turns of living -
so it is not without practical import
now we may conclude as a consequence of such an outlook that - there is no definite
description of that which exists - and by implication say that existence is - in terms of
such - unknown
this though is a far cry from being a nihilist - (if one can actually exist!)
for what is being doubted is not existence or existents but comprehensive or final
description
Santayana goes on to argue against the idea that immediate experience is what we can
depend on - the data - of the senses
and I think he's right to question this view
but again I wonder about his argument - he seems to think that such a view (sense
data) is a view about what exists
and my point is the same - the sense data argument is an argument about explanation
that is the sense data theory is an explanation of 'experience' - it is not - experience
- it is a theoretical reduction of experience
he goes on to suggest that we should confine our use of the term 'existence' to the facts
and events of physical science - and see our experiences as just stepping stones to
such
OK
there is a lot of straight forward common sense here
if you want to know i.e. - about what caused what - no sense in turning to a magical
explanation
(different of course if you are a writer of magical fiction and you are writing a story)
the world view of physical science will give you the tools to sort it out
but if on the other hand you are wondering about what such a world view is founded
on
that is you are looking for an explanation of the explanation - do not be surprised if it
is not as straightforward or as precise as A caused B
so you may come to the view that for certain practical purposes it works to proceed
with scientific explanation - and you may i.e. - end up regarding the basic principles
of physics as being essentially arbitrary - and finally perhaps not that much different to
i.e. - 'the laws of magic' (if we can speak of such)
the facts are never in doubt - only our descriptions
26/09/05
Quine: speaking of objects
how about this -
to assert x exists is to acknowledge x
isn't it just this
what x is - what the acknowledgment amounts to
perhaps - how we describe x and its acknowledgment - is another matter
strictly speaking all bets are off - or can be
in section III of his essay Quine says:
'Now if objective reference is so inaccessible to observation, who is to say on
empirical grounds that belief in objects of one or another description is right or
wrong? How can there ever be empirical evidence against empirical statements?
.....Grant that a knowledge of the appropriate stimulatory conditions of a sentence
does not settle how to construe the sentence in terms of objects. Still it does tend to
settle what is to count as empirical for or against the truth of the sentence........by
arbitrary projection in the case of the heathen or as a matter of course in our own,
therefore what has already been counting as empirical evidence for or against the truth
of the sentence comes to count as empirical evidence for or against the existence of
objects.'
a big jump here - or are we just switching horses mid-race?
the truth of the sentence is the truth of what?
nothing has been resolved here
we can't be sure what the sentence refers to - or what its assertion signifies -
so its truth is really out of the question at this stage -
sameness of meaning (object-ontology or not) is assumed - isn't it - under certain
conditions - and of course without empirical evidence?
its assumption - rather necessary - for getting on with it
perhaps we are dealing here - in human communication with gross collective stupidity
- that works?
in general here I think Quine is confusing theoretical with non-theoretical categories
granted when I say 'there's a rabbit' - the term 'rabbit' is an object term
but what does this mean?
isn't it that on reflection we describe such terms as objective - and this is to classify -
theoretically - a particular term
pre such classification - such terms i.e. - 'rabbit' - are without classification - hence
non-theoretical
so really when Quine asks - is the native referring to (what we understand as) 'rabbit' -
he is asking - does the native have such a meta conceptual scheme?
it is not about the happening - of the appearance of the rabbit - or the utterance of the
native -
isn't it to point to the fact? - much here is assumed - even more unknown
nevertheless we manage - or at least move on
27/09/05
attributing attributes
as a noun - an attribute is a reification of a defining characteristic (a perceived
distinction) of a thing ('thing' here - 'a non-described entity') - and all in all rather
Platonic
is the fact that different objects (things) can be picked out by the same description
(attribute) a problem? the red coat - the red apple - are we in using 'red' here -
committed to 'redness' in some sense - or less dramatically to similarity - in this case a
similarity of colour? - (and 'colour' here a description of a visual field)
what is such a similarity but a fact of observation (a fact of the world - specifically a
relation between a certain organism and it's field of stimulus) - so do we really need to
think in terms of attributes or properties as in any sense distinct from their bearers -
isn't it really just a relation - not of sameness (I would argue there is no such thing) -
but again of likeness - a looser and indeed a coherent concept
do we need to define attribute - beyond this - as 'family resemblance' - to use a
Wittgensteinian concept?
metaphysically speaking things are connected
we perceive similarities and differences
essence - what makes x - x and -y - can be tracked down within limitations - we can
give increasingly approximate descriptions of x such that x is x and -y -
but all this will finally come down to making certain philosophical / methodological
decisions about how to regard x and its descriptions
all finally (in terms of essence) arbitrary but - nevertheless not without point or
significance
individuation therefore is finally a decision - and the journey to definition which is
never complete - prompted originally by veridical perception - another fact of the
world - and one that does not bear too much scrutiny
seriously though - if I state - 'this apple is red' - what I am doing is pointing and
expressing
because of the way the world is structured - in this case - a conscious observer in a
given situation - we call such an expression - a report of an observation
another observer will give assent to this statement if his observation confirms my
observation
the statement refers to the apple
now what the apple is - apart from the term 'apple' - attached if you will to it - is
another question - as is the status of the observation and the attachment
various possibilities present - what we are talking about here is explanation
we can therefore say that the statement and the terms of the statement - 'this apple is
red' - are at the time of the statement - prior to analysis - explanation - undefined
if so - it means - I can make such a statement - and you can assent to it - but what is
known here - is not stated - not explicated
03/10/05
justification
justification is a key to metaphysics
the concept implies some form of objectivity
that which justifies is outside of - apart from that subjected to justification
and there is also a sense of authority
this is the real kicker
for what can it mean?
in what does authority consist?
whatever it is - it is in some sense over and above whatever - its subject(s)
is (are)
really nothing more than a principle of organization backed with concept of fear?
in metaphysical terms what justifies - a statement - a theory - a system of belief?
what can it mean to appeal thus?
in science we might say - only success - of prediction - of heuristic power -
so - no justification in the sense of something outside
and no authority but practice
we need standards - these though are made in the building of theory like the basic
structure of a physical building
in theoretical efforts
justifications - are really only second thoughts - about what is going on -
the idea of an overall view - of a project
some holistic sense of how things are going
reflection on - and - reflection on reflection
this thinking has implications for epistemology
epistemology as the question of subjective and objective knowledge
we can say we begin with our thoughts and ideas - these are objects of the subjective
realm - the inside - dimension
the expression - manifestation - manifestation of these subjective realities - can take
objective form - physical attributes
and so - we have something like the origin and the end of action -
the knowing can be in both or either modes - subjective / objective
the fact itself - really transcends the categories
it is as it were without categorization - unless categorized
we bring these categories to bear - to explain events
they are but this
and we - but the kind of being that does this
determinism gives us our sense of freedom - and it is no less real for this -
these categories - modes of knowing - are tools for theoretical account - explanation
reflection on what happens
what happens without such imposture - of thought - is without character - that is - as it
is - in itself -
it is strictly speaking - unknown
we come into the picture and in so doing set its parameters
consciousness in the world is centre stage
but there is no centre
look into consciousness and all you will find is consciousness - and this is to say you
see the unknown
or perhaps precisely - what you see is the seeing
and it is in 'no place'
this non-existent centre - nevertheless gives parameters to the world - the inside - the
outside
a structure out of nothing -
and so consciousness - 'the undefined definer'
(the beggar as giver)
the unknown centre that gives the world its bearings
(and graciously surrenders itself - once things are up and running)
on reflection - the only gift - knowledge
09/10/05
meaning
the problem of language - of meaning
is the problem of the logic of discourse
'language' as such is best seen as the name of languages -
common language - ordinary language - is in general a logical nightmare
what you find in ordinary language is strands of various ontologies operating
apparently together and harmoniously
this before reflection
i.e. an individual's description of another - may involve i.e. - strands of a
behaviouristic analysis - and - physicalist views - and even with this phenomenalistic
strands - perhaps in the mix materialism and spiritualistic ontologies - even indeed a
good dose of scepticism -
conflict over description - conflict - that is with another's (set of) descriptions - is
primarily an issue of - which ontology - and hence - which onto-language is to be
adopted -
short of a decision - to be clear on which language or set of languages to adopt in the
circumstances - there will be dispute over meaning - perhaps even incomprehension -
on a bad night violence
the issue I suggest is never that of meaning -
rather which meanings are to be employed - and by implication - which ontology (ies)
- metaphysic(s) - are at issue
the point is not that people can't understand each other - rather - that to do so - they
need to be as we say 'on the same wave length'
hence - it seems that those who share the same - or should I say similar metaphysics
are more likely to hit the same or similar note -
or - they can - perhaps without as much work as those coming from divergent meta
positions
nevertheless - reaching - or understanding common ground - and being able to find
common language is never beyond possibility
however it is not just a matter of good will - you need to have an open metaphysics -
to accommodate closed positions
perhaps an understanding that there is no one language - no definite description -
that finally what we truly have in common is that we don't know - and don't know
each other
p.s
the truth about ordinary language is that it's a level of meaning is faint - i.e. what is
being said is to be defined - looked into - meaning here - by and large - is
indeterminate
and to some extent this is how it should be - it is not a failing - a fault -
we begin in obscurity - or non-clarity -
it is generally the emergence of conflict (ontological / metaphysical) at this level
which leads to clarification - particularity -
or just a great tolerance of life - in a strange few
11/10/05
internal reading
the mind is simply a reading of physics
an internal reading
('in house' if you like)
physics reading itself
(Aristotle defined 'God' as 'thought of thought')
so
thought here - is by definition - a dimension of physics
of nature
an internal reading
a reading from within an entity
(this idea applies to biology - and of course psychology)
the reading - the interpretation
is strategy for the entity involved
what it (i.e. - man) requires - for its being - its existence - its function
a kind of 'physics referring to itself'
there is no reason I think - to assume this is writ large
it is focus - or given a plurality of minds - foci
it is just function
consciousness is a logical (higher if you like) development of this functioning
physics reads itself (for the purpose of the entity)
here it is clear there can be no objectivity - in the sense of extra-physical reality
and hence - subjectivity has no sense either - as a consequence
there is just what happens
as to why - or the origin of it all?
these questions - are just like any other questions - a function - of the functioning
any theory - conception - metaphysics - is to be seen in this light
as to determining the nature of this functioning -
any characterization will be - an outcome of the function
and finally reducible to need
need to function
or just - functioning
p.s.
the mind as physics reading itself
this functioning of physics creates dimensions - mind / matter - if you like - subjective
/ objective
the point being - before - this function
we cannot conceive mind or the world
these dimensions do not exist -
what exists - whatever exists - is just not known -
therefore -
mind is a function that creates function
a self creating function
it creates knowledge
but this knowledge is a function of a more fundamental function
that exists - for no reason - outside of its functioning
we can - imagine - a world without such function - but we must discount any picture -
for any such picture - is just a function of the function - that is being imagined as not
to be -
this is to be involved in paradox
better to say - beyond knowing - is the unknown
12/10/05
knowledge and consciousness
our knowledge of a physical object is a function of consciousness - the structure of
consciousness
consciousness - the function of consciousness is a function of the physical world
what is knowledge - is that which is given
given in the relationship of consciousness to the physical world
which is the physical world - functioning
so knowledge - in this sense - is an inner fact of the physical world
it is a relation -
a relation of part (consciousness observes) to - whole? - or part -
part - I think - and part - always -
the whole world - is never actually an object - perhaps a concept -
rather an imagination - or a logical construct
so knowledge is a relation between physical objects -
and as such physical
however my use of 'physical' here is what?
'physical' is the characterization - but here it is really a name
a name of that which exists
the point being - here it makes no sense to speak of non-physical - there is nothing
else - it is just what it is
and therefore - in a true sense unknown
and unknown - because it cannot be defined
and defined in the sense of 'distinguished from' - there is nothing else
therefore it is finally 'with no name'
(and it is at this point the scientist can give the mystic a leg up)
p.s.
on this view to describe knowledge as a relation - rather than an object
is to say it is - a relation between objects
and this statement: 'knowledge is a relation between objects' - is a statement of
reflection - about knowledge - it is if you like a meta characterization
and we can say from this knowledge is a reflective relation
that is to say i.e. - it is not a causal relation - between objects
but the point finally is that knowledge is a fact of a certain physical relation
but we only know this - given knowledge
given the relationship
our knowledge - that is - is dependent - on knowledge
(even the absence of knowledge is dependent on the existence of such a relationship)
and the existence of such a relationship (knowledge) is a function of the relationship -
17/10/05
Santayana VIII
authorities for this conclusion -
what exists - exists - this is to say nothing
simply to recognize the fact of being
to describe - is something - a conscious - self-conscious entity does - for its purposes
(its purposes too may need describing at times - and there will be no definite
description here - only an ongoing argument)
so what we are talking about - when we are talking about what exists - is our
descriptions -
and our descriptions of what?
you see - this is the same question - on another level -
we can only answer this question with description
my point is - I think this question of existence is a question only of representation
I say finally - and firstly - we don't know - what it is we are describing - and this is just
the reason for the describing
and it is not as if the description is solid - that we can as it were - base ourselves on
this - and move forward
the description - is rather a devise - a tool (if you would like to be hardheaded) - for
the next move
and if the next move is successful (whatever this may be or come to mean - is always
up for grabs) - is the description true?
who knows -
we all of course like to think we have a hold on existence - contingency - the workings
of it - the understanding of it -
and we refer to our theories - our descriptions - our metaphysics and our science - as
proof -
'happy coincidence' is the best that I can say -
and for reasons of mental health at least - we need to believe
but finally belief is a ploy - in a logical sense - in a psychological and material sense -
a necessary fact
we are best to enjoy - if it happens that way
17/10/05
Santayana VIII (ii)
in a strict sceptical sense - or in the sense I am holding to -
what is - is - but it is without description pre-consciousness
what it may be - pre-consciousness - pre-knowledge - is not a question that can be
answered -
does the tree exist - if no one observes it - is the unobserved existent?
well for theoretical reasons - we say yes - theoretical cum practical -
and for other theoretical - higher level reasons - philosophic - we accept that
perception is not to be equated with existence
consciousness describes what exists
existence without description (consciousness) is I say - undefined
the question of existence is just - and only the question of description
without description there is nothing to be said
I just want to go a little deeper here
and say that our fundamental ontological and epistemological categories - fall into this
classification
the material world - the physical object
the mind - knowing
are descriptions -
meta descriptions -
fundamentally - physically - biologically - anthropologically - historically -
psychologically - entrenched
but finally descriptions
descriptions of the unknown
you might ask - well - hey could it be otherwise - and isn't the fact that it can't - show -
we are not just talking of description - but in fact - reality?
I don't know if human beings could conceivably - in practice - do away with concepts
of mind and matter
but I could imagine the possibility -
the organism - you might say (and this too - is of course a description) operates within
certain parameters
it (whatever it is ) - defines - this we know - we do it
let us say there are base definitions - that fit - the organism - and within its parameters
beyond these - base positions - there is room to move
p.s.
it is clear - I think (personal hunch - putting aside onto-epistemological issues) - that
we are hard-wired - in the brain - to - as I put it - describe what exists - in certain ways
- in categories -
and here you could say - well - such descriptions - just have to be real
the point about it is - these categories - are just descriptions
so for practical - pragmatic - reasons - yes I would go with such an idea - as being how
it is - i.e. - a scientific view - even though it is anything but worked out -
there is no necessity in it
beyond our descriptions - there is no description to appeal to - to refer to -
in this sense - everything is a posit
and - if so - then any description can be valid
to be is to be described
17/10/05
Santayana VIII (iii)
'nothing given exists as it is given' - the argument that the contents of consciousness -
the inhabitants of the mental world - players in the phenomenal parade - are not as
they appear - but in fact are illusions - perhaps in the main benign - but their true
nature is something else - and to this Santayana argues a physicalist analysis -
here the problem (of Santayana as I read him) might be taking too seriously what he is
arguing against - the thing is - as conscious beings we cannot but describe - and we
are thrust into this 'entelechy' of description before we know it - Santayana can argue
for a physicalist description - OK - but the object of all this is not the material world
or the spirit - these are only descriptions - of what is not known
how do I capture event x - but by describing it as - 'what I felt' or 'what I saw' - or
'what I imagined' - and provide supplementary - detailed descriptions of x - some of
them for all intents and purposes given - given - within certain parameters of positing
further description or analysis - scientific - philosophic - to the details of - or concepts
of ontology and epistemology - are options - just as the initial descriptions are
what exists - how it exists etc. - is a function of description - and what has just been
said here - must be understood as a description describing - a description
beyond this statement there is no commitment
hang up your rock and roll shoes
23/10/05
reflection
I'm interested in the idea that the primary characteristic of the mind is reflection
matter (and this is not to prejudge the question of the relationship of mind and matter)
does not reflect - or so it would seem
except I suppose that our first metaphor for reflection is physical - a physical
relationship as i.e. - in the case of a physical reflection
so maybe reflection is not a distinguishing characteristic of mind -
in any case it makes the question of just what reflection is - more crucial
so we have at least the basic idea of physical reflection - we know what this refers to -
we have the experience
does it still make sense to speak of the mind reflecting?
how does this come out?
'I have a thought'
now the 'I' here is what?
a thought -
whatever else it is - it is this
and so 'I have a thought'
is what?
a thought - within a thought -
to put it very crudely
a thought referring to a thought?
(even cruder)
a thought having a thought?
what can all this mean?
but there is something else
within the 'I' - there is
the 'I' that knows that the 'I' is having a thought
so are we talking about three thoughts here?
all very strange - and terribly clumsy
but we have to start somewhere
so the question - 'what is a thought?''
we can only answer this with another thought
and so it is clear
we cannot expect thought to explicate itself - and what else is there to do the job?
or another way of putting it
thinking has no outside
you can only think 'within'
within - thought
so it's Plato's cave without the shadows?
23/10/05
thinking
so we can only work from the inside - in relation to understanding the nature of
thought
that is we can only think out an answer
we can only study the terrain - we can never leave it and look back
we build our idea of thought - from thought
we can only describe what happens in thinking
and primarily - what I think happens is reflection
thought thinking itself -
how can we understand this - explicate it?
'reflection' is this the right term?
it seems thinking is an organic process that is fundamentally holistic - that within
itself - separates itself - into subject and object -
thought - can be subject - can be object -
modes of thinking -
anyway -
reflection -
the seeing - of that which sees? - by that which sees -
so - an entity that creates itself within itself -
23/10/05
to reflect
so to reflect - which I am suggesting is the defining characteristic of the mind -
is to -
to have a thought -
is to have a thought - and to know you are having the thought
now in reality - there are not two phases (as in time) to this
the having is the knowing
the knowing is thus - what?
it is if you like the fact of the thought - and its awareness
the point is though isn't that - the awareness cannot really be distinguished from the
fact of the thought - the having
and so
thought - too is just this - awareness - writ small
an instance thereof
what I am suggesting is that awareness - thought - mind - is reflection
or 'reflection' is a term - name - to describe - awareness
so
we can take what I have just said above - and think about it
reflect on it -
this is what?
to posit the thought expressed
and to what?
essentially just to regard it - as an object - of thought
so it is really - a subject - something thought - being - becoming - the object of
thought
being included in - within the range of another thought
being subsumed?
in any case it is clear that the magic of it is that thought (awareness) can be subject
and - can be an 'object' - of awareness
it is this possibility - inherent in awareness - that gives it - a logical fluidity - a
capacity to be knowledge / to be the object of knowledge - that distinguishes
thought from other manifestations of nature
so - it is thought that is fundamentally dualistic in its activity - its expression
and what of the nature of such a 'thing' if you can call it that?
beyond this logical fluidity - I can't see what else you might say of thought - it's
inherent nature -
it has this facility - or this facility is a description of it - what it does - what happens -
beyond that - beyond such expressiveness - it is essentially unknown
we know awareness
we know self awareness
we know the fact of it - its existence - its experience -
we can to some extent describe and define it
but we can never see it for what it is (beyond this facility)
it is thus a unity - with two aspects - subjective and objective
matter (non-conscious) - I would suggest is one dimensional
it is a shell
20/11/05
Santayana IX
the discovery of essence
here Santayana begins with the idea that scepticism is intellectually liberating - his
take on this is that loss of faith leads to possibility - he gives the example of the
Indians who deny the existence of the world - and this has lead to an ontology that
includes the miraculous and the monstrous - i.e. - the Arabian Nights - yes indeed -
perhaps even Quine would have sympathy with this view -
doubt leads to possibility true - but how are we to understand this - does it mean i.e. -
that perhaps a very ontologically tight fisted world - one Oakam would look at
approvingly - is suddenly invaded with a multitude of entities - and is thus entirely
transformed - and for that matter - is never stable - for there are always more
ontological immigrants waiting at the door - waiting on the next liberating thought
- such a notion does give substance to the bones of scepticism true - the idea is - if
you doubt you can allow -
Santayana wants then to say it follows that if we understand our intuitions as illusions
we can then entertain the illusion without succumbing to it - the illusion and all its
possibilities - is in his view - the essence - or just what is - which he thinks is - the
essence - and so you can on this view - via scepticism get to a plane of certitude -
the certainty - of the illusion -
I understand the benefit Santayana sees in sceptical thinking - the fact that it does -
or can open one up to the possibilities of life - but aren't these possibilities -
possibilities of thought? - really thinking does not - in itself change the world - what
exists (though of course the consequence of thought - action may lead to
transformations) - what changes - or can - is how one sees -
I am loathe to jump to the conclusion that - all is illusion - and that we can be certain
about this - logically speaking is such an idea not equivalent to - all is real and we can
be certain about it? - the point being - what is gained by such an assertion? - perhaps a
sense of sceptical security - more a psychological than logical result? - so I guess I am
saying I fail to see where talk of essence achieves anything - and for my mind the
point of scepticism is just that while we may understand such notions as intuition and
essence - the point is that a sceptical mind operates with the understanding that 'I don't
know' - and really nothing needs to be added to this - it is a position - that specifically
does not require foundation
21/12/05
mind as idea of body
the mind as the idea of the body
the body as the extension of the mind
so
in a sense
the mind is a reflection of the body
or
the body is a reflection of the mind
so
mind and body are modes
expressions of
we say - each other
but if we wish to speak of the underlying substance
that is reflected
in mind and matter
what can we say?
at this point
at this level
the answer cannot be 'mind'
cannot be 'matter'
for such are expressions of
a more fundamental reality
or at least
of something else
the point is simply this
that if you go down this route
mind or matter
cannot be regarded
as primary -
fundamental
first order
the thing is though
we can only understand the world
in these categories
these categories beg the further question
but it cannot be answered
saved to say
the unknown
and
an unknown with no ontological commitment
what we operate with is expressions of reality
this reality we can only speak about
in terms of these expressions
21/02/06
reflections
a reflection is a reflection
and here we are speaking of
reflections of the unknown
so
the relation between the two reflections?
x reflects y
y reflects x
what does this mean?
what I think is clear is that the mind as a reflection of the body
is not a mirror image
and visa versa
hence e.g. the mind does not know the body - in toto
rather the knowledge is phenomenal - surface
and of course
what is it to say the body knows the mind?
the body and the mind
from the point of view of the body
there is no point of view -
or
the mind is this point of view
this is what the mind is
and so
the body is only
the mind's object
the mind the body's subject
mind and body are terms of a relation
it is the relation
that is 'above' the mind and body
that is - the unity
and it is a unity
again
like the foundation
that can only be expressed
in terms of the relationship
the relationship
the relation
cannot be further elucidated
but the important thing is
we are not talking about substance
the human being is not a substance (or substances)
rather
a relation
yes
21/02/06
metaphysics and pragmatics
reflection defines
any definition is never final - complete
hence from this point of view
no object or state - physical or mental
is ever fixed
this is if you like the metaphysical reality
the reality of reflection
the pragmatic reality on the other hand
the fact of being in the world
demands determinacy
(even if this is undercut - reflectively - metaphysically)
and so for practical purposes
the reflective reality of indeterminacy is denied
metaphysics is denied
it is denied in the act
and it is the act which in itself asserts determinacy
this assertion is - the act is - non-reflective
that is in itself
pragmatics becomes thus the assertion of determinacy
it's theories - it's concepts
are founded on this basis
the denial of reflective metaphysics
a denial - you could say that points to necessity as its basis
the necessity to act
the necessity to operate effectively - actively - in the world
any post-pragmatic reflection - is to the service of practice
what this tells us is that action begins where reflection ends
and the ending of reflection - is the decision to act
or the decision to act requires the cutting off of reflection
thus the act is always wanting of knowledge
(though no less an act for this)
the act as such is founded in this denial of reflection
thus every act reflects the unknown
22/02/06
reflections of the deep
the relation mind / body is the person
(a reflection of a deeper / larger reality)
the mind reflects the body - the body reflects the mind
the result of this - or a result - is knowledge
it is a reflection of the relation
a product - an outcome - an expression
the picture we have is like this
mind and body reflect reality
this reality - outside of this mind / body relation is not knowable
knowledge is rather an outcome of the mind / body relation
i.e. - we know the body - we know the mind
it is a reflection of a reflection of a reflection
somewhat removed from the ground of being
and our knowledge is very circumspect
what we know directly is impressionistic - sensational
and its ontological status is particular
the exploration of this particularity is the development of indirect and theoretical
knowledge - non-immediate
in a sense - you never leave the immediate realm - but the exploration of it requires a
more sophisticated and complex ontology
and this is theoretical knowledge
(another level of reflection if you like)
its reason is pragmatics - if we could survive on the sensational / impressionistic level
- we would
its not enough for this organism - partly as a result of the structure of the organism
(i.e. - needs are determined by structure - the composition of the thing)
hence - knowledge - non-sensational / impressionistic - is needed to meet the
challenges of such an existence
24/03/06
contingency
contingency in the true pure sense
is strictly speaking empty
or perhaps
without bounds
without definition
(the concept of God really comes out of this idea
it is a reflection of it
a substitute
the positing of another realm
spiritual ideal
as if in the act of this positing
the actual contingent reality is improved
or
somehow - by such a reality - made - non-contingent
i.e. -
the concept of God - has all the characteristics of the contingent realm
with the addition of spiritual posits
- order - knowledge - power
all finally - quite simply - emotional needs - writ large)
reason - or focus - is not outside of - or a special case of contingency
it is just the idea - formalized - of focus points
points of consciousness
(generalized)
reason has more to do with place - posit -
we order the world in thought - simply to defy it
there is an imperative here
without such decision
decision to limit - to engage - to control
there is no basis for action
- from the point of view of consciousness
there will be action regardless of consciousness - or its existence
this ordering though
this positing of reason
is - outside of the accident of consciousness - of no purpose
contingency - in itself - without what Satre calls - 'the for itself'
is pure being
and this purity cannot - is not impinged upon - altered - changed
at this level of understanding -
of consciousness - there is no focus
consciousness - metaphorically speaking - dissolves itself
here we are in the realm of pure contemplation
strictly speaking - the union of mind - in being - that is oneness -
beyond this - no description
no need
26/03/06
the dream
consider the dream
you awake and you see it - as it were from the outside
the post-dream (woken awareness) is of - is now (known to be of) a different kind to
the dream state
it is not the experience of dreaming - (i.e. - the content of the dreaming) that
distinguishes itself from the non-dream state - or visa versa
it is rather that the dream state has become - the object of the non-dream state
this we might say is not so much a choice of consciousness
more - an action of consciousness
consciousness distinguishes its states
and so a question
we speak of consciousness as an awareness
but there is functioning beneath this awareness
there must be for it's appearance - existence
and so consciousness
awareness - states of consciousness - so called - functions of consciousness
and as to the nature of consciousness itself rather than it's functions (states of
awareness)
what can we say?
it is - behind the screen
(plenty of ground for the imagination)
but literally unknowable
26/03/06
brain states
can we say it is a physiological process - a brain state?
the point is why?
corresponding physiological processes - that parallel states of consciousness - let's say
OK - for the minute
the world is physical - another OK
even given these concessions
the question - though at the heart of this is -
what is it to say?
it is to say - the world is physical - OK
we name it so -
and with this name - comes descriptions
this name / description - 'physical'
is a product of consciousness
we - for the sake of neatness - consistency - homogeneity - say
consciousness is physical
we bring it into the tent -
(the tent it built)
we will say the light shines on itself
in my view consciousness - finally defies any description
there is no view but consciousness
it is the seeing - not what is seen
but I have tried to suggest here
that we can see that logically speaking
there is an argument for saying that
the seeing of consciousness -
the states of awareness
may not be - all there is to it
that it is possible to see states of awareness as a function of something deeper
that consciousness is not fully exhausted by it states
and it could follow from this
that consciousness may exist in some sense in the absence of awareness
that states of consciousness - presuppose an unknown - dimension?
(should give the life after death - 'the mind survives' theorists a fillip)
30/03/06
where is the rub?
if the sceptic is right and we don't know
what would be the difference if we did?
or for that matter if the sceptic is wrong
and the epistemic right?
where is the rub?
the physical world is not altered either way
will people act differently?
well it might be suggested that they would or could - but finally how to know?
is one understanding ultimately any different to another?
you can change your view of a situation but what is this to say -
knowledge or its absence is not a big player here
not even a player?
different coloured chips - on the roulette table?
it all has more to do with colour than content
with artistry - rather than substances
it's how we paint on the canvas
what we paint on it
how we approach it - the changes made -
and remade - the activity
its irresistibility - focus
the canvas comes already - processed - cut - in form
the work begins
does it alter the canvas?
yes - something is changed - something remains unchanged
the idea of an original state is pure illusion
there never was one
(when does the begine begin?)
you cannot even imagine it (though some may think they can)
logic suggests it
that is all
(and logic here is only a process - an activity that is 'in canvas')
ultimately what is painted - created is a phantasm
we imagine it is the work - the canvas that is the point
this is the driving observation
the fact is - it's the wall
but who cannot be surprised
disbelieving of this?
03/04/06
Spinoza's concept of substance
Spinoza's concept of substance -
'in itself and conceived through itself' -
'that the conception of which does not depend upon the conception of another thing
through which it must be formed'
in short - existence per se
it is to say - existence exists
and it cannot be otherwise
(how could it be?)
the question though - what is this existence
- apart from itself?
is there anything to be said?
yes -
we know it expresses itself - as the material world - and as mind
how do we know this?
we see - reflect - this - primarily in ourselves
(expression of existence)
in mind and body
the seeing is only possible - given consciousness
but mind on this view is no accident - no epiphenomenon
it is existence
on this view - mind - one of an infinite number of possible expressions of existence
as is matter - the material world
could things be so constituted that existence was not known via these expressions
matter and mind?
yes
it would seem
the reality is of course that such is not the case
but on Spinoza's view is it necessary that existence reveals itself in these attributes?
good question
perhaps not - given that there are an infinite number of attributes we don't see
(this though is not to take away from the reality of what we do see - it is real - not
illusory)
the expression of existence in matter and mind
why?
is it some accident of necessity?
could the world be otherwise?
it is not - true
but there is some sense - (the infinite attributes of substance) - in which there is
possibility
not so much possible worlds as possible expressions
it seems though without mind we could not know this - unless there are within this
range of infinite attributes - something like other ways of knowing)
the idea of the infinity of attributes in a sense destroys the idea of substance
be careful what you wish for
for what does infinity come to - in any substantial sense?
that is where is the substance in infinity?
to say x is infinite defines x formally or mathematically - not in terms of content - its
reality - its substance - what does an infinite thing come to - anything?
such seems to be a contentless notion
04/04/06
Spinoza's extreme objectivism
from Spinoza's point of view - mind and matter - two attributes of God - two
expressions of substance
to speak this way is to adopt an objective stance
a kind of scientific view - a Spinoza science - the world is made of the physical and
mental -
or to be more precise - we can approach the world from a physical point of view - and
get a complete picture - and / or from a mental point of view - and - this too gives
us a total picture
the idea of two ways of knowing the one thing
but really isn't this just one way of knowing - via the mind
(are we to say the physical (i.e. the body) 'knows' the mental (the mind) ?)
and further - is not the physical world still object - to the subject of knowing?
a question too - is the mind in knowing the physical world - knowing itself - or to
scale it down - is knowledge of the body - knowledge of the mind?
Spinoza's view would be fine - if we didn't have to account for the 'self' of self-
consciousness
the mind knowing itself -
the mind as an object of consciousness
in the same way as the physical world is -
ideas and physical states - we can see - as being a symmetry -
but once you bring in self - a symmetry is broken
the mind is not just a reflection of the body
it is a reflection of itself
and so - the mind (itself) and / or its contents - are object - of the mind - (this just is
self-consciousness) AND the physical world - too - is object of the mind
what do we say of this mind - that holds itself and the physical world - as object?
at the least - that it is two-dimensional?
the mind that views - whatever - is if you like a level of mind -
and the mind that is (with the physical world) - an object of this view
(the mind as subject and object - there goes the neighbourhood - and the heap of
rubble on the lawn - the great home of Western logic - Aristotle Russell Frege -
walking the streets)
I think for Spinoza - the idea is that the mind is - like the physical world - one
dimensional - not of course that it can be - but this is his objective picture - his
'scientific view'
and I am not here trying to argue for the privilege of the self in all this -
the thing is you can't discount it - and any objective view (just as any subjective view)
must give account of the relation of mind to mind -
for without such no account of mind / body will be successful
05/04/06
substance
the fact is substance cannot be seen from the outside
and yet we get such an impression from Spinoza - re: sub specie aeternitatis
the whole - the totality - is a conception
a conception that comes from consciousness
consciousness sees outside itself (at least we can begin with this idea)
consciousness distinguishes itself from what it is not -
what it is not - is the world
we can say it knows itself - as within - therefore (at least) an outside
the totality - nature or God - is a conception generated from the nature of
consciousness
consciousness - distinguishes x from not-x
such is logic - the basis of it
and so substance - a conception generated by the logic of consciousness - of thought
consciousness reflects in itself and places itself within -
as to the nature of that which is outside of consciousness - or greater than
we never get out of the realm of ideas - whatever our conception
we never that is have a privileged position - (not in reality - even if it is projected in
thought) - of being outside of the world
there is - that is no objective position
a position that is outside of consciousness
(such an idea makes no sense)
Spinoza does not understand consciousness - its logic - its dynamic - its limits
the world outside of consciousness cannot be objectively known -
cannot be directly known
if direct means - in some way - knowledge that is not finally a processing of - what -
data?
and this data is not known
its character is not given -
it is made - constructed
the construction goes on - on a number of levels -
(a divine comedy)
and however simple or complex
it is a function of consciousness
no real substance here either
as it is up to consciousness - its reflection on itself - to come up with a conception - of
its own functioning
it is clear - the knowing of consciousness is an illusion - inside or out
consciousness is a metaphysical point (there are many) on a metaphysical map
a focus - (whatever in the end this means) - that stands in the world
simply - a point - that is substanceless - the unknown
05/04/06
Spinoza and subjectivity
I think Spinoza's model for the physical world - is extension
one dimensional - (in the sense that it is not reflective)
and for Spinoza - the mental is effectively no different to the physical
the fact that 'I know' - on such a view is not ontologically and different to
'x exists'
there is no real internal dimension to reality for Spinoza
everything is objective
subjectivity - just a fact of the objective world
we would say a physical fact
his conception is I think in the same vein as modern mind-brain identity theorists
Spinoza has no doubt about objectivity
the question for him is how best to describe it -
to account for its unfolding - its expression
for Spinoza the mind is a means to this end -
an instrument to be used in this enterprise - and for him - finally - it is no different - in
the end to that which it is put to the service of -
it too has to be laid out - explained - described -
just as does the physical world and its features
it's as if the mind displays the world
it is all like an exhibition
how do you distinguish the exhibiting from what is exhibited?
05/04/06
Spinoza and consciousness
Spinoza's theory of the equivalence of matter and mind
two aspects of the one substance
a prime facie difficulty - (perhaps not fatal - but nevertheless worthy)
physical states - simply exist - exist - out there?
they are not 'had'
don't we say something like - thoughts are had
consciousness is had
that is - it doesn't exist 'out there'
it is possessed -
do we think of or speak of conscious states - as being out there
rather I think the opposite - they are 'in' there
and for mine this is not just a verbal matter - an ordinary language argument
it is a true characterization
consciousness - is in my view - the inside - of the world
and such an argument is not necessarily an argument against - a kind of Spinozistic
monism
but it is an argument against - one dimensionalism -
a one dimensional view of -
my view is - in this sense - dualistic - reality has two dimensions - inside and outside -
a surface and an interior -
the interior - I say is consciousness - is mind -
the surface - the physical world
such a view - such as it is -
allows - one could say demands - as a matter of logic - a form of monism
an inside is co-extensive with the outside -
this is a solution to the Spinozistic problem
15/04/06
what is thinking?
what is thinking?
in simple terms it is to reflect
and what is this - to reflect?
it is the action of mind -
this does not really give us an answer
and to cut to the chase -
the problem is we can only answer such a question by thinking
that is we can only answer the question - thinking poses - (its nature) by thinking
this suggest thinking can explore itself
OK - this thinking - is reflection on reflection
if you like a second order reflection
in which thinking (first order) becomes the subject of thought
now I think this does happen in a clear way -
the question is though - what does this tell us of thought - the mind - thinking
or more specifically - reflection
reflection it seems is not - what?
fixed within bounds?
theoretically we can have a situation where there is no end to reflecting on reflection
the capacity to reflect - 'regard' - is without limit
even so
what is happening - at any logical level is just reflection
and so the question - what is this?
well it is consciousness - what it does -
and it is this (whatever it is) that distinguishes mind from matter -
matter - as an object of mind - does not reflect -
the reflection is the mind - operating - internally - on itself
p.s.
the idea of reflectivity and the mind as internality -
doesn't necessarily mean there is something other than matter
what I have in mind is the view that by 'matter' we mean 'what exists' - whatever it's
attributes and dimensions
on this view it would follow as a matter of definition that the inside - (mind) is to be
regarded as a form of - a dimension of - matter
here we would have to say
that matter has a reflective and non-reflective characteristic
the reflective is the internal of what is (mind) -
the non-reflective is the external - the surface of what is (the physical world)
could we then regard mind as a function of matter?
perhaps
an internal function that is not - by definition - a characteristic of the surface
anyway
still the question how to define - pin down
reflection - mind
no answer - except in terms of reflection
we never leave the farm
16/04/06
attributes and self-consciousness
Spinoza writes in his definitions on the attribute -
'By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as
constituting its essence'
in so far as the intellect perceives mind it perceives itself -
therefore self-consciousness?
is this the way it goes?
still one could ask - is it my mind I perceive or the mind -
and really where is the difference?
I perceive my body - I perceive matter -
I perceive my mind - I perceive mind
it is not an either / or proposition
you could say without these ontological categories - there would be no perception
17/04/06
Spinoza's theory of substance
Spinoza's theory of substance
is monistic
what exists is a singularity
there is only one substance
now according to Spinoza
we perceive attributes of this substance
(we are attributes of this substance)
attributes are what is perceived - expressions
on Spinoza's theory - perceived or not
they are expressions of what is
characteristics of it
now with these attributes - where does the weight lie?
in perceiving or in what is perceived?
I think Spinoza would say - the weight is equal
OK
still there is a question of the essence of substance -
i.e. that which all attributes have in common
that which is - if you like - prior to
perceived expressions
that which must be for them to be perceived expressions?
i.e. - can we distinguish - does Spinoza need to distinguish - attributes from
substance?
now extension and mind on Spinoza's view are two attributes
two perceptions of essence?
yes - it can't be two essences - perceived
the definition - of substance requires that it has an infinity of attributes -
now we can ask - in relation to the two attributes - extension and mind - how are they
to be distinguished?
- on Spinoza's view
are they just equivalent descriptions of one phenomenon - i.e. - substance?
it would seem so
now according to Spinoza - we can only describe substance under - two attributes - we
can see it as extended - or as mental -
and we do make a distinction
it is real -
if so what can it be based on?
i.e. - what distinguishes mind and matter?
this seems to be the direction Spinoza wants to avoid
on his view - it is not a question of distinguishing the two
- rather it is - how to understand 'them' as one?
and here it seems we can only talk of descriptions
different descriptions - languages of - the one
two descriptions - two of an infinite number of possible descriptions
so to the question - what is to count as the one description of the one substance?
prime facie - you would think that such is possible - even necessary -
(how else would we know substance as one - if we couldn't so describe it?)
what is clear though - is that we can only describe it terms of attributes -
is this to say no singular description is possible?
unless we say - as Spinoza does -
that substance is existence
OK - yes
substance in all its manifestations exists -
the question though is - how meaningful is such a statement?
to assert x is to - make an existential statement
x as such - (even once asserted is still x) - has no epistemic content
to say substance exists - appears to be making - a statement about substance
it is not
the existential assertion of substance tells us only that x is x
the common characteristic of all of substance's attributes - is existence
again - to say A1 exists - A2 exists etc.
is to say nothing
if so -
how are attributes distinguished on Spinoza's theory
and
how are they to be understood as different from - what it is claimed they are attributes
of - that is substance?
I think finally with Spinoza we have a pure assertion of existence -
the grand existential statement
x exists
(whatever x is - it exists)
but it is - over and above this oddly enough - an empty statement
I'm not sure that the existential assertion - is an empty statement or a meaningless
statement -
but it is - rather - colourless
and
lacking - substance
it seems our knowledge is attribute bound
we know substance through its attributes
our knowledge therefore is attribute specific?
as to knowledge of substance as a singularity -
this seems not possible -
for it requires that our knowledge is infinite -
beyond our limited perception (extension and mind) we have no knowledge
except that logical knowledge that substance is infinite
this though amounts to saying substance is unknowable - in itself
and in terms of its appearance - only in an attribute dependent manner -
and severely limited in this regard
18/04/06
Spinoza's approach
if everything is an expression of the whole - of existence
that is we come at the issue from the top down
and this is Spinoza's approach - starting point
we are proceeding not from experience - we cannot experience the whole
rather from reasoning
the idea that a part cannot exist independent of a whole
the particular - only has ontological reality given a universal - for it to be a particular
of -
we can say - that our basis for this ontological assertion is epistemological
it is a function of the mind
at this point of course you can question whether we have any basis for believing in
anything other than the mind
but this matter I suggest is already resolved
in the argument that the mind is a particular - is an expression of a greater reality - a
whole - finally
as to the nature of this whole - again we can say
it is finally unknown - but no less real for that
we can at least assume a relation between the mind and the world - even if again - we
may not be able to say - with any certainty - what it is
there is - at least logically speaking - the relation of inclusion
- the mind - included in - the whole
- this we can say - cannot be otherwise
so we can speak of relations - and the relation here - inclusion - is if you like -
primitive - undefined
so we speculate as to the nature of the relationship
and to do this is to exercise nothing more than a (higher?) function of consciousness
again it is the question of knowledge - what can we know - of the unknown?
it is the making of metaphysics
and the success of any such a creation will be measured by what?
what distinguishes one account of the relation of particular to universal from another?
why should we prefer one against the other?
any account will live or die on its own assumptions
for built into any serious account will be its criterion of truth
so finally no objective test - rather a question of consistency - at least of premises and
conclusion
so a deductive matter
OK - much to be said here - but I'll get back to Spinoza
what is it that distinguishes anything within a totality?
once we begin with the totality can we get down to the individual?
clearly this is where we really begin - with individual things
the whole is a real - but a logical abstraction -
Spinoza begins with the whole - the totality - existence itself
what exists on this view must exist - and it's everything - yes
but why does any thing exist?
can his philosophy address this question?
not really - for Spinoza such a question is really finally the same as asking why
existence itself?
and there can be no answer to this - in the sense of - there is something outside of
existence that is its cause -
for existence - substance is sui causa
the world expresses itself the way it does - why? - there is no reason
it could not be otherwise -
the best we can do is understand this
so finally we are left with a vision of necessity
as to the status of this - now there's a question
is it knowledge?
or is it logic?
in the sense of - what it is possible to think?
(and Spinoza's view at this)
yes - it is this
finally - the logic of substance
and Spinoza's view here depends on a form of the ontological argument
that thinking - shall we say good thinking - logical thinking is always about what
exists
thought - that is - reflects existence
(if you make this assumption - adopt this view - Spinoza's theory can be seen to
follow)
to think about the totality is therefore to think about what exists
when really all it is - is to give a logical setting - that has no content - substance - to it
- to the logical reality of an individual - a particular
it is just to say a particular is - an instance of a universal
we can say this without any reference to any actual existing thing
it is a statement that tells us - how we think about ourselves and the world - in a
fundamental way - it's a statement about the logic of this thinking
and finally there is no necessity in this thinking - unless you adopt it
logic is a realm of possibility - not necessity
how we understand the world - and indeed whether we understand it as a world is a
matter of conjecture -
we can adopt a particular ontology - yes -
but where the necessity?
19/04/06
the world as expression
the world expresses itself as mind - as matter
these expressions - our reality
the limitation of our perspective - the modality - of this perspective
entails - a tunnel vision -
we can reason - what we see is not all there is -
mind and matter
perceived perceptions of a reality of infinite - (possible) perspectives
what can this mean though?
can it have any substance?
is it simply
an argument for
the idea of totality -
the lack of limitation?
it is not as if Spinoza is arguing for possible worlds
as if reality - finally - is just possibility
and it so happens
this world - here - put up its hand
that it is not necessary
for on such a view you might argue
the given world is contingent
it strikes me that Spinoza's argument here for substance - is empty
no substance
and no possibility
it's a dead end - a null set
cosmologically - metaphysically speaking -
19/04/06
Spinoza's perception
on Spinoza's view the mind is both perceiver and perception?
we perceive mind as an attribute of substance
we perceive with mind
now if all that is being asserted here is that mind exists - OK
the thing is what kind of perception is this?
we can say that the mind is aware of itself -
but does it perceive itself?
how can the subject be its own object?
this of course is the problem of consciousness
still it's worth asking this kind of question
the mind's awareness of itself is
awareness of itself as subject
this it seems is contained in the concept of awareness
awareness here it seems cannot be further analyzed
mind is this
so
so does it make any sense to speak of mind as aware of itself
awareness aware of awareness
is what -
awareness
so - an argument that
logically speaking
the mind - is not an object of awareness
whatever is the object of - awareness - is outside the mind
so - the dichotomy - mind / matter
(matter as - whatever is outside)
and as to the nature of it all
we know mind
we know matter
and you could take an expressionist-metaphysical line and say
mind and matter are expressions of -
the totality -
but as to the totality
we can't assume anything
we can talk about what we know
and beyond that (if there is a 'beyond that') -
is what we don't know -
clear cut
21/04/06
substance and attribute
substance expresses itself - which is to say it exists -
as part of this we see - perceive - substance
from - substance - that is as modes of it -
(there is actually no other position - even God?
what can God see on this view?
one would think the totality sees nothing
for it is the total
only a part can see the whole - or see into it
God or nature simply exists
hence the point of view of eternity - is no point of view at all
except perhaps - poetic)
we perceive the world from the world - in the world - what we perceive is what is -
though not all of what is
(on this view there is an argument that the totality is not cannot be perceived)
what we perceive - are attributes of substance - existence - characteristics
extension and mind
attributes - that make up - that are - the mode - we are
we perceive our own characteristics
the body is a form of matter
the mind - of thought
still a question -
does thought recognize thought?
do I perceive another mind - with my mind - as it were - directly?
interesting -
I for one think this is so
but while space / matter is obviously everywhere
thought is not obviously so -
the problem for parallelism
God / nature - the totality - expresses itself in these attributes
do we have any reason to think there are other attributes?
Spinoza says - yes otherwise God / nature is limited
but this is really no argument -
what if the world is just extension and thought?
it appears so at least -
and that these attributes are infinite?
still the limit of two attributes - expressions
yes
but saying there are an infinity of attributes -
does away with the limit of attributes
but to what consequence?
what is substance other than its attributes -
infinite number or not?
Spinoza says attributes are perceived essences
attributes are thus what we know
beyond that is what we don't know
Spinoza of course would not have wished to concede to scepticism
and it is his avoidance of this reality
that has led to his theory of substance
instead of accepting that we don't know what we don't know
Spinoza says - reality is infinite
for all intents and purposes -
the unknown
22/04/06
modes
and what of the nature of modes -
clearly everything is a mode
a modification of substance - that which is something else - through which it is
conceived
here a mode is a reality - a modification of substance
anything that cannot be conceived through itself (i.e. - substance - the totality -)
therefore any expression of substance
that is conceived - in terms of another expression of substance
so a mode is something that is not ontologically independent
any particular - or anything that can be so conceived -
so modes - the world as is - without the abstraction of substance?
why not?
so yes - every thing can be seen in relation to another
must be - to be explained - accounted for
this is what science does
OK
but do you need substance?
i.e. - if you were to say modes are all there is
a nominalist argument?
wherefore substance?
except - as an idea of that which is (or may be) common to all - to all modes
a concept - is it logically necessary or perhaps rather psychologically necessary -
comforting - perhaps?
the idea of essence
perhaps we call this - 'existence'?
but here I am suggesting it as a pure idea - a notion of commonality
an idea that has no real substance
except in terms of ongoing heuristic endeavours
a kind of goal - of scientific endeavour - or a presupposition - that is not real - except
in a conceptual sense
NB
and just on the idea of essence
it presupposes omniscience -
for to have knowledge of the essence of all - is in some sense to know all
(this is not possible from a modal point of view)
it is obviously - another reason for Spinoza's substance
but even accepting Spinoza's idea of substance - can we make sense of omniscience -
of substance - knowing itself?
bluntly - self-knowledge - if self-knowledge -
is an outcome of consciousness - self-consciousness -
there seems to be no prime facie sense in the idea of the totality - aware - of anything -
let alone itself
the point is essence if it has any reality must be unknown
p.s.
modes -
we have the phenomenal reality
and it is the obvious - what presents to consciousness
clearly though for Spinoza - a mode is beyond this a question of explanation
- what can be understood in terms of -
at this point we leave the obvious -
we go into scientific explanation -
and here the phenomenal world can be seen to dissolve
dissolve into the theoretical - and its world of entities - always - necessarily - always
sub-phenomenal
and here there is no concretness - no stability as such
all is fluid - all is up for grabs
science at this level - is strictly speaking in a constant state of anarchy
so - in reality - from the point of view of theoretical science - the individual - the
particular is like - substance - a concept - an idea - a category - a framework
the reality we come to with this framework is - unknown (hence the framework)
24/04/06
contingency and empiricism
if we assume that all empirical knowledge is observational knowledge and what is
observed - is a contingent reality
are we assuming that if x is contingent x is observable?
and x is observable x is contingent?
here our notion of contingency is based on our theory of knowledge and our theory of
knowledge based on contingency
an epistemology and an ontology that entail each other
the problem with this though is that the world is greater than its knowledge
so for such a marriage to work - it need be assumed that empirical knowledge cannot
cover all the ground
so - here a reason to doubt empiricism
the window of opportunity for - non-empirical knowledge - the dreaded a priori - like
a dictator's hand
or
what?
the recognition that empirical knowledge - indeed that knowledge - whatever your
view is by its nature limited
that yes - in a sense we know (within certain parameters) but beyond these - is what is
not known - in empirical terms - is not observed - or cannot be observed
and this is just the nature of it
without such a limitation - the limitation of the unknown - there is no knowledge - of
any kind
OK
what this suggests is that some sanity is put into the issue if we take a step back and
have a think -
what does observational - empirical knowledge tell us about the world?
well first up it tells us - what we observe
this though on the face of it is everything - on reflection is in fact - nothing
what we see - that is the nature of it - is strictly speaking another question
we can say the world is what is observable -
are you happy with this?
beyond this statement is just - what?
quite clearly the unknown
that is if you want to push it - to further define - the observable - you as it were - have
to start again -
either that - or bite down hard and assume you have everything for the journey
what I think has happened in empiricism - is a switch -
we jump from epistemology to ontology - as if we haven't moved
voila - what we are talking about now - is contingency
(has quite a solid ring to it)
however nothing is actually really gained - just an impression of foundation -
foundation to observation
and ontology for your knowledge
thank you sir
my point is - yes - knowledge is knowledge of -
but in this case it is knowledge of the observable
but truly
again if you want to elaborate here - what is - the observable
who is to say?
28/04/06
Spinoza's attributes
Spinoza's statement of attributes -
as I understand it - his argument is
we perceive (the essence of substance as manifested in the attributes of extension and
mind) what is -
our perception of what is - is determined by what is - (substance)
therefore
there is - on this level - no room for doubt - no margin for error
what is - is what is perceived - by what is (a mode thereof)
tight argument - like a puzzle clicking into place
existence determines what can be known - what can be known (on this most
fundamental level) is what is known
end of story
how do you crack this code?
if you begin with Spinoza's premises - the conclusion follows
the knower is a mode of substance
and the knower - can know - the essence -
the essence - as revealed (to the knower) is - just what the knower is - extension /mind
the argument here is really about the status of philosophical / metaphysical thinking -
theories
if the argument cannot be faulted - is it therefore - true
as in trivial -
as in unfalsifiable
no content -
here though it seems we are
moving into the realm of empirical theory
OK
but still the question
what value - a metaphysics - that cannot be challenged - on its own grounds?
here it seems to me the only way to go is to say
OK - here is a world view that is well worked out
it's one of a number
the world is richer for this creation
the rational way to go in the face of such - the range of such views - is to appreciate
to adopt if - if circumstances (philosophical circumstances) suggest
but at the end of the day
as far as commitment goes -
suspend judgement
epoche
p.s.
the status of philosophical discourse - itself suggests an overriding metaphysics
- a meta philosophy - if you like -
a domain of possibility
possible ways of knowing and understanding
this range exists because there is no definite - one view
this fact itself is - or becomes - paradoxically - the fundamental position
it is the position of choice
nothing is demanded
and reason for adoption?
itself a study in possibility
29/04/06
what do you perceive?
when you perceive - and ask the question - the philosophical question - what do I
perceive? - the answer is of course reflective - after the fact - and is what?
the idea that we can speak of the image of an object and the object itself (the ground
of the image)
what is - what is perceived
both these dimensions - are the result of reflection -
after the fact -
and this reflection is necessary for knowing - knowledge
is not all knowledge - reflective?
and my point here is that the awareness of x (as it were pre-reflective) is pure and
undefined - in that it is non-reflective -
the experience is without knowledge - pre-knowledge
the awareness - I say is noumenal
this is not quite the Kantian sense - in that Kant I think regarded the noumenal as
analytical - or reflective - and the phenomenal as the presentation
here I suggest the noumenal is the presentation
what is presented is the unknown
reflection - and the phenomenal?
do we want to say here that the phenomenal is reflective - post presentation -
yes I think so -
my idea is that -
the connection of things - even persons and non-persons (perceivers and their objects
of perception) - would be included here - is - purely existential - primitive -
any definition of this is after the fact and - reflective
so pure experience is of the unknown
is noumenal
mind - enables the reflection that is experience - that is knowledge
the world reflects in mind
the mind reflects the world
it is not hard to conceive a world without this - reflection
no experience - no knowledge
it is this world - the unknown that we are fundamentally connected to
the mind is the reflection of this
the reflection - after the fact - of connection -
of - existence
so the philosopher's stone - the unknown
NB
it goes without saying that this argument is an argument of reflection
it is - as it were a reflective return to the non-reflective
paradoxically - if you like - a return to the ground of reflection - the ground of mind
it is to say we can know - that the basis of the known is the unknown
knowledge - knowing it's origin - its reason - is not knowing the inside of itself - it is
knowing the outside of itself - what it is not - the unknown
01/05/06
the problem of knowledge is not the problem of existence
existence is given
how to understand existence is not
is not a given
the question of understanding is the mind reflecting
it is reflection on what is given
what is given is not known
reflection is the knowing
knowledge is characterization of the given -
of the given unknown
how do we characterize what this is -
the characterization of the unknown?
epistemology - is reflection on -
the reflection that is knowing - that is knowledge
there is a necessity about it
it is not as if we choose to know
we must know
knowing is our fundamental activity as human beings
we cannot - do not operate without it
still to characterize the unknown is to what?
it is the question of how best to describe what is presented
again - the presentation is for all intents and purposes - necessary
the world we see as human beings -
in its basics is presented
to know it is to conceive it
(conception here is natural - it is what we do)
however the mind does not come to the presentation - fixed
the basis of conception is uncertainty
presentation is clear
but reflection uncertain
reflection is the process of uncertainty
it is grounded in uncertainty
the mind is essentially - uncertainty
any conception that is ventured
is by its nature uncertain
this is the ground of theory - any theory - any conception
the basis of this uncertainty - is possibility
the mind brings possibility to the world
knowledge is the expression of this possibility
and the world without mind - without knowledge
what can we say?
I say we don't know
however the fact of the world -
as a primitive
unknown - but primitive
suggests a view
that the world is without possibility
without mind that is
no questions in nature
only if mind
so - overall?
mind in the world -
an indeterminacy
as a fact of
nature
a contingency
and if so -
(and so it seems)
a necessary fact?
well as necessary as any fact
any event or class thereof
before we get ahead of ourselves
good to remember that 'contingency' and 'necessity' are conceptions
conceptions
of
the unknown
it is always tempting to get above your status and to speak from the pulpit - sub specie
aeternitatis - as it were
and to imagine you can conceive the totality and its status
however this is bad logic - or fantasy
beyond what we know - and this is uncertain - is the unknown
and here you - necessarily - come to an end of characterization
or if you like the reason for it
01/05/06
testability
empirical content is a question of testability
what can be tested?
testability a question of the nature of observation
what is observed is a question
never a fact
a fact is a conclusion of the question of observation
a decision
we observe
what it is we observe is a matter of reflection - i.e. the body of scientific thought
the point is
the object of observation - the existent
is without content
we assume its existence - as a base line - that it is -
this is OK - necessary
but such is just the fact of its presentation
such is undefined
(like a logical constant)
it's characterization
is a question of reflection
this does no damage to 'the fact of the fact'
it simply makes the point that its revelation is a conceptual issue
and it is fluid
subject to possible interpretation
the immediate object of perception
is - apart from its conceptual realizations -
unknown
p.s.
observation stripped down - minus any metaphysics
conceptualization
is an event within events
04/05/06
the idea of the body
Spinoza is saying mind and body are knowable expressions of substance
substance is one - it is not divided - but it can be known through these expressions
so mind and body are really alternative accounts of the one substance
the mind is the idea of the body - in the sense that - it is like a reflection in a mirror
in such a case - there is the body - and - the mirror image
and if we could adopt an outsider's view - sub specie aeternitatis
we would say - there are not two things - rather one in two dimensions
and what that 'one' is - can only be explained as an extended thing (the body) or its
image (idea)
beyond these descriptions - mind and body - nothing can be said of substance - but
that it exists - and is unrestricted - and this we know from logic
human beings are expressions - modes of substance - exhibiting the attributes of mind
and extension
we are these expressions - and we know that we are these expressions
so what I am saying is that the human being - can only see what is expressed - mind
and body
as to an essence over and above this -
Spinoza I think would say - there is nothing more to say
another way to put it - might be to say -
that the human being - beyond what we see - what is expressed is like substance itself
- unknown - a mystery -
however I don't think Spinoza would take this path - as it might be seen as a
concession to scepticism
on the question of 'ideas of ideas' -
this ability that we have - to have ideas and ideas of our ideas - endlessly
is really just a reflection of - the attribute of extension - the physical world
its essential characteristic being - its inexhaustibility
I know my body through its ideas
and I know my ideas (my ideas have content) through my body (my body is what is
known)
philosophers have characteristically seen two questions here - one of knowledge - one
of existence - what we know and what is
for Spinoza the two questions are versions of each other - to answer one is to answer
the other
we must always deal with both - together - for what exists is what is known and what
is known is what exists
Spinoza has no doubt
04/05/06
where is consciousness?
consciousness
is the inside (of the body)
this is intuitively OK - at least initially
where is your mind?
it's not out there -
it's inside
now what can we say of this inside?
firstly can we know it
can we know what it is
what mind is?
it depends - here - on your theory of knowledge -
what I mean is -
if you think knowledge is what is observed
i.e. - what is out there
the answer is no
you cannot observe mind
so yes - consciousness exists
but we cannot know it
end of story
on such a view consciousness is the observer -
not that which is observed
it is the knower
not the known
conscious reflection
consciousness reflecting on itself
just is awareness
awareness of the act of knowing
awareness of awareness
and this is consciousness
so yes we can describe - consciousness as -
awareness
and awareness - as awareness of awareness
but it's just what knowing is
therefore consciousness is not
on this view
an object of knowledge
NB
what this suggests
this reflection of consciousness
the fact of reflection
is that consciousness is its action
or - the act of consciousness is consciousness
(I say suggests this - because - I have so far argued - consciousness cannot be known)
the point here is that if consciousness is its event -
and this is fully understood
then - the end of substance
and its shadow
and its ghost
consciousness on this view is a kind of action
and this I say metaphorically
or analogically
that is - as if we were talking about an external event
therefore
all such statements about consciousness
characterizations of consciousness
statements from the inside
are best understood as metaphors
- poetic
and thus poetry is the language of consciousness
of the inside
07/05/06
what's to know?
for Spinoza my identity is my existence - pure and simple - beyond this existential
fact - primitive fact - definition or characterization is a question of knowledge - and
our knowledge of ourselves - not just the world - is limited - so the question is always
a live one
but perhaps it's not as gut-wrenching as say some existentialists might have it -
hey - what's to know? - these are my thoughts - this is what I do -
therefore - this - as in my activity - is what I am
I know myself in terms of what I do - as in - what I think - my thinking - and my
action - in space-time - so I know myself - in terms of my expression(s)
as an existential entity - I am this activity
the idea of the self as some kind of substance
for Spinoza yes - he regards individual 'selfs' as real existing entities
but as modifications of the greater picture - which of course makes sense
my sense is that his view is that - existence - in whatever form it takes - is what
happens - just - what happens
and it happens for no reason - that is there is no reason for existence but existence -
and yes existing implies activity - but pure activity
(which is just substance - being - existing)
so - the blade of grass exists for what - well who is going to say - for no reason?
we are likely to propose some explanation in terms of how everything is connected in
nature
and to say the blade of grass has a purpose of function in the whole of nature - i.e. to
feed cattle
and more generally to speak of evolution
Spinoza thought existence (substance) is not going anywhere
it may be useful for us to adopt such a view - some kind of evolutionism - in that - this
may enhance our capacity to exist and maintain our existence - the point of science?
the eternal truth - is here
it's everywhere about - it's always been here
it always will be
it is just the revelation of - existence
10/05/06
the unknown
much depends on how you characterize the unknown like what sort of ontological
status you give it -
and then whatever you say - it can be fairly asked - well how do you know the
unknown is such and such?
isn't the point of it that it is - unknown?
so what are we talking about here - can't be characterized?
Kant's answer was interesting
he argued what we face is to be characterized as the phenomenal - that which is
presented
to ask what is behind it
is to ask to know - that which is not presented to consciousness
and that for Kant is what the unknown is
he went further though
and really saw it as a reality - a dimension
and this unknown dimension - the noumenon - became for him the source of freedom
and God
now I wouldn't quite go down that track
though I think his answer to the question - what is the unknown - as - that which is not
given in experience - is eminently sensible
but still you could ask - why the unknown at all whatever status you give it?
now my thought here is that the unknown only comes into the picture because of the
nature of consciousness
and a quick answer here is to say the fundamental characteristic of consciousness is
reflection
and to say this doesn't prejudge the standard mind-body problem
for whatever theory you have of mind - you recognize that consciousness reflects on
the world and on its own contents
now one of the things that happens when we reflect is we look for an account of what
is presented to us
we look for explanation or foundation to what we experience
such is not presented - it is not there -
hence theoretical thinking - and all the theoretical entities that come with it (i.e. -
substance - electrons - the unconscious - historical process - God)
now all I am really trying to say here is that in the first instance reflection reveals the
unknown - i.e.- there is something I don't know
and that understanding only comes about because I reflect on what is presented to
consciousness
as pointed out Kant gave the unknown - an ontological status - for Kant it is a real
dimension of reality
I prefer a much less elaborate account
and really a more straight out logical account -
the unknown as - what - is not known
this leaves the question of what - as undecided - (unlike Kant who did define it)
and it strikes me that in a metaphysical sense - this is quite appropriate
(otherwise you would have to claim you know it)
in general - though I'm just saying as conscious beings
we are in a sense - conscious - not just of what is before us but what is not
and I think as soon as we reflect - we are in the realm of the unknown
we reflect - we conceive - theorize - speculate - in order to transform what we don't
know - to knowledge -
and this knowledge is always an attempt to explain what is before us
the world we live in
now in my view these conceptions - be they philosophical - (like what I'm doing here)
scientific - religious - imaginative - artistic
are without any foundation -
we may chose to believe i.e. - the story of science - the philosophy of Spinoza - the
teachings of the Buddha - as fundamental
as the foundation
but when any of these systems are put to test
finally
they end up at some end point of faith in - the empirical method - the geometrical
method or revelation - or whatever
there is nothing wrong with faith - but be clear what it is -
just a decision to stop
either that -
or keep an open mind
in general - my scepticism is primarily in relation to theoretical knowledge
which is just any account or underpinning of the world as presented to consciousness
for any theory about the world or any aspect of it is a free creation of consciousness
this is not in any way to devalue any such endeavour rather to just understand its
epistemological and ontological status
and also - it is important to understand the necessity of such
we must theorize on many levels just simply to enable our survival -
seen this way there is no choice about it
I think that how one conceives the world - that is how you think about yourself and
the world determines how you will feel - and how you feel will determine how you act
so it is the most crucial of human activities
I don't think we ever come to the end of such a quest or endeavour
I know for some that is regarded as a source of insecurity but as I have put forward
earlier - I see it as the source of our freedom -
and in a very real way why we have survived
it is the reason for adaptability - and most importantly creativity
human consciousness is essentially a searchlight in the darkness -
and while it might rest here - or there - there is never one view that encapsulates
everything
OK - so why one theoretical explanation rather than another?
why i.e. - does it strike me that Spinoza's metaphysics is has more truth in it than say
Hegel's?
well it's a big question
and I'm not avoiding it in saying that to some extent that is a question I deal with in
the study of Spinoza
to be quite honest I don't have an easy answer
when I first read Spinoza I was struck by his intellectual power - the simple beauty of
his conception and its breath taking comprehensiveness
later when I understood it better and in the context of metaphysical debate - I was
impressed by his solutions to some fundamental problems
i.e. - the cosmological problem - the mind-body problem
so for me Spinoza's has been a source of true intellectual joy
the need or desire for such I'm sure must be part of the motivation
and just on motivation - I see the question of one's motivation to be no different to the
metaphysical problem of the nature of it all
that is it cannot be isolated as some kind of cause outside of the main game
to understand the world (in a Spinozistic sense) is to understand yourself
in our day and age - largely due to the self-centered metaphysics of Descartes and
Berkeley - the prevailing sentiment is - if you understand yourself - you understand
the world
or - you understand yourself - but the world doesn't understand you
(Socrates might well have had something to do with all this)
also
in this connection - usually truth rears its ugly head
i.e. - why do I believe what I believe? - because I think it's the truth
the simple fact is - the truth is not there - out there - to be discovered
as some kind of touch stone for theory
one's conception of the world - one's metaphysics is one's theory of truth
the point being truth is a function of theory - not independent of it
e.g. - an empiricist concept of truth - i.e. a statement is true if it is verifiable - is true if
true - not because verifiability is observable - but rather because it is a theorem
based on empiricist presuppositions concerning the epistemological status of
observation statements
one's concept of truth is embedded in one's view of the world
Spinoza's system of thought could well be regarded as the best example of such a
view
however it is true - Spinoza did not regard truth in this way
(he did not regard his own system as one possible account of the world - he believed
and argued - that he'd nailed it -
and being a sceptic - even about my scepticism - I take his argument very seriously)
10/05/06
the reflectivity of consciousness II
the reflectivity of consciousness
and what is this?
it is when we think -
and this is to make a thought the object of thought
it is to focus on what is present to the mind
(thought thinking thought -
is this just what consciousness is?)
to explain this we can only
reflect on it
we do not leave the domain of reflection
we can only really state that it happens
not what it is
for thought cannot step out side of thought
consciousness cannot be regarded from - an outside
consciousness really only recognizes its own activity
it cannot say what it is
for ontology - what exists is a product of consciousness
consciousness knows - it reflects
but it cannot reflect on itself
explicate its own nature
beyond stating this characteristic
which is just reflection on reflection
(you never leave the farm)
what does this tell us?
(Descartes thought -
therefore I am
it doesn't actually lead to anything
reflection
states that - what?
thinking happens
- that thinking - exists?
yes
the location of it's happening - the where
is simply assumed
the 'I' is a reflection
and as a reflection exists
i.e. we name this reflection 'I'
and this is really all Descartes does)
can we say - reflection
the existence of it
tells us something about the world?
yes - that such an activity - process
occurs
happens in the world
this - we know
it is the fact of knowing
there is knowing in the world
where to from here?
13/05/06
the fact of reflection
the fact of mind is the fact of reflection
and we can regard it - this meta fact
in a number of possible ways -
we can i.e. - adopt a purely subjective view (Descartes / Berkeley)
or - an objective view - objective idealism - re Hegel
such reflections -
on the meta fact of reflection
are not however fundamental -
they are derivative
derivative of the fact
and so - what can be said of this meta fact?
the point is to refrain from characterization such as subjective and objective
descriptions (as above)
such are definitive
choices of definition
and therefore - secondary - reflective
the point of stating - the meta fact
is to state it - non-reflectively
it is - reflectivity - but we do not need to reflect on this (meta fact) in stating it
but how then is it to be characterized - stated?
as a primitive - I think
that is without characterization
it is - as I am putting it
meta neutral
in a sense if you like an empty fact or an open fact
13/05/06
neutral reflectivity
so still a question
how to state - reflectivity in an epistemologically and ontologically neutral way?
(or is this just not on?)
it is to say - or want to say - more than just that 'the mind is'
it is to say how it functions
which is?
xRx
or
x'Rx
therefore
x is contained in x'
therefore
x'
xR
x reflected
is what?
a statement
of a reflection
the fact of reflection
it is crucial to understand -
we cannot elucidate R
the reason -
for any elucidation - definition
is a reflection
in this sense
reflection
is primitive
I think this is true
also that it does not satisfy
but so be it -
the lack of satisfaction is no great surprise here
it is clearly - a characterization of reflection
perhaps
its reason
but my point here
is that reflection is not known
it - maybe the source of knowledge
but it cannot be known
(in the sense of explicated)
it is the ground of unknowing
p.s
we could perhaps take a happy approach to all this
and say
well reflecting is what we do
we know it in terms of its manifestations
which is our mental life and its creations
its activity
behaviourists might take this bait
14/05/06
reflection and objectivity
the reality is that the only objectivity in relation to reflectivity is reflection - another
reflection - a higher order reflection -
we do not think non-reflectively
finally it is just the activity - the machinery of mind
and it is - quite value free - there is no limit to reflection - either the number of or the
quality of -
strictly speaking - there is no quality here - per se
and the limit is only in the action of it
death and disease - natural limits
so - the mind does this -
reflects on what is given to it and on these reflections given
it is as if the process is there to make something of the presentation
and indeed a reflection is the making of -
and what is made is expressed in action
there is in all of this the illusion of meaning
or
the reflection is the creation of meaning
the process if we can call it that is consciousness
and it is clearly a logical process
in one sense it is the making of object to subject
the transforming
i.e. - a presentation of the mind - is object - reflection resolves it into subjectivity
what is clear is that these objects are fluid
they are instances of the reflection
to say this is of course to reflect on reflection
we can only know the mind - in - this activity -
its activity
we never leave the process -
only continue it
and to its nature there is no -
non-reflective argument
it is entirely pointless and it is everything we know
19/05/06
attributes
extension and mind
given Spinoza's presuppositions we have to assume mind as co-extensive with
extension
or as Spinoza put it - the mind as the idea of the body
the obvious difficulty is that most of nature does not display mental properties
from Spinoza's point of view - as a matter of logic mind is infinite and everywhere
now one way around this is to accept the metaphysical argument - mind - as infinite
and everywhere
but to argue that as such it is not obvious - apparent
and there is plausibility here
- as such we do not observe mind - (as we do extension) in ourselves and others
so why should it be any different - with other manifestations - modes of substance?
another way of putting it is to say we do not observe knowing
so - how do we - know?
how do we know that we know?
how do we know mind?
the only answer here I think is that mind is its own explanation
and you could say here - well this is no explanation
perhaps so -
and if mind is without explanation
this is not too far from Spinoza
if we were to say - well what is extension? - it's own explanation -
what answer is this?
this is not to paint Spinoza as a sceptic -
just to say that from his point of view
what is - is
and extension - is - what it is
it is not reducible - or explainable -
for Spinoza the thing is to understand it correctly -
to operate within its logic
to think and act in terms of its logic
my own view is that for Spinoza substance is the backdrop for what is
the concept a necessary given - what is - what exists
Spinoza comes at it from the top down -
but this is just an argument about what is necessary for unity - for homogeneity -
and of course any metaphysics must get this right
diversity it would seem - must be an outcome - a manifestation of unity
the question always is how?
at base Spinoza's answer is - that there is no diversity - just manifestation -
pretty straightforward really -
but for mind -
unless you argue mind is a fundamental - manifestation (attribute)
perhaps -
mind is - just not observable
- it is - as we know it - the inside of the world -
19/05/06
inner space
so - the mind as the inside of the world
the inside of space
the inside of matter
perhaps mind here is still an attribute - but clearly I am suggesting that we see it as a
dimension
again - if an inside - it is not an inside that is there to be observed
it is qualitatively different to - the outside
and just how much of the outside - has this inside?
not much it seems
but then I did argue - it's not as if it is a question of look and see - of observation
the mind - is aware of itself
this is the source - of knowing - about the mind
(not what I would choose as an answer to this problem - but where else to go - really?)
the mind reveals itself in awareness
the mind is awareness
so
the question is then one of awareness
is the world aware?
or are there only mind-points - in the world
then the outside is clear cut
the inside as I am putting it can only be known - by itself
therefore - it will not be possible - to know it - as other
it cannot be regarded - objectively
it is pure subjectivity
therefore -
it is a category mistake - to argue the issue - one way or another - empirically -
it has no empirical dimension
it is - ideal
which - for all intents and purposes - as far as I can see - is to say - nothing
or to say - nothing can be said
or
if there is any language available here it is only metaphorical - poetic
20/05/06
inside the inside
in the last couple of posts I have been trying to make sense of Spinoza's argument that
mind is an attribute of substance - one of the two (of an infinite number) revealed to
us
and at the same time trying to make some sense of my own idea that the mind is the
inside of the world
the intuition for this idea - the inside of the world - is just that the mind - as we know
it - it would seem is inside the body -
and then to see how far you can take this notion -
can it be extensively applied?
i.e. - if we regard extension as outside - logically you might argue - all extension - all
outside has an inside - therefore mind is everywhere
one difficulty though is - that it is usually argued - mind is not extensive - i.e. not
spatial
on the other hand - such a view doesn't make sense
if something exists - it exists in space
so are we talking about a different kind of space - or a different kind of entity
inhabiting space?
the mind - awareness - recognizes space - and itself - in space
the 'in space' here - though - is a different kind to the existence of the physical object
in space -
it still seems to me that it is intuitively clear that mind is in space in the sense of
inside it
and physical objects - the material world?
in space - as in the 'surface of space'
this view is to argue that 'space' has two dimensions - two metaphysical dimensions
inner space - outer space?
20/05/06
does every outside have an inside?
mind as inner space
the ghost in the machine?
well no - on Spinoza's scheme
extension and mind -
as I read him
are attributes - of substance
not substance itself - or substances in themselves
perceived essences - is also how he puts it
expressions is how I have come to think of it
expressions - that is of - substance
and this substance - in my view - is unknown
unknown - in itself
we can understand its manifestations
extension - and mind
but beyond this there is no penetration
except in a logical sense
so
on such an interpretation -
mind is an internal representation of substance
the physical world - substance - seen from the outside
we might get away with arguing this as a metaphysics of human beings
almost in a Kantian sense -
but how far can you take it?
can it sensibly be extended
to cover all of nature
perhaps God is not equivalent to nature
perhaps God is just an aspect of nature
(and nature just a expression of substance)
again
how far to extend mind?
I guess the question is - does every outside have an inside?
i.e. - we might argue the human being is in this sense two dimensional
but what of the rock
I would think not
and this makes room for what?
occassionalism
evolutionism
epiphenomenalism
either these options
or
parallelism?
and is this Spinoza's view?
parallelism -
my previous argument on this issue -
an attempt to save the day for a parallelism was to put that mind - only knows itself as
mind
the point being we could argue that - yes mind is everywhere - as a matter of logic
but it only identifies (knows) itself in particular
not universally
this is a way
20/05/06
knowledge of the mind
as regards knowledge of mind and its place in the world -
I know my mind - directly
there is no inference
in fact for all intents and purposes I am - my mind - for it is only through my mind - I
know my body -
yes
my mind -
is this all that can be said -
can we speak - strictly speaking - of mind -
unpossessed - as it were -
a reservoir of - spirit - out there - that we and other species dip into in varying
degrees?
this is the question - in a way
is mind as with extension - a force to be reckoned with -
or rather just an anomaly - almost a mistake of nature?
- scattered points in matter - no substratum?
so does my mind's knowledge of itself
(and I am assuming this for the moment)
go beyond itself - recognize - mind in other forms?
not directly - this is clear
indirectly - well yes
and if not - well some kind of solipsism -
I may not be the only one that exists - but the only one with a mind and knowledge
clearly not on
the mind recognizes itself in other physical forms?
is this just analogical inference -
or is there a more direct knowledge here?
i.e. mind recognizing mind
if so - how?
if this is on - it's not so much a question of perception as in sensual perception
though clearly perception plays an instrumental role
rather it is recognition of -
it is in some sense a cognitive action
it is an apprehension
the mechanics of this I don't know and have no idea to put forward at the moment
but I will stick with this notion and try and think it out
21/05/06
apprehending minds
even if we could establish a plausible case - for how the mind apprehends other minds
- non-inferentially
we are not necessarily any closer to a Spinozistic - pan-mentalism
for all we can thus argue is that a mind can recognize another mind
and yes there are characteristics that are common - difficult as it might be to specify
what they are -
and yes - such characteristics would - could form the basis of a theory of mind
still mind is only recognized in certain manifestations of nature
it is not universally recognized
mind has only particular appearances - in any recognizable sense
mind it seems is a characteristic of certain beings - but not all existents - or existence
to say this is in a way an argument for epiphenomenalism - a slight argument
if mind recognizes itself - in other forms and - mind is everywhere
why only the partial recognition?
could that just be - that mind in it's human form is limited in it's range?
yes - you could go down this track - but why - how intuitively plausible is such a
direction?
by the by I don't see how Spinoza could really avoid such a track
and the limitation argument comes to what?
well not much - as there really isn't any argument for saying - mind could be - more
than it is
evolution - yes - but that is just the never never - reaching beyond itself
not out of the question - but a bit flaky in this context
anyway the idea - would have to be that mind exists in other contexts - (in all
contexts)
but we can only know it - in the forms of sentient creatures
so - what I am getting at here - is that - such a pan-psychism - (is that the right term?)
- as Spinoza's - actually depends on scepticism to have any intellectual basis at all
21/05/06
looking into the brain
one attraction of the mind-brain identity thesis is that it quite specifically locates mind
- in the brain - and is clear about its ontological status - brain process
perhaps we can ask - why the brain - and not elsewhere - the argument here is
supposedly - scientific?
if true - this view puts pay to pan-psychism -
mind as a physical process - not an entity - or substance
with only the small problem - how you could ever know - on the basis of observation -
that any of this is true
as a conception - an idea of mind - about mind - a reflection - yes -
on this level as valid as any other
it strikes me that this question cannot be settled empirically
and that it may be a mistake - to in anyway speak - or think of the mind - empirically
the point being - that if mind - as I put it earlier is the inside of the world - it is not
accessible to empirical review -
for it is only the outside - the surface - that can be so accessed
the nature of the mind is not an empirical issue
I like this - but it raises the question - how then do we deal with - speak about -
understand the mind?
my stab here will be to say - in its own terms - ideally
and what can we expect from such?
because we tend naturally to think of knowledge in empirical terms - our natural
model for knowledge is science
and inductively - the gradual build up of detail to generality
knowledge of the mind - if such is possible - will not be like this
how does the mind work?
we can begin I think with reflection
I argue this is the basic operation of the mind
in fact it is mind for all intents and purposes
the outside - the observable physical world - does not reflect
it presents
mind reflects
(so - at least this - the connection is tight)
and reflection -
is?
the capacity to generate thought -
the activity of mind - what it does -
(which is not to say much)
perhaps art - as an analogy - helps here
I have said before that the language of mind is poetry
that the business of mind is metaphor
that the mind creates - generates - metaphor - and metaphor for metaphor
I don't think the deductive model is the model
clearly the mind can work in such a way
and does for very real purposes
but this model is only - one - metaphor - for?
for what -
for the way the world is
to cut directly to the chase - the world presents - it is naked - and silent
the mind reflects - it clothes and gives voice
what I was getting to - is that the reflective nature of the mind - in my view does
not follow any single model - i.e. deductive - inductive -
true these are models - metaphors used
but the mind can reflect - chaotically as it were - without rhyme or reason
this is really the essence of creative power
- the fact that the activity of the mind is essentially anarchistic
21/05/06
I doubt therefore I doubt
in general my position is a comprehensive scepticism
the question of mind - of the mind-body relationship
is a question we cannot know the answer to
and I mean this in a constructive sense
so far I have argued that the question of mind - the problem of the nature of mind -
cannot be settled empirically
mind has no objectivity
so to regard it - from - a physicalist - materialist point of view
is just not possible
it is not that it is wrong
it just cannot be done
the mind does not exist as an observable entity -
and to the question of its relationship to the body -
this is not a question at all
it cannot strictly speaking be raised
it is not that - there is not such and such a relationship
my view is that it is wrong headed to ask the question
for any answer to the question
presupposes a relationship between what is observable with what is not
we can't say there is not such and such a relationship
it is that we can never know
- therefore the question is ill conceived
this is my first point
the next thing to say is that the reason the question - the issue arises - and appears
sensible
is just because
someone thinks they know something
my point is that knowledge of the outside world - and knowledge of the inner world
are strictly speaking limited to their domains
there is no cross over
so how to deal with this?
the answer I think is this
and it's a kind of Spinozistic argument
it is that the inner and outer realms are dimensions or expressions
of a more fundamental reality
or perhaps - description
what is known is the inner - is the outer - mind - matter
I see these dimensions (and their 'stuff') as expressions of a singularity - that is
(except in terms of their expressions) - literally and obviously - unknown
it is if you like - a logical ground
that is without character
it is the description necessary - if the two kinds of 'experience' (inner /outer) are to be
unified -
it is what cannot be said
cannot be known
the 'open description'
it is what I think Spinoza - meant - or should have meant by 'substance'
21/05/06
inner and outer
I argued in the last piece that we have two kinds of knowledge corresponding to two
kinds of experience - the experience of the inner world (mind) and the experience of
the outer world (matter)
clearly we can and do speak of the world - as a singularity - a unity - as one
this is just to make a logical statement
it is to recognize that the dimensions inner and outer are dimensions of a unity -
that which has an inner and outer
for even if you want to limit the inner to conscious entities - still we are speaking of
the nature of the world - of the totality -
and we do not need to go much further than this
i.e. - Spinoza defines the totality - as one - eternal and infinite
this - or such an argument is not germane to my argument -
the point is - for the notion of dimension to make sense
it follows that dimensions - are dimensions of a unity - whatever its characteristics
now I think it is best to leave it just there
as a logical argument - not a substantial - ontological - position
it is knowledge - that -
not knowledge of what
as such it is contentless -
a neutral monism in James' and Russell's senses
but a neutral stripped bare
a ground that indeed - need not be known
its assertion is as far as you need go
(and what kind of logical assertion is this?
it is to acknowledge the groundlessness of being
as the ground of being - and to state this in most economical way
and if the statement cannot be made 'without content'
silence
still - there is nothing wrong with a bit of noise
even if it signifies nothing)
23/05/06
no escape
the mind holding itself as object?
what does this mean?
how is it to be explicated
the subject transferring itself to object - while maintaining subjectivity?
we understand the relation subject to object
where the two are ontologically distinct
i.e. - the object is outside of the subject
but what to make of the notion of an object within subjectivity?
subjectivity as object?
what I have argued to date is that the defining characteristic of the mind is reflectivity
reflection - is what the mind does - and thus - for all intents and purposes - what it is
so what does this mean?
we begin with reflectivity
and by definition - reflectivity is a relational operation
which at the first means - whatever the content of reflectivity - we are always speaking
of a 'relation between'
that which reflects - that which reflected on
'subject' and 'object' will do here
these are the 'relata' - of reflectivity
the posits -
OK to have posits
doesn't this suggest - something does the positing?
is this - separate to the positing?
i.e. - is reflectivity - mind - as I suggested?
or is reflectivity - the operation - the function of mind?
is a distinction necessary?
on logical grounds - it seems so
unless we want to say - the mind posits itself (as reflectivity)
the mind posits itself?
or is it that - yes - there is mind
and all we know is what it does?
if the former view - mind is essentially an unknown
out of which issues forth - reflectivity
the relational operation
if the latter -
if mind is just its operation -
we are left with nothing more to say - than
the mind - is what it does
i.e. - if you would like to know something more fundamental -
there is nothing that can be said
there is nothing behind the appearance - i.e. - the action of mind
beyond this action - mind does not know itself -
i.e. - there is nothing to know -
OK
back to the mind holding itself as object -
perhaps all awareness - just is self awareness
that there is no real sense to consciousness that is not self-consciousness
and in that case there are just different kinds of object
the object - outside
the object - inside -
or the inside as object
if so - then objectification - of the inside - the outside -
mind or matter - is what mind does
and - of course to do this it must be able to reflect
so reflection is the fundamental here -
what it is - apart from its operation -
we cannot say
we can only reflect - on it
no escape
24/05/06
mind and activity
on such a view as I am putting forward
the activity of the mind defines
mind is defined in its activity -
we might call such an activity - conception -
if so
mind defines itself as conception
- conception - here is a description of what it does
and this too - conception - is - or can be defined - further elaborated
for - various purposes
so - simply and briefly I say - 'mind' is just a name - a description - if you will for - a
certain kind of activity
note - here I am leaving 'the certain kind of activity' - purposely blank - or as blank as
it can be - in description
to emphasize and point to the fact that we begin as it were with nothing - nothing in
the sense of definition - of knowledge
we reflect - or this is what I call it - to give the activity - as with any other activity -
definition - and so on
what I want to say here -
the picture I have is of beginning with nothing - and reflecting on the activity that -
follows - and from this - knowledge -
the base - the base of humanity - is nothing - here is the purity of - the foundation of -
what we do -
knowledge - is - I call it reflection
the making of something of nothing -
in the beginning - was not the word
in the beginning is nothing -
the word is the making of - something -
this is not magical -
it is just - pragmatic
action - existence requires in conscious entities - definition - (reflection) -
language is the given - and necessary - medium
out of this comes the world - we make
this is of course an ideal - theoretical picture
we are born into the action of the world - and its language -
there is no nothing in reality - only in logic - in conception - or the logic of conception
still I want to say epistemologically speaking
the ground is pure
or perhaps - ideal
with no presumption - no content -
it is nothing -
here - if you like I am speaking of the soul of man
24/05/06
relations again
I think we come out of nothing and define
the world presents as it is
but as it is - is a relation
a relation between presentation and mind
so what we know
is this relation
and its definition is the business of our action
- our activity - this relation - this knowledge - is metaphysically speaking a creation
much is in fact given - in the relation
the presentation is stable
here the knowledge has a base
however the relation is never fixed
it is within its base - fluid
this is the origin of creativity
the constant possibility of interpretation
to the extent that the familiar
may - in certain endeavours - contexts - be replaced
hence - art
hence - science
the weaving is endless
the activity - makes for a reality
however behind this activity - of making knowledge -
is nothing -
the world is featureless
the mind an emptiness
in reality we never see this
we can only achieve this understanding -
in reflection on reflection
this is metaphysics
27/05/06
focus
consciousness is a focus
(it knows what it sees)
and knows that it is a focus
that is - that it is not limitless - all seeing - all knowing
so consciousness knows it is defined - that it operates within limitations
and the limitation is not just the specificity of focus
but also
the nature of the ground -
its ground
the ground of focus
- i.e. - its reason -
however - here too there is knowledge - knowledge that a ground exists -
not one though that consciousness - sees
description of what is seen
the domain of focus
is a secondary function - of consciousness
consciousness - sees - but on reflection how to describe?
so what is seen is presented - but not known
reflection demands description
description is not given in presentation
it is post-presentation -
and how does it come about?
here - consciousness - creates out of nothing -
the nothing that is presentation
here is the mystery of consciousness -
the act of creation
- of thought
- primal thought -
what is presented -
and even - what is beyond -
and beneath
what is presented
it is here we have our conceptions of the world
our descriptions
our explanations
we may be able to explain such - causally - as it were
- one idea led to another - and - this came out of such and such a need -
- OK - this though in reflection on the conception created -
it does not account for - nor can it - account for -
the act of creation
which is thus
the fundamental unknown
that is the foundation of consciousness
28/05/06
focus II
or another way of putting it is to say
the essence of consciousness is focus - i.e. - there is no focus in the non-conscious
the absence of focus defines the non-conscious
the object of consciousness is in the first place the non-conscious (non-focus)
and secondarily - focus - or a focus
and thus thirdly - focus itself -
the point of focus - is that it focuses
on what is
and - that is - non-focus and focus
focus is a view - in a metaphysical sense
consciousness is this view
the world is viewed - through consciousness
or more correctly - the world sees itself in consciousness
so - the appearance of focus - is another description of the appearance of
consciousness
and this appearance is not just another manifestation of phenomena
or again - more correctly - not just the generation of event or thing (on the non-
conscious level)
yes - the point being that the emergence or - the happening of consciousness is a
change in the nature of the world
it is the appearance of a dimension of reality
(for the argument's sake it doesn't matter if consciousness is an emergent property as
they say - or was always there - or here)
it is - as some have thought the emergence of the self
how do we account for this?
what is self?
at the most basic level - recognition
recognition of -
- objectivity?
yes - strangely -
and in such - is the reality of subjectivity
it is to say - that subjectivity and objectivity are essentially one moment
the one moment split
so -
if we can speak of 'pre-self' -
we are speaking of a world - without object - without subject -
what is such a world?
the unknown -
pure and simple
and is not the world - as we know it -
just this -
the unknown - revealing itself
in consciousness
in focus
this - we must think of - as a cosmological development
and if so
it is - one without reason
for reason - only comes with consciousness
the world itself is without reason
how different is such a statement to
the world is its own reason
the difference between everything and nothing?
31/05/06
the human dilemma
the human dilemma is consciousness in contingency
the essential intuition of consciousness is freedom - it's freedom
and yet always the knowing that this freedom is contained
the containment is the world - is contingency
consciousness is in the world - it has no context without the world - i.e. outside the
world
'outside the world' is a concept consciousness cannot formulate - except in an
imaginative negative way
the point is that consciousness knows itself as within -
it is the 'being in the world' - this knowing - which is the foundation of the assertion 'I'
that is consciousness - that is self -
it is 'being in' that defines consciousness - gives its universality - a particularity
the primal intuition of freedom - is consciousness knowing itself - knowing itself as
universal
without the constraint of particularity - of contingent instantiation
this knowing though is essential
(it never leaves consciousness)
consciousness operating in the world - is the real as distinct from essential knowing of
consciousness
consciousness aware - not of itself - but of - the world -
and so two realities for consciousness
consciousness as essence - the essence is - freedom
consciousness as reality - the reality - is contingent
the dilemma of consciousness is the reconciliation of itself
understanding the paradox of essence and reality
freedom and contingency
there is no movement here
no movement above and beyond
sorry George
the dilemma is fixed -
any imaginative movement to a higher reality - a reality of resolution
is wishful - is flight
p.s.
consciousness is always aware of its essence - its freedom
in any moment in reality - in contingency
finding the place of freedom
is an art
and the art is to find that contingency which gives peace from the struggle
and by the by
art is consciousness' assertion -
and assertion in the face of the unknown
the expression of freedom as freedom
whatever its form
its language -
its shape and colour
it is finally 'the assertion of'
the being of consciousness
as free -
art is in this assertion too
an invader
it invades the characterless world of pure being
and asserts a reality
it recognizes the unknown
but is never accepting of it
it creates in the unknown
gives it form and content
however
the unknown is not thus diminished
it is just characterized
these creations of consciousness
are ephemeral
they hold only - really for the moment
of their creation
it is only human vanity
the need for permanence
that leads to the idea of art
as something above and beyond
time and place
we think a physical form
a physical expression lasts
and even that the idea of it might
survive corruption
this again is more to do with desire
than reality
at the end nothing penetrates
every creation
a hit that misses
02/06/06
who killed Spinoza?
Spinoza's death - some questions
Steven Nadler in his excellent biography 'Spinoza: A Life'. (Cambridge 1999. pages
349 -350) writes the following regarding the circumstances of Spinoza's death -
'Spinoza was obviously not well in the winter of 1676-7. He probably allowed himself
to be bled a couple of times, as this had seemed to provide some relief in the past.
Given the nature of his illness, he would have been coughing frequently, and must
have been paler, thinner, and weaker than usual. Still, Van der Spyck and his family
told Colerus that they had "no idea that he was so near his end, even a little while
before he died, and they had not the least thought of it." Spinoza, stoic by nature,
254.
probably suffered his infirmity with much reserve and little fuss. Always trying to be
as faithful as possible to his philosophical principles in his own life, he was not given
to pondering his mortality. This was an activity, rather, for the superstitious multitude
who, moved by hope and fear, worry about what is to come in some alleged hereafter.
As he proclaims in the Ethics, "a free man thinks least of all of death, and his wisdom
is a meditation on life, not on death."
In fact, Spinoza himself may have been unprepared for the quickness of his decline, as
Schuller suggested on the day after his burial: "It seems that death's unexpected
debilitation took him by surprise, since he passed away from us without a testament
indicating his last will". This is not entirely true, There was no written will, but
Spinoza did at least tell Van der Spyck that, immediately after his death, his writing
desk, which contained his letters and papers (including the Ethics), should be sent to
Rieuwertsz in Amsterdam. But if Colerus's report about the final day is to be trusted -
and presumably he heard it all directly from the landlord and his family, although he
was writing nearly thirty years later - Spinoza, although aware of the gravity of his
illness, had no idea that he would not last the afternoon.
When the landlord came home [from church] at around four o'clock [on the day
before], Spinoza came downstairs from his room, smoked a pipe of tobacco and spoke
with him for a long time, particularly about the sermon that was preached that
afternoon. He went to bed soon afterwards in the forechamber, which was his to use
and in which he slept. On Sunday morning, before church, he came downstairs again,
speaking with his landlord and his wife. He had sent for a certain doctor LM. from
Amsterdam, who ordered them to buy an old cock and to cook it up that morning, so
that Spinoza might, that afternoon, have some broth, which he did. And when the
landlord returned with his wife, he ate it with a good appetite. In the afternoon, the
landlord's family went back to church, and Dr. L.M. stayed with him alone. But when
they came hack from church, they heard that Spinoza died at around three o'clock, in
the presence of the physician, who just that evening returned to Amsterdam by
nightboat, not even seeing to the care of the deceased. But he made off with some
money that Spinoza had left lying on the table, along with some ducats and a few gold
pieces, and a knife with a silver handle.
Spinoza died quietly on Sunday, February 21. The doctor who was by his side when
he passed away was, to all appearances, his old friend Lodewijk Meyer, although
it is possible that the "doctor from Amsterdam" was, in fact, Schuller. Schuller later
told Tschirnhaus that he was present on the day Spinoza died and claimed to Leibniz
that he had searched through Spinoza's things "thoroughly, one by one, before and
after his death." Whichever physician it was, the disappearance of the money and the
silverware is more likely explained as a case of memento collecting rather than theft.'
some questions -
his health?
'Given the nature of his illness, he would have been coughing frequently, and must
have been paler thinner, and weaker than usual'
OK but as Nadler notes Colerus reports they (the family he boarded with) 'had no idea
that he was near his end, even a little while before he died, and they had not the least
thought of it'
his last afternoon: Colerus reports that when the landlord came home from church
'Spinoza came downstairs from his room, smoked a pipe of tobacco and spoke with
him for a long time'
if Spinoza was suffering - and ill with a respiratory disease - and also coughing, paler
and thinner than usual - would he be smoking and talking for a long time?
here the report of him smoking and conversing in the afternoon does not seem to be
consistent with the picture of sick man on death's door
on the day of his death -
the doctor?
still you might say - if he wasn't sick why would he call for a doctor?
and the doctor prescribes chicken soup - which Spinoza eats 'with a good appetite'
we are told the landlord and his family go to church in the afternoon and Spinoza is
left alone with the doctor
why didn't Colerus identify this doctor?
why withhold his name - and only refer to him with initials?
why the mystery?
anyway Colerus reports 'but when they (the landlord and his family) came back from
church, they heard that Spinoza had died around three o'clock, in the presence of the
physician, who just that evening returned to Amsterdam by nightboat, not even seeing
to the care of the deceased'
OK - so who told the landlord Spinoza had died - was it the doctor - or had he gone by
the time they came back from church?
Colerus is not clear here - had the doctor already gone when they returned from
church? - if so the report of Spinoza's death is from an unknown source
if it was the doctor who reported his death and he was there at three o'clock - why
couldn't he have 'seen to the care of the deceased' before he left in the evening?
and why - of course would this doctor cut and run?
Spinoza's dagger-
'but he made off with some money that Spinoza had left lying on the table, along with
some ducats and a few gold pieces, and a knife with a silver handle'
memento collecting?
we are told in the next breath that the doctor was most likely 'his old friend Lodewijk
Meyer'
the things that were taken were all things that can be sold
the idea of memento collecting doesn't fit
but would the doctor thieve - and especially given he is an old friend?
and it would be known he was the last to see Spinoza alive?
anything missing would be directly traceable to him
is there any real evidence that there was a doctor with Spinoza when he died?
or that a doctor visited him on his last day?
only on the report of Colerus based on the say so of the landlord Van der Spyck
it's all Van der Spyck's story - as far as the Colerus account goes
(the report of Schuller being the 'Amsterdam doctor' is a report from Tschirnhaus who
is going on Schuller's say so - again - no corroboration)
the last meal of chicken soup with Van der Spyck - Colerus doesn't tell us if the
landlord partook of the soup - only that Spinoza ate heartily
the theft - it was the doctor of course
then there's Schuller's claim to Leibnitz that he had searched through Spinoza's things
'thoroughly, one by one, before and after his death'
before AND after his death?
why did Schuller report this to Liebnitz and what was Liebnitz's interest in this?
and what was Schuller looking for?
and whatever it was could it have led to Spinoza's death?
03/06/06
ex nihilo
we begin as it were out of nothing
the appearance is what we know as real
and there is primal doubt at the first realization
- the question of one's self in the world -
to be separate and a part of -
what is the resolution of this?
what is the gulf?
our instinct is to know
to fill the absence with certainty
a certainty never seen - never touched
only imagined after the event
still behind the phantasms of sense?
an essence - a substance - a bedrock
a perfectly reasonable assumption
so the question is knowledge
and the lives of humans are in every moment and aspect - an exploration of this issue
how to find a stability - a basis - a foundation for being
the thing is knowledge if it is to function here
is but a window to what is looked for
and once you see through the window
you see there is nothing
and this is the great revelation of knowledge -
that as a pure quest - it shows itself to be an empty form
we fall back then on our ways of knowing
(forsaking what can be known)
this is the possibility that is consciousness
(we never leave the truth of consciousness - the question is only whether to embrace
or reject - how to find - a stillness in possibility)
that is the source of the quest for finality
to abandon the quest
and accept the reality of possibility
of possible ways of knowing
the ultimate (unknown)
is the reluctant truth
we come to
it is here that the world - becomes deeply subjective
and in reality
our movement - our movement in the world
becomes the only true account
of where we stand - and of what the world is
and this account will always defy logic
is never complete
perhaps - not even translatable
bodies become the resolution of mind
lives lived - the answers
and the solutions - never true or finished - nevertheless their validity - in the necessity
of being
the fact of existence - the fact of death
the history of movement
in space and time
in arms legs
and eyes
we came always to the absence but each journey different
every picture unique
04/06/06
Santayana X
some uses of this discovery
the discovery is essence
he says in chapter 9 -
'my scepticism at last has touched rock bottom, and my doubt has found honourable
rest in the absolutely indubitable'
here he defines essence as the object of intuition
and goes on to say that each essence is defined by instant apprehension
the first thing to note here is that it is clear that for Santayana scepticism is - as it was
for Descartes - a means to an end - the end being certainty
it is methodological scepticism at base
cut away the opposition (dogmatism) and then move into the palace (certainty)
what I have attempted to argue is that such a view is a negative scepticism
a scepticism about what is not
I argue it is possible to have a positive scepticism
one where the end - a sceptical view of the world - is effectively - the ground of our
understanding
it's as if - we learn that we in fact begin with scepticism -
that the non-sceptical claim to knowledge is the mistake - the error of our ways
there are moments in Santayana when one gets a sense that he saw this
however - this discovery of essence - I don't think is one of them
however - it is worth looking at - he does have some true insights - that come out of
this idea
in chapter 10 -
he sets about showing that his essence is not that of the Platonists or the empiricists
and much is said of essence -
so what is essence for Santayana?
let me give an example
he says (p.91) -
'Suppose for instance that I see yellow, that my eyes are open, and that there is a
buttercup before me; my intuition (not properly the essence "yellow" which is the
datum) is then called a sensation. If again I see yellow with my eyes closed, the
intuition is called an idea or a dream - although often in what is called an idea no
yellow appears, but only words. If yet again I see yellow with my eyes open, but there
is no buttercup, the intuition is called a hallucination.'
the point being?
there are various ways of stating it
one way is to say that a physicalist account of the experience is not incompatible with
a mentalist account (does anyone use the term 'mentalist' anymore?) perhaps
'sensationalist' might be more modern
there are other possibilities - perhaps a pragmatist - i.e. behaviourist account
what Santayana is getting at is - I think - that we have various languages for
describing what we experience and they are finally all valid
this is a radical view - and one I agree with and argue for
it is I think an argument of positive scepticism
the problem for Santayana though
is his 'indubitable' - his essence -
if such is the instant apprehension
the question - what is it the instant apprehension of?
surely it's something - at the very least
but then what are we talking about?
I suspect his essence is existence
and by essence here he means existence in some kind of pure - inarticulate state
the ground on which all our concepts imaginations delusions - whatever - rest
the problem is - if you are going to say it's something
if it can't be described - where is its existence?
is it just an assertion -
with no basis at all?
to my mind Santayana just missed it
forget talk of essence
just speak instead of - yes - the unknown
my basic point is this - the object of knowledge is the unknown
it is the unknown that all our 'knowledge' is directed at - is a response to
it is precisely because there is no essence
or should I say knowable essence
that the possibility of interpretation exists - is real
what we begin with is the unknown
what we respond to is the unknown
our knowledge is always a possible account of what we do not know
or as Santayana says at the end of chapter 10 - and I think this goes some way to the
point -
'so that, for instance, alternative systems of religion or science, if not taken literally,
may equally well express the actual operation of things measured by different organs
or from different centres.'
05/06/06
Damasio I
I intend to review Antonio Damasio's book 'Looking for Spinoza'
and I will begin here with chapter 1
he begins by saying feelings of pleasure and pain are the bedrock of our mind
and that we often fail to notice this simple reality - because images use up so much of
our attention
so bedrock -
as in a reality behind image?
and is this to suggest feelings - and feelings of pleasure and pain - are somehow
behind images
the image is what is up front
the feeling behind the image?
I would have thought pleasure and pain are direct in awareness
not a backdrop
as far as I know the term 'feeling' is not used by Spinoza
OK - let's not make too much of this
pleasure and pain?
passions - by which the mind passes to a higher or lower state of perfection
and passions?
here we need to go to emotion
and for Spinoza - the modifications of the body by which the power of the body is
increased or diminished and at the same time the ideas of these modifications
if adequate - these emotions are actions
if inadequate - passions
so passion here?
two definitions?
one - the passing to a higher or lower state
two - inadequate cause of such a passing
as in III.D.3:
'therefore, if we can be the adequate cause of any of these affectations, I understand by
the effect an action: otherwise a passion.'
on the face of it - a difficulty here -
is passion any modification that leads to higher or lower states or just inadequate
modifications?
i.e. could I be self directed and passionate?
or am I only passionate when acting in response to?
is it me that's confused here?
OK back to emotion -
the modifications by which the body's power is increased or diminished and the ideas
so essentially changes in potency
passions?
inadequate emotions -
i.e. not self directed
OK - now back to pleasure
pleasure is
the passion by which the mind passes to a higher state
something doesn't quite fit
how can a passion lead to a higher state if by definition a passion is an inadequate
effect -
a result not self directed?
unless we are to say that pleasure is in itself a higher state of perfection
and it can come about either adequately or inadequately
yes
I think this is right
this is what Spinoza is saying
passion and emotion -
passion - an inadequate cause
emotion - any modification of potency
pleasure - whatever the cause - a higher state of perfection
very subversive
so Damasio's - 'feelings of pleasure and pain' are what exactly in Spinoza's terms?
III P.XI. note -
'We see then the mind can suffer great changes, and can pass from a state of greater or
lesser perfection; these passions explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain'
here - pleasure and pain - emotions
and the changes that can occur which lead to these emotions - passions
so why does Damasio refer to pleasure and pain as feelings?
and then later 'feelings and their essential ingredients - pleasure and pain'?
on page 6 he says -
'Could it be that while emotion and feeling were twins, emotion was born first and
feeling second, with feeling forever following emotion like a shadow. In spite of their
close kinship and seeming simultaneity, it seemed that emotion preceded feeling.
Knowledge of this specific relationship, as we shall see, provided a window into the
investigation.'
so it is clear - Damasio wants to introduce feeling -
his chapter is called 'Enter Feeling'
and this of course is fine - but it is not Spinoza
Spinoza argues pleasure and pain are emotions
they are not something else - the long lost twin
this is not an argument against Damasio's thesis only a questioning of his use of
Spinoza
now as I said above 'feeling' is not a category Spinoza uses or at least as far as I can
see - I might well be wrong here
but just to tie it up
if pleasure and pain are emotions as Spinoza says
again what does this mean?
emotions?
Pt. III def. III -
'By EMOTION (affectus) I understand the modifications of the body by which the
power of action of the body is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the
same time the ideas of these modifications'
in the Everyman edition of the Ethics 1989 there is this note by Parkinson:
'It is worth noting that an emotion, for Spinoza, is both mental and physical; in his
terms, it is the same state of substance expressed through the attributes of thought and
extension.'
affectations
changes - modification in substance -
that are expressed in extension and thought
so pleasure is a state of mind and body
in so far as it is state of mind it is an idea
in so far as it is state of the body it is a physical change
so 'feeling'? - is what?
the term we use to describe this -
Spinoza's term was 'emotion'
and Damasio cannot really just say that 'feeling' is the same as 'emotion' - given that
he wants to distinguish the two terms
so - again what is feeling?
in this chapter it hasn't been defined - except rather poetically as a 'twin'.
I think the key to Damasio's distinction is in his science
he says on page 5 -
'But the opposite was not true: Some patients who lost their ability to experience
certain feelings still could express the corresponding emotions'
what follows here is the twin metaphor
earlier he says -
'Imagine, for example meeting someone who, as a result of damage to a certain
location of the brain, became unable to experience compassion or embarrassment -
when compassion or embarrassment were due.....'.
so what is going on here?
what is this - either you have the emotion or you don't?
and here too one needs to think about what is meant by emotion
no doubt neurologists begin with standard behaviour
i.e. - standard emotional responses are categorized in a standard way
we identify embarrassment i.e. - by certain behaviour - which in normal functioning
human beings doesn't vary too much
however this would not be expected in the case of certain brain injuries
isn't it most likely that the neurologists cannot interpret the behaviour of the non-
embarrassed individual?
it is not to say there is no emotional response - just that it is not recognized or indeed
perhaps even understood -
be this as it may I still don't see what 'feelings' are supposed to be?
are they known internal states?
and how - for Damasio are they different from emotions
what is it to lose the ability to experience certain feelings and still be able to express
the corresponding emotions?
I just wonder if these patients are being read correctly
again if you experience pain you have the emotion of pain
the emotion of pain is the experience
if you don't experience pain you don't have the emotion of pain
emotion from a Spinozistic point of view
is a unified event
it is not as if something can happened to the body that weakens it and this is not
experienced in the mind
the loss of power
you see there just may be very good reason for why Spinoza put this thesis in such
general terms - increase in power / decrease in power
and it is this generality that makes feelings irrelevant - unnecessary and likely to just
get in the way of clear thinking
it is not where you have a certain feeling that is to the point
it's about potency
and yes we have certain names for the increase of potency and for the decrease
these particular expressions are useful - but finally irrelevant to the real state of affairs
it looks to me as if Damasio has introduced feeling into the argument - and as it turns
out - as the basis of his argument - without really defining it satisfactorily in relation
to emotion
we'll just have to see
he began chapter 1 with the statement that:
'Feelings of pain and pleasure or some quality in between are the bedrock of our
minds'
this rock is not bedded - and rather slippery - I think
05/06/06
Damasio I (ii)
page 7 -
'Life being a high wire act, most feelings are expressions of the struggle for balance,
ideas of the exquisite adjustments and corrections without which, one mistake too
many, the whole act collapses. If anything in our existence can be revelatory of our
simultaneous smallness and greatness, feelings are'
OK. - feelings here are ideas - expressions of the struggle for balance
ideas
so if feelings are ideas -
this makes some sense of the bedrock claim
and if so - why the term 'feeling'? - 'ideas' obviously - at least on this page - works
well
and we get introduced to the meaning of life
the struggle for balance
look I know I'm being a bit petulant here - and I hope Damasio doesn't take offense
because I think he's written a great book
but why 'balance'?
and what is balance?
hope it's a bit more substantial than feeling
the point is how do you know this is what life is about?
sure you've made your observations constructed your theories
and yeah we all have hunches
but balance could be anything or nothing
poetry is not philosophy - or science
and the thing that worries me here is we are going to see - if we haven't already - a
teleological argument -
if what our feelings reveal is a struggle for balance
balance must be the goal
teleology
this is the biologists curse - and it seems one way or another - they fall in -
biology never really got beyond Aristotle
OK enough with the insults
the worry is Damasio is going to try and hoist this 'balancing act' on to Spinoza
let's hope he falls off the wire before that happens
'Emotion and related reactions are aligned with the body, feelings with the mind. The
investigation of how thoughts trigger emotions and of how bodily emotions become
the kind of thoughts we call feelings provides a privileged view into mind and body,
the overtly disparate manifestations of a single and seamlessly interwoven human
organism.'
the situation has gone from serious to grave
how thought triggers emotion -
Spinoza on emotions - 'I understand the modifications of the body by which the power
of action of the body is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same
time the ideas of these emotions'
so thought triggering - emotions
it sort of sounds like Damasio might be thinking that thought is something other than
emotions
that we are dealing with two categories - and one can trigger the other
too much Descartes is a bad thing -
'and of how bodily emotions become the kind of thoughts we call feelings'
I'm starting to think there is something really wrong with the way Damasio has read
Spinoza
if indeed - the above statement is meant to be Spinozistic
now it might be me who's misreading Damasio - but it sounds to me like he's saying
that there is some kind of dynamic relation between body and mind -
'bodily emotions become the kind of thought we call feelings'
and for 'feeling' here - read 'thought'
how body becomes thought -
is this it?
if so - it's not Spinoza - in fact it's everything he argued against
Antonio - this is going to be a hard one to swallow
(can I suggest Wild Turkey)
there is no becoming in Spinoza
Hegel might be the next book
think of it this way -
what we have from Spinoza is a logical description of reality -
it's a vision of what is
Spinoza believes we can see reality sub specie aeternitatis
there is no movement - no becoming
in this perspective
the power of Spinoza's thought is that he doesn't depend on science for the truth of his
outlook - it is meta - meta physics
05/06/06
Damasio I (iii)
'For example, when Spinoza said that love is nothing but a pleasurable state, joy,
accompanied by the idea of an external cause, he was separating out with great clarity
the process of feeling from the process of having an idea about an object that can
cause an emotion'
separating out - the process of a feeling - from the process of having an idea - about an
object - that can cause an emotion
what Spinoza actually says is -
'love is nothing else than pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause'
Pt.III. Prop. XIII. note
there is in this definition no mention of feeling - process or causing an emotion
Spinoza is saying pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love
pleasure
and
the idea of an external cause
this is love
what this definition does is explain the idea of love - in terms of pleasure - which as
an emotion is a modification of potency - and the idea of an external cause - as
distinct from an internal cause
pleasure and its explanation is love
that is it is not just the increase in power -
it is this plus the idea of an external cause
love is pleasure caused by something outside of the self
under certain circumstances - you can love anything - everything
it seems so - on this view
it's a question of what gives you pleasure -
Spinoza thought it is possible to experience the joy of everything
the intellectual love of God
we are getting ahead of ourselves here
God - watching human affairs would say of love - it is pleasure or joy accompanied
by the idea of an external cause
that would be His observation as it were
also important to emphasize here too - that it's not just the having of the emotion of
pleasure -
you can experience pleasure - without any accompanying idea
still pleasure - but not love
the idea of an external cause makes it love
and the idea of course could be true or false
05/06/06
Damasio I (iv)
Page 12.
'An affect cannot be restrained or neutralized except by a contrary affect that is
stronger than the affect to be restrained. In other words, Spinoza recommended that
we fight a negative emotion with an even stronger but positive emotion brought about
by reasoning and intellectual effort. Central to his thinking was the notion that the
subduing of the passions should be accomplished by reason-induced emotion and not
by pure reason alone.'
Spinoza's opening statement above - is really just - an objective account of what
happens when -
when an affect - an emotion is restrained or neutralized - it is in Spinoza's terms a
scientific account - as scientific as explaining what happens when water boils or is
cooled
there is no recommendation here - and this is important to understand regarding
Spinoza's ethics - he does not recommend that you do or don't do anything -
he is not in this sense a moralist
he is not really a prescriptivist - he is - or attempts to be - certainly wants to be a
descriptivist
so if you want to know what the right thing to do is - don't read Spinoza
if on the other hand you are looking for a dispassionate account of moral terms and
their use - he's your man
Spinoza does not tell you how you should get your pleasure - he does however present
an account of nature of pleasure
Spinoza suggests that what is good is what is useful - he doesn't tell you what you
should find useful
he can tell you why what you find to be useful is useful - and why what is not useful is
not useful
no recommendations on how you should go about your life
and so when Damasio says Spinoza gives a theory on how to subdue the passions
this is not I think strictly correct
yes Spinoza thinks that not being able to control outside influences will lead to a loss
of power - he gives an argument
the issue - if you wish to avoid suffering - is to avoid being a victim of circumstances
for Spinoza this is not about subduing and inducing - rather understanding
it is in his view - an intellectual endeavour -
knowing the nature of reality and one's place in it
working from adequate ideas
06/06/06
Damasio I (v)
'I am convinced that mental process are grounded in the brain's mappings of the body,
collections of neural patterns that portray responses to events that cause emotions and
feelings'
mental processes - ideas?
grounded in the brain
its neural patterns
and these 'portray' -
do we read 'picture' here or what?
responses to events
events that cause emotion
and feeling
- what a dog's breakfast
mental processes grounded in the brain
hard to see how this isn't a mind-brain identity thesis
and is he suggesting this is Spinoza's view?
for Spinoza - substance expresses itself as extension and thought
so on this view - you can take anything and see it - explain it - in physical terms or
mental terms
it's the one thing
looked at in terms of its different expressions -
this goes for the brain
the brain exists as an extended thing within a physical system
on the other hand I can view this modification of substance as mind
the idea of the brain -
and all this might involve -
as a system of ideas within a theoretical framework
we can explain this thing therefore as mind or as body
as mental or physical
the brain as such - as substance - is only knowable - as body and mind
my point is - as far as Spinoza is concerned
the human brain is not essentially different to anything else
we may as well be talking about a grain of sand
mind for Spinoza is a feature of the world -
not just some small part of it - i.e. - your brain
it is not found just in small isolated centres
for such a view re Liebnitz
'neural patterns portray events that cause emotions and feelings'
so I can look into a brain and see a portrayal of an event that causes pleasure?
that is I can see the neural pattern of an emotion
that is a modification of the body by which the power of action of the body is
increased and the idea of this modification
and the idea of this modification
on Spinoza's view - emotion is the change in body and the idea of the change
can I suggest that ideas are thought - not observed
that at the best the only correlation that might be made is between a neural pattern and
behaviour
from the point of view of science
the idea (of a physical change) is not observed
Damasio might be OK with this -
can't we infer there is such an idea - even if not observed simply on the basis of our
metaphysical assumptions?
yes - but where is the empirical content in such an inference?
and where can it be - how is it to be tested?
'Caute'
06/06/06
Damasio II
Damasio begins with a somewhat sharper definition of feeling - and the relation of
feeling to emotion
emotions are public presentations
feelings private
emotions play out in the theatre of the body
feelings in the theatre of the mind
and he suggests that emotions precede feelings in the history of a life
also that emotion and feeling are a continual process
and also - homeostasis
OK so he thinks it useful to distinguish private and public dimensions of the organism
first up I should say I will look at this from the point of view of Spinoza's thought
that's my first interest here - how accurate a representation of Spinoza do we get from
Damasio?
having said that - I recognize this may well be - in the full playing out of events - a
misrepresentation of Damasio
the point being he may well be putting up his own - deviant version of Spinoza's
thought - in good faith - in the fullness of the argument
nevertheless at the very least he claims to be accurately representing Spinoza
so it's worth a look.
this private / public distinction?
first up let me say it's never been exactly clear to me where Spinoza is on this question
does he think the mind is private?
is the mind the private dimension of substance - extension its public face?
frankly I don't know how you would avoid some view like this
nevertheless as far as I know Spinoza never made such a commitment
my own view is that we should see consciousness as the inside of the world
the inside of extension
and if this - there is not only external knowledge - but also internal - inner knowledge
Spinoza though - I don't think viewed it this way
his perceptive was entirely objective
as if sub specie aeternitatis
we have ideas of ideas - that how is we know ideas -
it is how we know - mind
this is Spinoza's very bare - and beautiful simple theory of consciousness
as a matter of logic - mind is not peculiar to particular modes of substance
it exists as a dimension of - an expression of substance - per se
it is one way that we know
and for Spinoza - therefore mind is objective - primarily
it is a feature of the world
and the world is objective - it is not my thought
my thought is a feature of the world
I am in this sense entirely - objective
I don't think in Spinoza there is any subjectivity
there are only the objective features of reality
and we are this reality
our characteristics are these features - writ small
and these characteristics are all we know of reality
all we can know
OK - back to Damasio
feelings private - the problem here is science
how do you establish the existence of non-observable entities?
what is the method - what is the process?
faith - it seems - and a conspiracy of believers
just a point
but why distinguish emotion and feeling
Damasio is incurably a biologist
too much time in the garden
(although Voltaire did think this was the way to go)
feelings for Damasio it sems - are something like the (internal) observables of
emotion
the flowerings
the buds
so we need this machinery
this biology of emotion
Spinoza did not think so
from the lofty heights of sub specie aeternitatis
he saw emotions very unemotionally
a change in potency
couldn't be more scientific than that
pleasure is the expression of an increase in potency
pain the expression of decrease
I am not against the great tree of emotion grown and nurtured by Damasio - but I fail
to see what is gained with all the stages - dimensions and flowerings
a rock in the field tells us as much
and less
07/06/06
Damasio II (ii)
homeostasis and the reappearance of teleology
page 30 -
Damasio says - 'The single word homeostasis is a convenient shorthand for the
ensemble of regulations and the resulting state of regulated life'
and in the note to this he gives the game away -
note 5 -
'the word homeodynamics is even more appropriate than homeostasis because it
suggests the process of seeking an adjustment rather than a fixed point of balance.
Steven Rose introduced the term for these same reasons....'
Spinoza -
pt.I. Concerning God Appendix
'Now since all these prejudices I am attempting to point out depend upon this one
point, that men commonly suppose that all natural things act like themselves with an
end in view, and since they assert that God directs all things to a certain end (for they
say God made all things for man, and man that he might worship God, I shall
therefore consider this one thing first, inquiring in the first place, why so many
acquiesce in this prejudice, and why all are by nature so prone to embrace it; then I
shall show its falsity, and finally, how from this there have arisen prejudices
concerning good and bad, merit and wrong-doing, praise and blame, order and
confusion, beauty and ugliness, and other things of this kind......'
further on he says -
'Thus I have explained what I undertook in the first place. It is not necessary for me
now to show at length that nature has no fixed aim in view, and that all final cause are
merely fabrications of men. For I think this is sufficiently clear from the bases and
causes from which I have traced the origin of this prejudice, from Prop. 16, and
corollaries of Prop. 32, and above all from all those propositions in which I have
shown that all things in nature proceed eternally from a necessity and with utmost
perfection. I should add, however, this further point, that the doctrine of final causes
overthrows nature entirely.'
the way I would put it is that substance has no end
for if it did - it would not be substance - for that would mean there was something out
side of substance - a contradiction
so the point is - in science - not to fantasize
deal with what is -
this by the way is not to say there is no place for fantasy - Spinoza for one recognizes
the place of imagination in life
but imaginative constructions - are not in his view science
teleological fantasies are imaginative constructions
not science
which brings me back to
homeostasis / homedynamics
Damasio is putting a teleological thesis here - OK - except it's being put fraudulently -
not as a imaginative construction - a comforting meta fairy tale - but rather it's being
spruiked as science
'the process of seeking'
the 'regulated' life
very good I hope he gets there - but leave nature - and science out of this quest
this is so presumptuous - so anthropomorphic
regardless of your attitude to Spinoza
this is bad science
07/06/06
Damasio II (iii)
Conatus
Damasio continuing on with his homeostasis argument
page 36:
'It is apparent that the continuous attempt at achieving a state of positively regulated
life is a deep and defining part of our existence - the first reality of our existence as
Spinoza intuited when he described the relentless endeavour (conatus) of each being
to preserve itself. Striving, endeavor, and tendency are three words that come close to
rendering the Latin term conatus, as used by Spinoza in Propositions 6,7 and 8 of the
Ethics, Part II. In Spinoza's own words: 'Each thing, as far as it can by its own power,
tries to preserve in its being' and 'The striving by which each thing strives to preserve
in its being is nothing but the actual essence of a thing'. Interpreted with the
advantages of current hindsight, Spinoza's notion implies that the living organism is
constructed so as to maintain the coherence of its structures and functions against
numerous life-threatening odds.'
it's clear from this that Damasio thinks homeostasis is a modern rendering of conatus.
what needs to be understood here is that for Spinoza the essence of existence is
existence - there is no other reason - what exists exists because it exists
the point of existing is to exist
it's really as naked as this
Spinoza does not say how one does or should exist -
what it is to preserve in being
this is essentially an open question
if it's a question at all
for what substance - its modifications - and modes - do
is - preserve in being
it's not as if there is one way or another
a matter of choice
everything you do is to the preservation of your being
for some - who think - maintaining existence is one thing and not the other
one way and not the other
Spinoza must appear as utterly subversive
subversive in that his view of the essence of man subverts any - particular conception
homeostasis - is a fair enough idea
but let's say homeostasis was not what biological science suggested
that some other conception was regarded as the true view
the point is - Spinoza's conatus - his theory of conatus - would be in no way affected
08/06/06
Damasio II (iv)
on page 68-69 Damasio says - in relation to a patient who received a certain treatment
for Parkinson's disease - and had a contrary reaction - to that expected -
'...the presence of thoughts capable of causing sadness - the presence of emotionally
competent stimuli. Except of course that no such thoughts had been present prior to
the unexpected incident; nor was the patient prone to having such thoughts
spontaneously. Emotion related thoughts only came after the emotion began'
the presence of thoughts capable of causing sadness
again Spinoza's definition of emotion -
'I understand the modifications of the body by which the power or action of the body
is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these
modifications'
and sadness - III. prop.11 Scholium -
'We see that the mind can suffer great changes, and can pass to a greater and now
lesser perfection: the passions explaining to us the affects of joy and sorrow. By joy
therefore in what follows, I shall understand the passion by which the mind passes to a
greater perfection; by sorrow, on the other hand, the passion by which it passes to a
lesser perfection.'
so - thoughts capable of causing sadness
does Spinoza think that thoughts cause sadness?
sadness is on his view a modification of the body by which the power or action of the
body is diminished and the idea of this modification
the idea - as well as the altered physical state - is sadness
a change in the body - as for example describe by Damasio in his example - in so far
as it leads to a diminishing of capability - will be accompanied by the idea of this
change - in this case - sadness
so - in this case - there is a change of state in the person - resulting in diminished
action - and the idea of this
Spinoza does not say one causes the other
that the change in the body causes the change in the mind
his perspective is that there is a modification in the mode which expresses itself in a
change in the capacity to act and the idea of this
sadness in this case is a name for such a modification
its expression is physical and at the same time mental
so on this interpretation
thoughts per se do not cause sadness
sadness - as a thought is the idea of a loss of power - that is the same event as the
body's loss of capacity
and this is the emotion
the emotion of sadness is not one aspect of this state of affairs - it is both aspects
so
'emotion related thoughts only came about after the emotion began'
I think for Spinoza - 'emotion related thoughts' - just is the emotion - some change of
potency
as revealed in thought (and act)
the thinking that is sad is the emotion expressed in thought
so - from Spinoza's point of view - it makes no sense to speak of emotion and
'emotion related thoughts'
this is a confusion
for they just are one in the same
for Spinoza - it's not as if there is some kind of faculty we call emotion which has
certain kinds of thoughts - or doesn't - so it can be either a full warehouse or an empty
one
such thoughts - i.e. - joyous or sorrowful are the emotion (as expressed through the
mind) - in the body the emotion is expressed in a change in physical capacity.
09/06/06
Damasio II (v)
patient C
is a case where a stroke victim would break out into fits of uncontrollable laughter or
crying - without any outside stimulus to such events - and without experience of joy or
sadness prior to such events - it is reported he would end up - after the event feeling
somewhat sad or somewhat giddy -
so
what do we make of this?
is it case of an emotional state without cause - (except we presume the brain damage
from the stroke) - or is it rather that the brain here is not functioning normally - and
the result is an apparent emotional state
apparent in the sense that the behaviour attendant is characteristically viewed as
emotional?
the question Spinoza would ask I think is - is there a change in the potency of this
individual?
there appears - from the report of the subject - to be no change is his emotional state
no sense of joy - an increase in power - no sense of sadness - a decrease -
but we have the usual suspects of laughter and crying
it looks to me as if here you have a case where the behaviour is aberrant
it doesn't reflect the emotional state
or doesn't reflect it in ways that are a true account of the state
so
what do we say here?
the report of being somewhat sad or giddy suggests that indeed there could have been
a change - but not to the order - suggested by the behaviour
and so the question - how do we know?
and it's a good place for this question to come up
because it is clear that not just in the case of patient C - but actually in all cases of
overt emotional behaviour - it is from an epistemological standpoint a real issue
how do we know the emotions?
Spinoza's account - his definition of emotion III. Def. III
is not an answer
yes Spinoza states here what an emotion is
and this definition is really a meta-scientific statement
to get his view on the question of the knowledge of emotion you need to look
elsewhere
a good place is Part II Prop. 40
just quickly here - he outlines three kinds of knowledge:
. vague experience / opinion or imagination
. common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things
. intuitive science - from the formal essence of attributes of God
to the essence of things
the question here is - what do we have with the case of patient C?
Damasio seems to be arguing - we have knowledge - at least of the second kind
and yes - if there is knowledge here - it is of this kind
my question is
how can we be sure here?
and my question is really to Spinoza
is it possible to know with certainty - what constitutes - a change in potency
that is to know if - certain behaviours are signs of this
and signs of either an increase or decrease?
or as in the case of patient C - perhaps - not a sign at all - rather an 'epistemological
phantom'
(good term - might just throw everything out of whack)
I guess it is not - in reality such a dilemma
the way Spinoza sets it up - emotion is any such change of potency
cases like patient C - are difficult - really because despite our knowledge - our
theories of the brain we can't be sure -
not to say a clear picture might not emerge
but it is important for scientists to have a clear understanding of what they don't know
and not to mask their ignorance in a mumbo jumbo of cerebral circuits
the main point here is that patient C's behaviour may not have anything to do with
emotion
it's possible that - there is no change in his potency at all
this view is almost the premise of Damasio's argument
therefore -
09/06/06
Damasio II (vi)
'Evolution appears to have assembled the brain machinery of emotion and feelings in
installments. First came the machinery for producing reactions to an object or event,
directed at the object or the circumstances - the machinery of emotion. Second came
the machinery for producing a brain map and then a mental image, an idea, for the
reactions and for the resulting state of the organism - the machinery of feeling'
first up the theory of evolution is in Karl Popper's terms a metaphysical theory - that is
not empirical - for the reason that it is unfalsifiable - which may explain why it
continues to enjoy such currency and popularity in biology and apparently - neurology
we don't usually think of neurology as a pseudo science and perhaps it's not when it's
done without the help of metaphysics and imagination
for Damasio - the brain is the machine room for the emotions
must have started with a mecarno set and the moved on to doing magic shows
and in this quote we get yet another characterization of feeling - the machinery of
feeling
is Damasio feeling his way with this theory of feeling?
the real break through is - 'Second came the machinery for producing a brain map and
then a mental image, an idea for the reactions and for the reactions and for the
resulting state of the organism - the machinery of feeling'
this appears to be solid Descartes with the help of evolution -
for a start - substance - which is what we are always talking about here - is not
evolving
from the point of view of our limited point of view - given in ordinary experience -
and given our need for explanation of the motion and rest we observe and experience -
yes - we have come up with some ideas that give us a picture of what might be -
behind the veil of circumstance - evolution is one - and it has had some - actual
empirical spin-offs
but not only is it not science - it's not good metaphysics
the same can be said of the Damasio's misuse of homeostasis - in it's empirical context
fine - as some quasi - all embracing theory of biology - it is misplaced - and certainly
as a metaphysics - very poor
the problem with this evolution talk is that it is so mushy - unscientific
we have a brain map -
a map we have made
and then a mental image
yeah well you show me - where this mental image is on your brain map
this is so bad it's almost ridiculous
if this is the state of neurobiology - pity the patients
OK
substance as expressed in a human brain is expressed in two ways
as a physical state
as a mental state
we can understand the brain - as we can understand anything else as having a physical
and mental dimension
in Spinoza I see no reason to say the mind is in the brain
or that the mind - is the brain
it is important to understand what Spinoza is not saying
and how radically different his view is to the way Damasio describes the situation
Spinoza says the mind is the idea of the body
he doesn't say the mind is the idea of the brain
09/06/06
Spinoza
so
the mind is not the brain
the mind in Spinoza's terms is a much bigger fish
at the same time it is not true to say that we cannot speak of the brain in mental terms
the brain finally is substance - modified
as such it has both physical and mental characteristics
perhaps it is easier to speak of the idea of the brain
and the physics of it expressed in idea - as idea
so the brain as in the human brain
is clearly an idea of - presumably based on - in Spinoza's terms - on adequate
knowledge
that comes down to sound physics
sound biology
so what we get in these sciences is an objective picture of the brain
my idea of the brain may be no more than an image - the grey lump of flesh - which I
believe to be efficacious - largely because this is what I am told
how the brain works
as in the science of the brain is in Spinozistic terms - to go to the second level of
knowledge
the level of common notions and adequate ideas
the idea of the brain at this level
is quite a different matter to the idea we may have begun with
in simple terms
the brain works as it does
and I may have a conception of it that reflects in mental terms just what it does
such a conception would be in Spinoza's terms - adequate
it's a good question though what this adequate knowledge amounts to
would Spinoza think a complete picture of any physical system is possible
(brain included)
I think he would
I doubt any scientist or philosopher would hold to such a conception today
surely all our knowledge is by its nature inadequate
it's just a question of how inadequate
that is - it is a matter of degree
and here of course we are talking of empirical knowledge
conceptual or logical knowledge is another matter
it seems to me that the so called certainty of such is not a feature of the world but
rather a formal construction - a design of the concept
and I think one of the best examples of this is Spinoza's substance
'that which is in itself and conceived through itself; in other words, that, the
conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must
be formed'
one way of looking at this is to say substance as defined is defined as that which has
no empirical content - and is defined as that which is conceptually complete
so in a way it is a definition of certainty
or an explication - of certainty
and of course certainty must be presupposed here for it to be an explication
so what is the point?
is anything being said?
yes I didn't mean to get on to this track
what I wanted to follow on with was this
OK - I have a conception of - whatever - let's say the brain
you have a conception
the Royal Academy has a conception
every man an his dog has a conception
I guess we're going to say - at the least - that the Royal Academy's conception is the
most comprehensive - idea
and yes it may well be
but how do we know?
that is how do we know any of these conceptions bear on the physical reality of the
brain?
how do we know there is a connection?
that one is a reflection of the other?
this is not just a question for Spinoza-ites - it applies to any such claim to knowledge
one answer to this question might be -
well if knowledge is not this - what is it?
granted no one can look from the outside - and see if the relation - Spinoza suggests
holds
there is no outside
and I guess - if so -
we must make the best of the inside
Spinoza's theory of mind and matter - is elegant and simple
and without the problems of others
in terms of elegance and simplicity it wins the day?
also - when we speak of mind
would Spinoza be prepared to say that in a world without consciousness
- human / animal
there is mind?
10/06/06
Damasio III
contents of feeling
Damasio proposes that -
'The contents of thoughts with themes consonant with the emotion; and a mode of
thinking, a style of mental processing...'
a regular grab bag this - something for everyone
the key thing is Damasio wants to distinguish emotion and feeling
'consonant with emotion'
so feeling is something else - consonant with emotion
and yes you can dress feeling up with themes and modes and style
but I don't see the point
if you take Spinoza's definition of emotion - you have an elegant simple and powerful
conception - and there is no theoretical need for this ring in 'feeling'
Damasio's 'feeling' is a straw man
'Feeling in the pure and narrow sense of the word, was the idea of the body being in a
certain way. In this definition you can substitute idea for 'thought' or 'perception'.
Once you looked beyond the object that caused the feelings and the thoughts and the
mode of thinking consequent to it, the core of the feeling came into focus. Its contents
consisted of representing a particular state of the body.'
OK - essentially no different to Spinoza's definition of emotion
'Feelings, in the sense used in this book, arise from any set of homeostatic reactions,
not just from emotions proper.'
first up homeostasis is an explanation of phenomena
as in a theoretical account of what is happening
strictly speaking there are no homeostatic reactions - there are reactions observed and
explained as homeostatic
this confusion of phenomenal and the theoretical in Damasio is endemic
secondly - what does he mean by emotions proper - presumably something other than
emotions
and what really does he think the term emotion refers to?
some background engine room?
and by all means create a science which generates ontologies - but you have to have
some observational-experimental evidence - otherwise stick to poetry - and call it
poetry
'Feelings are perceptions, and I propose that the most necessary support for their
perception occurs in the brain's body maps'.
'the brain's body maps'
again - a theoretical notion - designed proposed conceived ultimately to try and
explain observed actions and reactions
feelings are perceptions
this idea he has of the brain's body maps - as the most necessary support of the
perceptions -
OK if support here means explanation
the brain's body map - only exists as an idea - and he is saying this idea supports
the idea of feelings as perceptions
an argument for an argument
why is a feeling - a perception - why not a conception?
perception in science usually refers to the deliverance of the senses
is this what Damasio thinks feelings are?
I don't think so
but I am yet to see what the point of perception is here
except I suppose he has to prop up his notion of feeling - with something and really -
anything would do - given that there is nothing to it anyway
why not say a feeling is an awareness - of - of what?
well I would go with Spinoza here - awareness of potency
awareness of increased capacity or decreased capacity -
i.e. pleasure and pain
perhaps the whole point of Damasio's endeavour is to try and explain that when I say I
feel - it is equivalent to saying - the brain feels - or my brain feels -
and he wants to give this notion of a feeling brain some creds with his home boys
- the neuro-bios
to locate feeling in the brain -
to say an attribute of the brain is feeling -
is to what?
presumably from a scientific point of view
it is to observe feeling in the brain
therefore feeling as an observable - objective phenomena?
what Damasio does - is put up a concept of the brain - and argue that - within this
concept we can scientifically recognize feeling
this though is to 'observe' theory - with theory
also within this - the notion of feeling - is to function for Damasio (sometimes) - as a
theoretical concept
phenomena
straight out - cause and effect - objectively observed - is lost
has been supplanted by a theoretical model - masquerading as phenomena
the problem here is - mistaking theory for phenomena
and the reason for this - in Damasio's case - is he wants to give an objective account of
a non-objective state (and further to give it - top grade flesh and blood)
feeling is an internal state - it is not out there to be observed
Damasio wants to observe feeling - or suggest with a few neuro-bio models - tricks of
his trade - this can be done
not so much - smoke and mirrors - just a series of mirrors -
10/06/06
Damasio III (ii)
anyway
'Some variation of pleasure or pain is a consistent content of the perception we call
feeling.'
in common parlance we say people perceive and they feel
two different activities - though related
I perceive a work of art
I feel uplifted by it
we don't normally say I perceive pleasure
I feel pleasure - and often as a result of a perception
the feeling is a consequence of
not the object perceived
cause and effect - if you like
it seems that for Damasio the cause (perception) is the effect (feeling)
'Feeling is the perception of a certain mode of the body along with the perception of a
certain mode of thinking with certain themes.'
a feeling - if we have to keep using this term - is a description of a unified state of
consciousness -
meaning - when I feel good - it's just that - it's not that yes my body feels good - I have
good thoughts -
that may be an explanation - but it is not the phenomena - or how we report the
experience to ourselves
strictly speaking - feeling is without content
the experience is without content - that is until we analyze it - break it down
these break downs actually add nothing to the experience - only to the understanding
of it
and - that is - if understanding is required
'Feeling is a consequence of the ongoing homeostatic process - the next step in the
chain.'
homeostasis
I don't know - I think we're being dazzled here with a motherhood claim
when we explain - we look for regularities
the regularities will be found
it's what explaining is about
finding regularities is about theory construction
it's the imposing of theory on phenomena
pre-theory construction - the phenomenon - any phenomena - is what it is - at this
stage - essentially unknown
to find regularities - is to systematize to theorize
so homeostasis in this sense is the presumption of theory
it's there before you look
just another point -
I think Damasio wants this concept to be all things to all men
biological meta-scientific - and metaphysical
as a metaphysical concept - it is as I said a motherhood statement that has more to do
with theory construction than what a theory is about
but if it's meant as an empirical statement - where the empirical content?
we know it can be verified - every time you open your eyes
but can it be falsified?
what observations would - could lead to its rejection?
is it possible that we could observe a fundamental process that is not moving to
regularity
and how would we know - identify such?
'The above hypothesis is not consistent with the view that the essence of feelings (or
the essence of emotions when emotions and feelings are taken as synonymous) is a
collection of thoughts with certain themes consonant with a certain feeling label, such
as thoughts of situations of loss in the case of sadness.'
feeling as I am going to use the term - is undefined - contentless
not to say - it is not a real phenomena -
so yes - feeling is not just a thought
a thought here
the thought of sadness -
is a reflection on - feeling
it is one step removed
an attempt at - objectivity
it is a thought about....
a feeling
and this characteristically occurs when people do not understand - what they are
feeling - or why -
they reflect on it
think about it
a sad thought - is what?
is there such a thing
you can think about sadness
you can feel sad - and think about it
but a sad thought?
I don't know about that
I guess I am putting here that thinking is always a reflective action
after the fact - of experience -
which prior to thinking is essentially unknown - an unknown reality had - but not
known
in practice of course it is generally not this black and white
'If feelings were merely clusters of thoughts with certain themes, how could they be
distinguished from any other thoughts?
feelings per se are not thoughts
feelings are if you like raw experience
that are objects of thought
'How would they retain the functional individuality that justifies their status as a
special mind process?'
this special mind process
yet to be established Antonio
in fact if what I say is on the mark - feeling is not a process or special - or for that
matter - of the mind
feeling is raw experience - undefined - the object of - thought
'The particular state of those body components, as portrayed in the brain's body maps,
is a content of the perceptions that constitute feelings.'
'the particular state of those body components' - is to say nothing
'The immediate substrates of feeling are the mappings of myriad aspects of body
regions designed to receive signals from the body.'
this 'substrates of feeling' - makes its appearance
perhaps next - we will find substrates of substrates
that might explain things even better!
'Some might object that we do not seem to register consciously the perception of all
those body-party states. Thank goodness we do not register the all indeed.'
look - what we experience is what we experience - it is unified and undefined
you can break it up into body parts if you have a mind to
that is explanation
you do not 'experience' - the explanation of your experience
'Obviously, we do not 'experience' the blood level of glucose dropping...'
well we experience something when that happens
science and medicine give us an explanation of that something
the experience is not effected - by the explanation
it would be the same without it
'Experiencing a certain feeling is experiencing the body in a certain way......'
again - if you say so - if you want to explain it that way
we do recognize different kinds of experience
firstly just because the experiences are different
and we then go on to think about what that might mean
'I caution that the emergence of mental images from neural patterns is not a fully
understood process.....'
it has only ever been proposed - never understood
it's at this point one wonders whether we are dealing here with a genuine argument
or just some kind of a con
'In brief the essential content of feelings is the mappings of a particular body state....'
the map is a map
a picture -
the content of feelings is always a theoretical issue
feelings do not come with their content on their sleeves
apart from the content we give - them - they have no content
'A feeling is in essence an idea - an idea of the body and, even more particularly, an
idea of a certain aspect of the body, it's interior, in certain circumstances.
yes well we can elucidate feeling in such a way
but I think really at this point Damasio should try to get in touch with or reconnect
with his feelings
'A feeling of emotion is an idea of the body when it is perturbed by the emoting
process.'
not what I had in mind - a feeling is an emotion caused by emotion
here we are again
the cause is the effect
very scientific
10/06/06
Damasio III (iii)
in his section in chapter 4 - feelings in the brain - new evidence
Damasio - gets subjects to think of emotional episodes in their lives - and then the
measurement -
'All the body sensing areas under scrutiny -......showed a statistically significant
pattern of activation and deactivation.......The results told us in no uncertain terms that
some of the mysteries of the physiology of feelings could be solved in the neural
circuitry of body sensing brain regions and in the physiological and chemical
operation of those circuitries.'
OK what do we have here?
let's begin with Damasio's idea of feeling - seeing as we can't get rid of it
a feeling of sadness e.g. -
OK I feel sad
I may identify certain physical and mental reactions
i.e. - the feeling - leads me to think - let us say negatively about a certain circumstance
- these negative thoughts are the mental dimension of this feeling
this feeling also expresses itself physically - let us say I weep
so the feeling is these reactions
what I know is these reactions
if someone says what's the matter
do I say 'I think negatively about.....and I weep' -
no I describe these reactions - events as sadness
I give the experience a name - commonly associated with such reactions
and if I am further asked - what do you mean by sadness?
I say 'well you know - it's a feeling'
feeling is more general category
used to explain the term 'sadness'
but what is real here?
are these feelings - some sort of state - actual state - underlying these reactions?
or are feelings - and feeling - just labels for reactions?
Damasio thinks that because - you can observe a change in brain chemistry when
someone says they are feeling sadness - you have found feeling in the brain
what you have is in fact is not the discovery of feeling
rather physical reactions in the brain
that are associated with reports of - in this case - sadness
no different really to tears
you see what's interesting here is how you interpret the brain activity
Damasio wants to say it is the state of sadness
such and such a reaction - just is sadness - under these circumstances with this subject
that's what it is
he thinks he's found feeling in the brain
all we can say experimentally is these actions / reactions - (brain activity) is happening
- is observed
(and that it corresponds to certain reports of emotional states)
is the activity - the source of the tears and the negative thoughts?
or is it just what is observed?
putting it bluntly - is brain activity the cause of the experience - or just an expression
of it (whatever it is)?
in Damasio's terms - is the brain activity the feeling - or is it rather an expression of
the feeling (again whatever this means)?
Damasio would have to say the former wouldn't he -
because if he didn't - what is this thing called feeling?
what is feeling - if not finally brain activity?
and of course the brain must be running the show - or else - what's going on?
surely you are not saying brain activity is just an effect - an expression?
an effect of what?
it is in fact what I am suggesting - and my reason is as follows
what happens in this world - from a Spinozistic point of view - is expressed and can
be understood in physical and mental terms
what happens is so expressed
thought - and here - brain activity - are expressions of modes of being
what we know is not the cause of things - only the expression of the cause
or we can as it were - only approach cause through expression
expression of what - you ask?
fair enough
what I say is this - we don't know
for Spinoza it is substance
and if you think of substance - in itself as it were - without it's expressions -
independent of it's attributes
what do you have?
well I don't think Spinoza would wish to go there - or say that you can
but if you do you will be face to face with the unknown
11/06/06
Damasio III (iv)
false body mapping
on the face of it a curious notion
I understand what is being put here - that i.e. - we can be in pain but not feel it
we can have pain but not feel it - yet in some sense know that we have pain
the idea of false body mapping that Damasio puts is designed to avoid the problem
and the problem is crucial - for his theory of the feeling brain
it is this - if the brain maps - falsely - in some circumstances - how can we know
that it ever tells the truth?
and of course the question -
how do we know what is the truth here?
clearly feelings are not the criterion - we know they can be false
but how do we know this?
if feelings are all we have to go on - and I stress 'if ' here - then what we feel is true
and if so there is by implication - no false body mapping
and this just may be to say - the body tells the truth - its truth - even when prior so
called knowledge suggests the opposite
putting it sharply - if there is no feeling of pain - there is no pain
the 'pain-body map' is not operating - it has been replaced - or was not operatintg in
the firat place
another map operates
and so it's not a question of true or false here - just obsolete and new - maps
perhaps Damasio might consider the idea that body mapping is not a static business
that yes there is always a body map - but at no point of space or time can it be the
same as that which preceeded it - or that of the next instant
perhaps Wittgenstein's idea of family resemblance is to the point here
if so - and I think this does make sense - what sense is then left of the notion of body
map
is it strictly speaking never possible to obtain such
for as I have suggested there is no permanence here
we can take a snap shot of the brain or regions of it - but immediately the map has
changed
you can't freeze time and space
and you would need to have a sharp concept of map
the alternative is to recognize - that in the body / brain mapping business
the stock is always obsolete
(it's the same problem for Wittgenstein's theory of meaning -
OK - eliminate essentialist definition - recognize that meaning is never dedicated - is
never fixed - good thinking - but whither meaning?
Wittgenstein - regarded such - philosophical discussion as illness and his task to cure
it
be careful what you wish for
his theory of meaning itself - on it's own argument - has no meaning
which is just the view he started with against the verificationists - and the author of
the 'Tractatus'
verifiability as a result died as a criterion of meaning
but the cost was to kill off - the criterion of meaning - any criterion of meaning
so you could ask - hey what was it all for?
Dashiell Hammett when ask in later life - why he froze insects for a hobby said
'one way of filling in time is as good as another'
very subversive
Spinoza would have smiled
it is reported that one of Spinoza's pleasures was to watch spiders fighting
back to the issue at hand - if there is anything left after that)
on the other hand
if we take the view that feeling doesn't amount to much in terms of the science of the
brain - that it is not based on knowledge - that it is essentially ephemeral
we have to fall back on the hard slog of observation and experiment
to find out how the brain functions
and this kind of work - how does it relate to how you feel?
well it's the old question
is there a correspondence between the physics of brain activity -
and one's consciousness - in Damasio's terms 'feelings'?
all the imaging in the world only produces images of what is seen
not what is felt
Spinoza takes the radical view - the physical reality and the mental reality are
depictions of the one reality
we know - ourselves in two ways
they do correspond
but you will not find matter in mind or mind in matter
however - what for Spinoza - you find in both is substance
substance is mind
substance is matter
so the correspondence is not one to one
as in mind is matter or matter is mind
it is rather - a three way relationship
mind and matter both reflect accurately substance
mind and matter are aspects of substance
so in the case of feeling pain
good science should be able to show this in physical terms
in the case of not feeling pain -
good - up to date science will show this too
it really doesn't make any sense to speak of false pain
11/06/06
Damasio III (v)
we can observe the actions of the brain
form hypotheses - theories - draw up maps
we can then experiment to see what mental states are associated with what regions etc.
what we are doing here is correlating mental and physical states
if you ask - what is pain?
I can point to a region of the brain and it's activity - and say this is the physical -
neural expression of the ideas that X has when he reports having painful images
in so doing I am assuming that the neural behaviour is what - is reflected mentally -
is this so?
am I saying - one is the other?
or that both are expressions of something else
let's call it - 'more fundamental'
Spinoza called it substance
substance in the mode of a human being
but substance nevertheless - that which the physical and mental are expressions of
we can only know this substance in these terms - physical and mental
it is not as if substance is a third reality
in so far as we describe the physical and mental as attributes
we can say they are attributes of -
substance
but in reality the physical and the mental are all we know
so
when I experience pain
what is it?
is it - a physical expression
a mental expression?
both
so what sense - pain - the unified experience
here I don't think we can avoid going down the substance route
the underlying reality
the unity
the experience that is pain
is
not known
we don't know what it is -
and for that matter what anything is -
any experience
short of a physical description and / or a mental description
the thing in itself - experience
is not known
until that is we apply physical and mental predicates
I make this point to give some credence to the idea of the unity of experience
it is to say the unified experience is unknown
the experience as known is divided
this analysis -
might in some way give some sense to what I think Damasio was trying to do with his
concept 'feeling' -
the place where physical and mental meet - are one
it is just that in my view - that place is not definable - or characterizable
and I mean that in the strictest sense
the 'unknown' as I am using the term - is just that
i.e. - it is not 'an unknown substance'
or a 'thing in itself'
I put my argument in non-ontological terms
as simply the absence of knowledge
but just back to experience feeling and pain for a moment
when I say experience is unknown
what this means is that it is unknown in an analytical sense
what I experience - yes I describe as pain
this description - is not reflective
it is immediate - it is a given
given in the sense of what is presented
given - phenomenally
theoretical analysis will show I believe that the greater the depth of the analysis the
less that is known - and finally - if there is an end to this - the end is the end of
knowledge
p.s.
I think it is important to understand that for Spinoza
the correlation of mental to physical as in what Damasio does as a neuro-biologist is
not an empirical matter
Spinoza was not putting forward an empirical hypothesis
his argument about the relationship of mind and body is not touched either way by any
empirical experiments
so - all the neurological research in the world - actually has no bearing on his claims
for this reason you might question the whole basis of his argument
this fact does explain why scientists have not paid much attention to Spinoza - for
right or wrong he has nothing to say about what they do - if by that is meant proper
empirical research
it also follows that any attempt to show that empirical research supports Spinoza's
theory of the mind / body is misguided
11/06/06
mind body brain
the question of the relation of mind and body
the question of objectivity
how do I know of mind
I have consciousness
and this having of consciousness is to know of the having of consciousness
certainly human consciousness
I know that I know
perhaps we can short cut it by saying consciousness is lucid
what I mean is it sees itself
in every act of itself
every idea if you will
an idea is self-aware
can this be further analyzed? - I think not
so - the body
the mind regards
the mind regards the body as outside of itself
it regards itself as inside the body
the mind knows the body as matter
matter is 'that which is outside'
the mind knows itself as 'not matter'
the mind recognizes its content as ideal
therefore itself as ideal
the inside of the body is consciousness
the outside of consciousness is body - is matter
the unity is logical
mind and body are two dimensions of the one entity
the physics of the body is the surface of the entity
this is the object of science
matter is surface
the inside is consciousness
it is the knowing of the surface
that which knows
that which is known
the brain as an object of science is no different to any other physical surface
it can be known
our knowledge of the brain is knowledge of the surface - of a surface
it is not knowledge of consciousness
the outside is not the inside
the mind is not an object of knowledge
it is the knower
to regard the mind as object is to mistake it for the body
12/06/06
consciousness
the mind is the idea of the body
but the mind must also be the idea of itself
how can this be for Spinoza?
the point is consciousness is aware of itself
where is self-awareness in Spinoza?
the idea of the idea (of the mind) -
does Spinoza recognize this?
self-consciousness
does he account for it?
what does he say here?
surely mind is the idea of itself?
the mind holding itself as object
is what?
the mind cannot regard itself from the outside
there is no outside
can the mind see itself from the inside?
what does this mean?
what is reflection - if that's what this is?
can we say - mind is the capacity
mind reflects -
on the body
on the world -
on itself
what is reflection then?
a function?
if so - a function of what?
is it that we recognize reflection
in the act of - reflection?
this is as it were a logical description of what?
an act -
beyond this
where can you go?
any account is just - reflection
so - the action of the mind is
the fundamental - the function -
is what?
closed -
reflection cannot be - further analyzed -
we can describe what the mind does
- and this description is what the mind does -
we can never get out of reflection
we cannot explain the mind - further
we can only -
do what the mind does -
the mind is this act
this act - is unanalyzable -
or the analysis is final
the analysis cannot be further elucidated
we cannot see outside of this
we can only describe the inside - of the mind -
and what this tells us is that the mind is this inside - the inside
reflectivity - the mind is
just this - fundamental - dimension
a dimension - the act of which is reflection -
there is no external view of the mind -
it is just this function - this internal act
the world - the outside - does not reflect
it is reflected on
the physical world is the ground of reflection -
mind is the act of reflection
body is the object of reflection
the primary object
primary reflection can be the subject of reflection
secondary reflection is the mind reflecting on itself -
on its (primary) reflection
the mind is limitless in its reflective capacity
reflection in a logical sense is without bounds -
however - this said - always it's primary object - is the physical world
the outside of mind
the non-reflective surface
12/06/06
knowledge of the mind II
I put in the previous post that the mind - consciousness - reflects
that this is the process of knowing
the object of knowledge - of consciousness of the mind - is that which is outside
the mind - consciousness is the inside of the body
the body is outside - the world if you like is outside
that which is outside is the object of knowledge
consciousness - the mind - is not - outside itself
therefore - it is not the object of knowledge
the point being
there is no knowledge of consciousness - of the mind
we cannot know the nature of the mind
consciousness is knowing - not the object of knowledge
the mind - knowing - is unknown
the best we can say is consciousness reflects - this statement itself is a reflective
statement
this is a statement of what the mind does
not what it is - if what it is - is to mean something other than what it does
what the action of the mind is
and any reflection on reflection
is but - logically speaking a statement of reflection
we are aware of what the mind does - its action
awareness is not knowledge
13/06/06
awareness
and awareness -
awareness is the logical space of reflection
reflection?
the subject regarding itself as object
the mind seeing itself as mind
knowing as knowledge
the act as object
the translation of logical categories
the subject translating to object
and in the act remaining subject?
or is it the subject translates to object -
and in so doing becomes the subject-object?
to put it this way is to break it down
or to begin with the elements and build to the composite -
when in fact in reality -
in practice -
the composite is what we have
the subject as subject / object
this may be a way of putting it
but what does it mean?
what is subject /object
well - the unity of consciousness
what we experience
?
still this seeing the subject as object -
this 'seeing as'?
and it is this - isn't it - that is the question
is this what underlies reflection?
or just another description - equivalent description of it?
awareness as the logical space of reflection?
the act as a state
yes - as in the state of the act
the act as state
the act of reflection as the state of awareness
doesn't take us too far
the act as ground
ground of itself -
this is to say at least
that reflection is - in this sense -
without foundation
in that there is no foundation
the act is pure
the state essential
14/06/06
mind and matter
mind and matter as dimensions
expressions of the one substance
we see this in human beings - and other entities - by inference
what empirical reasons do we have to believe that this arrangement is universal?
I have argued that mind is
an internal dimension of the entity
the human being as an entity - knows - this dimension of itself
(this dimension - is self)
clear enough
but how can it possibly know this - outside of itself -
that is in empirical terms?
to suggest that it does - and that this attribute (or as I say dimension) exists in all
things -
is this not a form of the final cause - the anthropomorphism that Spinoza was so keen
to debunk?
a second point I want to make
Spinoza's view is that the entity can be read as either mind or extension -
i.e. - that a complete explanation can be given - in either attribute
I say to this -
the mind can be a complete - is - a complete explanation of the inside - of an entity
of that dimension
a physical explanation - a complete account of the outside
of that - dimension
but as regards the entity in toto -
there is no one account -
there cannot be one account
there is no one overriding perspective
only the possibility of attributive accounts -
in Spinoza's terms - no substance - no substantial account?
aspects - we can detail -
but this is all
Spinoza - to solve this problem -
argues for 'sub specie aeternitatis'
the perspective of eternity
this is not a perspective we have access to -
and the idea of it?
it is an abstraction from attributes
an abstraction
that is more in the line of imagination than science
we cannot step outside of space / time and hold - reality as an object of thought or
perception
to suggest such is to engage - in a cosmological absurdity
14/06/06
singularity
the concept of singularity
Spinoza defines the concept of singularity
this at least
cause in itself?
the idea of cause
and then cause as sui generis
the definition of substance could be no more than an intellectual exercise - an exercise
in logical thinking
introducing cause - and cause in itself
and applying this to the concept of substance
is to take the concept of substance - the idea of it - and give it objective existential
status
at this point we are no longer looking at a concept
rather a reality - an existential reality
at this point substance exists
and what sort of a move is this?
at this point - substance - the concept - is used as a definition of existence
is this a philosophical sleight of hand -
from the concept of 'rabbit' to rabbit?
and then apply the characteristics of the actual - back to the concept?
in this case the attributes of mind and extension
so my argument is that substance the concept of substance
is no more than a definition of singularity - of oneness - of unity
now does such a definition - concept apply to what exists -
to reality?
Spinoza's argument -
well if reality is a singularity - a oneness - a unity - yes
it applies to nothing else -
so is reality this?
yes according to Spinoza
but why -
you can ask?
what I say is - the argument for substance is not relevant here
for it is an argument for the concept
if the concept is to apply to what exists - we must have another argument?
question
what sort of argument?
how could you show that the concept of substance does or does not apply to what
exists?
is this issue empirical?
if not - what kind of question is it?
can an observation settle the matter?
no
for a theory of the nature of reality is not just a theory of what can be observed
or is it?
the other important issue here is
the question of the status of such a conception as that of substance
and in particular Spinoza's substance
can we conceive of a totality?
according to Spinoza we can if we think about it correctly - as in finite and self-caused
but the issue is - what is being conceived in such?
is it reality - the real world
or is but an idea - it is assumed can be applied
an idea is an idea
how do we know that such has content
existential content?
does it matter?
not in the realm of imagination
but yes - in the realm of fact
so - yes we can imagine with Spinoza such a concept applying
but this is not to say yea or nay regarding its actual application
the problem is that empirical testing
is with and in nature
we never have the vantage point of looking at nature from the outside
we don't have a God's eye view
14/06/06
cause of itself
'By cause of itself, I understand that whose essence involves existence; or that, whose
nature cannot be conceived unless existing.'
'whose essence involves existence' -
that which exists
cause of itself therefore - that which exists
that which exists is that which exists
'whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing'
i.e.
you can't have the conception of x
unless x exits
is this to say -
what exits determines what can be thought?
yes
so the first part says
the cause of itself is that which exists
and the second part
that which exists cannot be conceived unless it exists
so again
conception dependent on existence
is it essential that anything in particular exists?
and what does this question mean?
is the existence of a particular thing anything but accidental?
is it necessary that a particular thing exists?
one would think not -
as the existence of any particular thing - it seems is a contingent matter
OK
is it necessary that something exists
that existence - exists
well this concept of existence - is - in fact nowhere to be found in re
the concept is a universalization of particularity
what exists is particular entities
existence is not a particular entity
it is a conception - with no particularity - or existence - except as a conception
one would think it cannot be 'that whose essence involves existence'
and of particular things -
again it seems there is no essence to them
that which is cause of itself
cause of itself
eternity?
a conception yes
its existence -
as that which we don't - cannot know
essentially a negative concept
(with positive overtones)
14/06/06
cause of itself II
the point of D.I. - cause of itself
is to show the limit of explanation
to make clear that explanation finally has an object
and that the object - is what is to be explained
defining that object - is the adventure of thought
but that it is - despite any understandings - any conception
is just the very point of the endeavour
there is to be no endless chain of reasoning or observation
for such a process has - by it's very nature
lost sight of it's own reason
Spinoza quite reasonably calls that which is the object of thought and action -
substance
and I think he is clear that we cannot know it - though you wouldn't know this from
his argument - and I think because he was primarily concerned with what can be
known and the conditions of this knowledge
he was from the beginning an existentialist - I don't mean this in the modern sense -
but rather in the sense that his focus was squarely on existence - people existing -
but as to the nature of substance - the nature of nature - the nature of God - he is
modest in his claims - modest but sure
he begins and ends just with what we are - extension and thought
he says these are two of an infinite number of possibilities -
for the infinite number of attributes read - what we don't know
what we do know is thought and the physical world
these are expressions - bone fide - of reality -
that which is to be accounted for -
and it's - all here - ready to read - the patterns and possibilities of thought and the
nature of the physical world -
in this sense there is no mystery
the question is how to put these - perhaps apparently disparate attributes -
characteristics together?
how to understand the relation between knowing and what we know?
and there is nothing to it -
it is just this - knowing and the known -
two dimensions of the one existence
the subject and the object
as to why this - why this reality - this existence - this arrangement?
there is no answer
the question is not existentially meaningful
reason being - it is no other way
the world we live in just is as it is
how best to describe - if it is necessary to describe
and it is clear that given the passions of man -
and the violence and turbulence that results from their reign and expression
there is a place for clear explanation
it is not only desirable - it is necessary
necessary - because false gods are always being invented to the service of discord
15/06/06
Spinoza mind self-consciousness
for Spinoza
as I understand it mind is an objective property of substance?
a subjective / objective distinction does not exist for Spinoza
Spinoza's world is fully objective
all knowledge is objective
the question is in what sense is mind an objective property of substance?
an attribute Spinoza says in D.4 is that which the intellect perceives as the essence of
substance
the intellect perceives
for Spinoza - extension as an adequate idea and mind - an adequate idea
a clear self-contained idea as it were
so what part does observation - or experience play in this?
observation and experience are - can be - either the basis of inadequate or adequate
ideas
the raw material - of experience is the data for ideas
how the data is understood determines the kind of knowledge that results -
so the question of knowledge - of adequate ideas - is about seeing the world without
confusion - which is seeing it - as it is objectively - that is adequately -
understanding that the essential properties of substance are extension and mind - is to
understand the objective features of substance - the world as it is - the question though
is how is this achieved?
one answer might be that of Pt. II. Prop. 7: 'The order and connection of ideas is the
same as the order and connection of things.'
this is to see and understand the correspondence of mind and matter
the point being we come to mind and extension in the understanding of ideas and
physical properties
and we come to see the mind as the idea of the body -
this is a result of the intellectual process of adequate ideas
my mind and my body are then understood as characteristics of a greater reality - that
of mind and extension
so it is the mind at work that gives us this knowledge of mind and extension
and mind here?
is what
an adequate idea
so
what does this break down to?
an adequate idea of an adequate idea
is this Spinoza theory of consciousness?
the point being if the mind is an adequate idea
to have this adequate idea
this perception of essence
must itself be an adequate idea
but then the question could you have anything else?
i.e. - an inadequate idea of an adequate idea?
no -
to have an adequate idea of the mind is?
the question - is it two - adequate ideas
or one?
for Spinoza can the mind be an object of the mind?
actually I suspect not
I think Spinoza is clear here - the mind is the idea of the body -
it is not - the idea of the idea
and it is for this reason
we can't find self-consciousness in Spinoza
15/06/06
mind without substance
the mind as the idea of the mind?
this is OK
the issue is -
is the idea something had
if had - it is known - that it is had -
so -
which is -
presumably - the idea of - having and idea -
and is this too - had?
the point is - ideas are not enough to establish mind
mind as self-consciousness
just ideas -
leads to an infinite regress
perhaps -
this would suit Spinoza
but the infinite regress occurs
because - in such an argument -
there is no mind
- no foundation to ideas
ironically no substance to it
- on such a view there is no account of the observer
simply the order and succession of ideas
OK some modern objectivists would like this -
but it leaves a hole
perhaps it's the problem of taking the objectivity of science too seriously
thinking the objective perspective
is all there is to it
it's too one dimensional
Spinoza - it seems has objectified - ideas
given a 'scientific' account
much to be said for it
but the real problem of mind is not
to my mind -
is not the relation of mind to body
it is rather the problem of the relation of mind to mind
this is the problem of consciousness
mind and body - a side issue
15/06/06
substance has no substance
this problem - the problem of mind for Spinoza -
that mind becomes an infinite regress of ideas
you would think should be resolved in substance
the fact is though substance - is only known as - mind or extension
so - the infinite regress of ideas - just is substance (as mind)
substance is no foundation for Spinoza
it may appear to be - he may believe it is
he does want it to function as such
but this is not the case
substance - for all we know - is its attributes
its expression
strictly speaking - expression
- no - 'its'
there is no substance to substance
substance in this sense - if you wish to keep the concept - is the unknown
this is the best you can do
otherwise the picture we have -
is expression - nothing more nothing less
just - revelation
and revelation of
itself
revelation of revelation
no substance to it
strangely modern
15/06/06
the scaffold argument
as I am representing it
the substance argument is a scaffold argument
you put up the scaffold to build the edifice
after the building is complete you remove the scaffold
the point being substance is a false foundation
its purpose is to get the ideas of extension and mind - up and running
the twin spires if you like
after these have been established -
substance has no further use
it can stay or be dismantled - it matters not
it is not part of the edifice
the edifice - it helped build -
was necessary to the construction
a kind of seventeenth century take on Wittgenstein's ladder
15/06/06
cause of itself III
D.I. By cause of itself (sui causa) I understand that whose essence involves existence;
or that, whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing
essence must be existence
for without it - existence the entity cannot exist -
obviously -
therefore
that which must exist -
cause of itself - is that which exists
what cannot be conceived as not existing?
what must exist -
reality
the basis of everything
substance
the totality
the ground of contingency
how can we know of this?
existence per se
it's a conception
that cannot be conceived without existing?
OK
let's say yes
but
what is it a conception of?
of - necessity?
is it anything other than this
- the idea of necessity
applied to what exists
OK
how to know - if necessity - applies
is applicable
outside of the realm of ideas
to anything?
still - the reality
that time passes through
that space covers
regardless of any existing thing
what to call this?
substance
a spot on description really -
must reality exist
yes
can you conceive otherwise
no
so it seems
still even so -
what can you say of this?
of this necessity
that it must be
and this is to say?
only - that it will not pass
persistence -
this we know as -
certainty
is this so?
a certainty of what?
thought -
knowledge
based on?
thought
pure logic
is?
what must be
is that logic?
necessity?
why must necessity apply
to existence?
logic
to have any sense
is about
what we can think
we can think necessity
but is existence necessary to this
what else could necessity refer to?
and it only has meaning - in relation to existence
without a non-contingent sense of existence -
necessity is meaningless
necessity becomes the description of substance
which must be that substance is
is necessary -
cannot not be -
still it's rather colourless - substance
it must be
what exists exists
what we can know
- only what is -
only what is necessary
very good
16/06/06
cause of itself IV
could the cause of itself argument not be an argument from necessity?
rather an empirical argument?
rather an argument based on observation and experience?
not that we observe existence in itself
or substance as Spinoza would have it -
but rather that
we know things exist - and persist in their existence
also
that the death and destruction of any one particular thing -
is not the death and destruction of all
and experience teaches us that the world recreates itself - or - new things emerge
and persist in space / time - endure - to the point - at least of dramatic change
i.e. - death - destruction
isn't it safe to assume that this state of affairs will continue?
where is the need for necessity?
and yes - on the basis of these observations
why not speak of 'existence'?
existence as such
- as the explanation for the myriad creations and changes -
where's the problem?
if there is none
we can drop -
necessity - the ontological argument - substance
and substance on such a view is just a description of what exists
or even the term we might reserve for something approaching a complete description
seems easier to me
16/06/06
cause of itself V
my preferred position in all this is to say -
cause of itself - as in existence itself
is a concept - that really - properly points us to
the unknown
- to just what we don't know
and the fact of not knowing
and it is this which is the true object of knowledge
I mean here - it is in a sense - always before us
that we don't know
what we glean - or think we know -
is set against this ever present backdrop
it is the theatre on which - in which our knowledge plays are performed
17/06/06
existence in itself
is the idea of existence in itself an idea that can be confirmed or denied?
not I think by observation
in that what we perceive is particular
rather it is a matter of reasoning
x exists
therefore
existence
the argument that the particular can only exist given the universal of which it is an
instance
the idea of existence is therefore - on this argument a necessary conception
unless you are prepared to argue - particulars - all particulars exist in a void
and have no reason - for their existence
so existence is what?
it is difficult to see what can be said here
to assert the existence of x
pure and simple is to ?
assert - that_________
existence is no predicate?
i.e. - it is to say nothing of a thing
only 'that'
is it no more than - assertion?
to assert - that
and such an assertion - that x exists is to make a logical assertion
one that is - in it's fundamental form - is true if it is not a contradiction
the question of the character of x
is as Quine has put it - the question of value of the variable
the existential status - of x - is a question of content
the bald assertion - 'x exists' - as such is contentless - in fact
the existential statement as such - has no content
the nature of that which is being asserted is a question of knowledge -
not existence per se
ironically - to say something exists - is to say nothing
but as to existence - as a universal - the ground of being - if you like
how does this fare?
as I suggested above it is more in the line of a logical move
an argument about the basis of particularity
which is only an argument
there is no necessity here
i.e. - the world just may be particular things in a void
I find the idea strange - but nevertheless - it's open to argument
and if so
we cannot hold the concept of existence in itself as anything other than
a theory of ontology
18/06/06
Spinoza God Nature the unknown
so substance -
in itself - conceived through itself
God - absolutely infinite - substance - infinite attributes
and Nature -
absolutely infinite substance - infinite attributes
hence God or Nature
thought - is an attribute of God
therefore God can be regarded as a thinking thing
and
Nature can be regarded as a thinking thing
God is not exhausted by thought -
thought like extension
characteristics of God -
not the only characteristics
of God or Nature
therefore
the unknown
if the concept of infinite attributes
is to make any sense
the unknown
the unknown attributes of God or Nature -
infinite
apparently
22/06/06
Damasio IV
on page 151
'the myopia of the future caused by prefrontal damage has a counterpart in the
condition of anyone who consistently alters normal feelings by taking narcotics or
large quantities of alcohol. The resulting maps of life are systematically false,
consistently misinforming brain and mind about the actual body state. One might
guess that this distortion would be an advantage. What's wrong with feeling fine and
happy? Well, there seems to be a lot wrong, actually, if well being and happiness are
substantially and chronically at variance with what the body would normally be
reporting to the brain. In effect, in the circumstances of addiction, the processes of
decision making fail miserably and addicts progressively make less and less
advantageous decisions for themselves and for those close to them. The term "myopia
of the future" describes this predicament accurately. If left unchecked, it invariably
leads to a loss of social independence.'
the resulting maps of life are systematically false, consistently misinforming brain and
mind about the actual body state
this view while on the face of it fairly uncontroversial - perhaps even commonsensical
- is not all it seems
first up feelings (Damasio's term - not mine) have never been a reliable guide to
biology or medicine
if they were we would have no need for these sciences
and isn't it clear that one's feelings of pleasure - may have nothing to do with good
health?
what's the drama here?
one's state of health from a scientific point of view may or may not correspond to
one's feelings
Damasio has not understood the first lesson of science -
that the reason we have science is because what feelings tell us - is as good as next to
nothing
how can the brain be misinformed?
could it be that the brain has the correct picture - but the information is faulty?
how would you decide this issue?
first up you drop all talk of correct information and false or faulty information - data is
data
and simply look at cause and effect -
now this may be no simple matter
but the point is to drop presuppositions about correctness - for want of a better word
Damasio - goes on to use 'normal'
and here he is really displaying myopia - philosophical myopia
granted scientists in the main are cautious thinkers
they need always to work very conservatively - to build up their facts for their theory -
but the point of good science - good theory construction - is to see what you see
objectively
and to do this you need to know what you are doing
in the case of the addict -
are you a medical scientist?
a social worker?
a born again Christian?
or a brain surgeon?
what would Spinoza say here?
I think he would regard all this talk about feelings and brain maps as rubbish -
Spinoza says of joy - 'the passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection.
The affect of joy, related at the same time to both mind and body, I call pleasurable
excitement (titillatio) or cheerfulness....."
how does this relate to the conatus
first conatus: III.PVIII. -
'The endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to persist in its being is nothing else
than the actual essence of that thing.'
as I read this - and I suspect it is not a standard reading
Spinoza is here saying it is of the nature of an existing thing to persist in its existence
now this may or may not be a pleasurable or joyful affair
as a consequence -
we can say the addicted person - in this respect is no different to the non-addicted
person
it is of the essence of both to persist in the endeavour
and what is to count as success here?
a long healthy life?
well you might think so - but Spinoza does not say this
in fact he is quite clear that there is no goal to life per se
yes we make choices - we imagine goals - ends
but these are products of the imagination - not reason
emotional props to the fact that the only reason for existence - is existence
so the point is - there is no point - beyond existence
this is Spinoza's answer to the question of meaning - of the meaning of life
life is the meaning of life
(or technically - existence is the meaning of life)
so the endeavour to persist - is what we do - whatever we do - and it's no contest
there is no right or wrong way -
there is just what we do -
there is just existence
this is really all Spinoza says
for Spinoza - to understand a person's emotional state is to understand their potency
their power
for emotions are for Spinoza the increase of decrease of the power of the body and the
idea(s) of this
and just what does this amount to?
an addicted person may well have the idea that he or she is more powerful as a result
of their drug use
are they mistaken in Spinoza's terms?
I think not
could they be dying as they have this sensation and idea of power?
yes
so were they mistaken?
is it a case of the body map giving the wrong information to the brain and mind?
not on Spinoza's analysis
if so
how are we to understand power?
power is existence?
if so
is death the loss of power
the loss of existence -
and is this the loss of life?
I don't think Spinoza sees it this way
life may - go - existence does not
the loss of life - the loss of power
or an existent's - loss of the power to act?
i.e. - the dead man still exists
action diminished -
perhaps for Spinoza death is the state where one is only acted upon
and we can't really speak of 'one' here
so - perhaps only the actor - in Spinoza's sense of the initiator - is an individual -
existent
with the loss of the power to initiate - one has lost life
it becomes a question - if you distinguish life and existence -
can the power to exist be increased or decreased?
Spinoza thinks so
but what does this mean?
and is he perhaps wrong here?
perhaps existence is the constant - life - the variable?
so what is it to increase the power of the body?
avoid death as long as you can - eat well exercise - avoid drug use?
yes I suppose if you have something like Damasio's view of the power of the body
a standard scientific / medico view of health
but it amounts to the view - power is health
OK - so you can't act if you are incapacitated - i.e. - unhealthy to some degree
perhaps Damasio is right
what worries me though is - there is no real theory of power or theory of action in
Spinoza
if you discount death - and the idea of the standard of longevity
take it out of the picture
who's to say?
who's to say what an active life is?
what an increase in power of action is?
what is the standard?
who's to know?
Spinoza does not offer us secondary theories here
there is substance - and within substance - modes affected
that's it - it's that simple
so
does it finally just come back to pleasure and pain
I suspect this really was - Spinoza's considered opinion
and if so all bets are off
22/06/07
Damasio V
p.194
'That in complex systems such as ours, the brain's regulatory operations depend on the
creation and manipulation of mental images (ideas or thoughts) in the process we call
mind.'
OK - so what we have here is a mind-brain identity thesis - the mind as a brain
process
Damasio notes that he is not confident of explaining the relationship between brain
circuitry and image
and that he has not nailed the problem to date
(1)
first up - a question - is Spinoza a mind-brain identity theorist? - some people have
argued this
I beg to disagree here
in Pt. II. P. XIII Spinoza states his view -
'The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of
extension actually existing and nothing else.'
OK - Spinoza does not say the object constituting the human mind is the brain
important point I think
now what this idea of the body means may be hard to visualize to a century convinced
the mind is the brain
before Descartes it had been thought it was the heart
the point being - it is just to identify the mind with a part of the body
OK
we must address another prejudice - that of 'the' mind - who today thinks of the mind
as not being located in a specific part of the body?
to understand Spinoza you must know that he does not see it this way
the mind is like extension - an objective attribute of reality
mind is not a exclusively possessed - by any feature of reality
nevertheless we can speak of the human mind
the mind as the idea of the body -
here the body is the object of the mind
the mind the body's subject
the relationship of mind and body is the subject / object relationship
it is a logical relationship
the unity of the mode that is a human being
is such
that it has a subjective dimension
and an objective dimension
the dimensions point to
or are expressions of
a unity
that is substance - writ small
or
the human being is an expression in miniature of the essence that is God
that is the totality
reality - writ large
which is in Spinoza's view - at the very least
like man
mind and extension
subject and object
man was made in God's image
finally there is no other image
(2)
what of this view of mind?
what is Spinoza argument for it?
II.P.I - 'Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing'
particular thoughts are modes that express the nature of God
so the attribute of all particular thoughts - belongs to God
thought therefore is an infinite attribute of God
this argument depends on Spinoza's argument for attribute
that is - the reality of attributes - and of thought as an attribute - an attribute as
Spinoza would have it - objective - infinite -
the attribute argument goes back to the argument for substance
but just looking at the argument of II.P.I
the form of it is - particular thoughts point to a universal thought
if particular thoughts exist
therefore
thought
and for Spinoza
therefore
God
my own view here is somewhat different to Spinoza's
I argue consciousness is to be equated with ontological - metaphysical internality
consciousness is the inside
and of what?
well at least of human beings -
and other conscious entities
human consciousness is distinguished from animal consciousness to the degree that it
is reflective
which is about thought
human beings can think about thought
I confess I don't know any other way to say this - but 'reflectively'
and I don't think it can be described non-reflectively
the point is that on this view consciousness sees -
it sees itself - it sees the world - the surface
that it is the inside of -
I'm not convinced that all things - have an inside
I don't know
and for that reason I would not characterize mind as Spinoza does - as an infinite
objective attribute
my outlook does have implications for the Damasio argument
first - mind is not a surface phenomena
so - it is not accessible to surface analysis - i.e. - science
mind is - indeed the source of science - but it cannot be the object of science
what we observe is only ever the surface of things
the observing itself is internal - not external
how to characterize the inner states?
can this be done?
yes but only introspectively - artistically - figuratively - poetically
and that is to say you need a different language
the language of science will only ever describe what is out there -
not what is inside
so on my view - the kind of picture the mind-brain identity theorists put forward - a
kind of positivism of the mind - is just not possible
and I think even they know this
but science is a vain whore - wants everyone and everything to come to her - when in
reality it's a case of beauty is skin deep
or at least science can be regarded this way
my picture really of mind and matter is that -
apart from what I have put - regarding the internal / external distinction
what we are really talking about - is primarily a relationship
there is something of this in Spinoza too
for me it is not a relationship that is to be resolved -
it is rather - and simply the relationship of the inner to the outer or subject to object
but however you want to describe it - my point is the human being - ontologically -
metaphysically speaking is - a relationship - or a relation (in the logical sense)
not a substance - a relation
not a variation on a substance - rather - possibly a variation on a relation
23/06/06
the third man
what we can say is
we can look in and look out
Janus looks both ways
and from this -
that such implies a unity
if you like - an underlying unity -
the ground of vision
this is at the very least - a logical ground
i.e. - the inner and outer are not possible
unless they are the inner and outer of something
all we directly - actually know though - is what we see
or that we see -
our two dimensional vision
we assume substance - to explain dimension
clearly though - seeing a dimension or two dimensions
is not to have an objective - non-dimensional view
it is not to have the substantial view
Spinoza - in a way saw this and it is I think the reason for his substance argument
and further his idea that it is possible to see 'sub specie aeternitatis'
that is to say Spinoza saw the need for a third view
the view that encapsulates - in his terms the attributes given - mind and extension
is God's view -
for extension and mind are attributes of God
and God is greater than his characteristics
or these characteristics
so God or substance is the third - overriding perspective
the reason for the argument is clear
however the truth is - there is no third view
no third man
or third perspective
and it is really impossible to say what such would even be
subjective / objective and _____?
what?
transcendental
perhaps
in the meantime
the unity of vision is a logical point
this is the best we can say
there is no inside / outside - subject / object - unless there is a unity
it is a presupposition
the 'person'
you
yes - you
are a presupposition -
23/06/06
the third man fallacy
for Spinoza
the attributes of extension and thought
can be regarded as separate
and yet identical
the mind is the idea of the body
the body - the mind as extended
so one is the other in a different form
but to say this - to visualize it - to understand it
you need to be able to see both
to speak of both mind and matter - objectively -
where does this objectivity come from?
how is it possible?
this is what I shall call the fallacy of the third man
the idea that there is a third position - that is objective to mind and body
that is outside of mind and body
a vantage point
a third perspective
Spinoza's metaphysics depends on this possibility
at best it is a conception - (that does not know itself)
an idea -
but when you understand what it is supposed to do
- to be
it is a position - outside of - reality -
it is a position that in Spinoza's terms is not that of the body or that of the mind
rather - that of -
of what?
as I said in the previous post - Spinoza didn't shrink from the issue -
for him the answer is God - is substance
OK - very well
but my argument is that such is not a position we can have or adopt - in Spinoza's
form or any other
and it is in one form or another an argument in Western philosophy that is the source
of much error
24/06/06
Damasio V (ii)
I made the point earlier that Spinoza is not a mind-brain identity theorist in that he
doesn't equate the mind with the brain - this is true
but by the same token it is true to say that Damasio's work on the brain is work on the
mind
the mind is everything - covers everything - so - indeed an understanding of the brain
is an understanding of the mind -
the brain as mind
so - yes there is a sense in which - while Spinoza is not an identity theorist - the
identity thesis is not incompatible with his view
and another point to make
perhaps quite a radical one -
and it is that one could say that for Spinoza the mind is a non-issue
if nothing is not the mind
where's the problem?
so you could well read Spinoza as effectively disposing of the problem -
scientists can get on with their work - without fear of contradicting Spinoza's
metaphysics
business as usual -
so I'm not sure given this view of the situation - in what sense Spinoza's metaphysics
can have any real relevance at all to good science - and good science of the brain /
(mind)
perhaps his insights are of use to Antonio Damasio -
however - the point is - nothing Spinoza has to say really has any empirical
implications - and Spinoza would argue that good science doesn't impact one way or
another on his metaphysics
Damasio has written a fine book - which among other things may lead some readers to
think that while science is indeed important for the working out of detail -
metaphysics is where it is at for the big picture - and finally and therefore -
'metaphysics' is just that - 'before physics'
26/06/06
mind as a presupposition to substance
mind is a presupposition to substance
the concept can only be formed given mind
but even this is not strictly true
perhaps it's knowing that is presupposed
in that to formulate the notion of substance
we presuppose a capacity to know
reflection on this may lead to mind as a concept -
and then on to substance
but - back to knowing for a minute
in a sense - mind is some sort of answer to the question
what is it to know?
mind - substantializes or objectifies the act - of knowing
if act is what we are talking of
and this is a real question
what are we talking about here?
the straight answer is I don't know
the formation of concepts - mind - substance
is a response to this
and what is it to respond like this?
what is going on?
the base line is lack of knowledge - of the act -
explanation is sought
how do I explain - describe what is going on - when I think?
the lack of knowledge is reflective
we are never as it were lost for words on the surface
a primary statement is made
i.e. - I think
even though its content is in question
even though - that is - it is regarded - on reflection - as contentless
so more notions come into play -
as it were to underpin the essential scepticism
mind is what knows
and the flip
inorder to know - mind must exist
I know
therefore
mind exists -
and -
inorder for mind to be
real - meaningful sensible etc.
substance must exist (Spinoza would say)
and then again the flip -
inorder for mind to be
substance must exist
mind exists
therefore
substance
what goes on here
what is going on is the creation of foundation
I would have it that our fundamental intuition is that we don't know
(this is to suggest that Descartes was mistaken in thinking 'I think' is fundamental - it
was only fundamental because he chose not to think about it further - that is it became
his foundation - his place to stop and build - and it was essentially a clever appeal to
the obvious)
and it is after this intuition -
that the necessity for knowledge - for foundation - is - quite obviously - apparent
so -
the manufacture of knowledge -
of foundation
as necessary
and this is important
necessity emerges out of nothing
necessity emerges out of need -
the need for - knowledge - or a foundation for knowledge
and subsequently - a structure - a building - a description
foundation here is really - a logical construct
it is decided upon -
that there is foundation -
clearly this is an unknown -
but it is in response to this notion - this idea - that things begin
it is essentially a process of explanation
a kind of fishing expedition
how to find in this notion all that we want - all that we need -
i.e. - mind - substance
and it is essentially an artistic process or endeavour
a making of notion - form and content
and finally a picture - a presentation -
it is no more substantial than this -
we construct ourselves from necessity
26/06/06
the ontological argument
Spinoza puts up a concept which is not self-contradictory -
and from which he can deduce concepts (mind and extension) necessary for an
explanation of the world
which is to say - substance
OK - so the concept of substance is used to produce other concepts - which give
substance to the concept
so the concept of substance - as put by Spinoza - is -
self explanatory -
(which is not only its method - but its essential character)
where Spinoza is clear is that he has put forward a foundational concept
that is so -
just because it has no foundation
it cannot be regarded as derivative
as coming out of another
it is defined so
it is this - a foundational concept - that is without foundation itself -
its purpose though is to give foundation to secondary concepts
so
the trick is
to say there is no foundation to existence
there is only what is -
existence is its own foundation -
so
you might ask
how did existence get into this?
well - what is existence?
that is really the question -
or can be seen so
Spinoza addresses this question
his theory of substance is his attempt to give character -
to the concept of existence
for existence outside of any concept
is the unknown
the description of existence - the giving of content to the concept is to characterize -
define -
a contentless concept
yes you can say what exists exists -
it looks like you are talking about something
but in fact - it is really - language talking about language
another way - it is to say X is X
ontology - the concept of X -
the attempts to describe it - characterize -
does not
create anything
it is only an argument of understanding
how to best describe - what needs to be described
so just a recap -
what I want to say re Spinoza and substance - is
the concept emerges as any - meta principle - from the unknown -
the unknown is its reason
and any concept just is a concept of existence
of what exists
so
we tend to say what exists exists
and our theories
either hit the mark or don't
this though is not how it is
what exists for all intents and purposes is made
by thought
pre-thought - what is - is - but it is unknown
but we need to know it -
to function -
we create -
our picture of existence
these pictures serve as proxy
it's a necessary proxy
for - there is no - non-proxy picture
there is only our conceptions -
their truth / falsity
again - a concept
each meta concept defines itself as true -
different meta concepts - pictures are not in conflict -
so long as you understand that
they are all valid pictures of the unknown
and the unknown is silent
27/06/06
the ontological argument and painting
if we regard the object of knowledge as unknown
the question then is how to give it character
so initial metaphysical definition
i.e. - existence
existence as a description of the full range of what is in question
then to further characterization -
i.e. - God - as a name of existence -
we impose an image
(we make images - this is what we do - as much as walk and run)
an image which is loaded up - with the attributes we believe to be essential
(it's meta pioneering - loading up the wagon - staking out the claim - building the
cabin)
the ontological argument as put by Anselem is a mistake
in the sense that - to think existence is - that which is described -
when in fact it is the description - of that which - needs to be formulated - described -
that which is unknown - not known -
my point is that there is no existence but the concept of
which is description of the unknown -
if the description is adopted - and it is
we can then speak of - not the unknown - but existence
a small advance really -
that necessitates further characterization -
strictly speaking - in a logical sense - there is nothing to begin with
so - to make an existential statement
is to characterize
it is always to describe
the existential statement simply brings the flux - to order
it is the maestro's tap to the orchestra's cacophony
the ontological statement creates a platform on which to build
below is the unknown
God - the concept is such a description
existential concepts describe
and any creation here - is descriptive
this is all to speak analytically -
we operate with an enormous treasure chest of concepts and description
we are really just creating the art work - as we go -
we place ourselves - in the picture - on the canvas - and begin to paint - and we never
stop - or leave
28/06/06
an inside job
what I have been arguing is that the mind is not a brain function
that the mind is the inside - the internal dimension of things
and of this I say we have no observational knowledge -
no objective knowledge
knowledge of the mind is reflective
this is not to say all mind is capable of knowledge - that all mind is reflective
the inside of a cell?
does a cell know itself? - I doubt it - but I suspect there is some ontological sense - in
its functioning - but this though is not awareness
(interesting question - I think I'll have to swat up on Liebnitz
monads just might be the go here)
perhaps here
mind and body are identical in some kind of way?
that the physical complexity of a human brain -
is matched
not with complexity - in the physical sense
but with the complexity that is - reflective consciousness
so the identity is one of fit - one of match
the inside of a human cell - is not conscious of its complexity - for the reason that it is
not complex
in fact for all intents and purposes - not much point in referring to the consciousness -
or the mind of a cell
Damasio I think made the point that mind is a characteristic of complex living things -
he didn't seem too enthused about the consciousness of i.e. - a rock
and this point I think is that mind comes with living complexity
I see the point
but still I put my 'inside story'
admittedly on metaphysical grounds
but I would say the inside of an inanimate object - is - likely to be - as active as its
outside
- no movement
and in any case what I want to say is you could never know -
knowledge of mind - other minds - is - essentially - analogical - in relation to higher
order living things -
metaphysical - otherwise
that is an entity if an entity - is metaphysical two dimensional - inside / outside
otherwise we are not talking about a thing
i.e. - it makes no sense to say - there are things that just have an outside -
and likewise - no sense to speak of entities that just have an inside -
no comfort therefore to ghostbusters
29/06/06
some points
so
consciousness / mind is the inside
of the body / of the world
it cannot be known objectively - observationally
we cannot observe mind
mind is the observer
knowledge of consciousness is subjective
it is reflective knowledge
the reflectivity of consciousness - is simply the way it works - what happens - inside
as to what this is - how to describe it - again - this cannot be done - objectively
mind is knowing from the inside
any account of the reflectivity of mind - is reflective
that is any account of reflectivity - is reflection
the fact that mind can look at itself -
hold itself as object
the subject as object
is to say the object is contained in the subject -
therefore knowledge of consciousness - of the mind - is analytical knowledge
the reflective capacity of the mind is infinite
it is the infinity of operation
the operation is reflection
in this sense - the mind is infinite
however it is not an infinity that increases
it is not a quantitative / substantive infinity
it is rather what we would call a mathematical / logical infinity
in this sense the mind is infinite
the essential characteristic of the mind of consciousness - is focus
focus in / focus out
the mind is Janus
this is the primary characteristic
all conscious activity is reflective
the mind is reflectivity
all reflective activity is focused
reflection as such cannot be explained non-reflectively
the reason for reflectivity - for the reflective mind - is speculative
it does not appear that all consciousness is reflective - or reflective to the same degree
- of the same kind
in so far as the mind is the inside
mind is everything - is in everything
everything - any thing - that has an outside - by definition has an inside
however - it seems clear that most of nature - is non-reflective
which is to say that inanimate entities - do not know
so - talk of the inside - of mind - in such categories - is effectively irrelevant
the mind of things - the inside fits with its outside
this is not an empirical - rather logical assertion
understanding the surface of something -
and the differences in surfaces -
is a key to knowing the nature of the inside of things
this though is speculative
inside knowledge - is confined to entities that have reflective consciousness
reflectivity seems to be a characteristic of certain complex living physical entities
to say this - to go here - is a reflective view
in truth we cannot have real objectivity
in the sense of step out of ourselves - and look back
the idea of this is the fallacy of third man -
such concepts - i.e. - Spinoza's substance though illogical -
have imaginative value
reflection is knowledge
the object of knowledge - is that which is not knowledge
the object is not altered by the focus of consciousness
reflection creates its own platform
its own foundation
knowledge is a response to need -
the need to know
the need to know the unknown
knowledge is therefore necessary
creativity - meta creativity is
consciousness fulfilling its need
30/06/06
the end of reflection
knowledge is reflection
theory of knowledge - reflection on knowledge
reflection on reflection is what?
consciousness recognizing itself
and in this recognition knowing the end of reflection
that the end of reflection just is reflection
that there is no analysis beyond this
reflection is reflection
that this is consciousness
consciousness knowing consciousness
and this reflection is - what?
how will we describe it?
it is the assertion - the statement of the fact of the essence of consciousness
that consciousness is reflection
the unity of consciousness
what to call this meta reflection?
that reveals consciousness - that is consciousness
that the revelation is the essence
the essence the revelation?
perhaps
the transcendental reflection
it is that reflection which states the ground of reflection
the ground of knowledge
and the act of reflection
this is the nature of it
and as such it is internal - in a meta sense
it is not a surface act an outside act - as in observable
it is an act of mind
what I am also saying is that mind just is this
if we can call mind anything - it is an act
so the idea of mind as substance or thing - is not metaphysically sensible -
at best it is an imaginative - poetic notion
mind as reflection is fundamental
reflection in this sense is the logical foundation - definition of mind -
you can't go any further with this analysis
so why do we - or at least I - ask this question?
habit - metaphysical habit perhaps
or is it just that the nature of reflection is to ask - to reflect?
to come to the end of it - in this sense seems strange
but it is more than this - there is a sense in which reflection points to something more
fundamental -
points beyond itself
beyond reflection - in the strict sense of beyond - is the unknown
and this is just really to put everything in perspective
it is to make the point that the object of reflection -
that which reflection addresses
that which is its focus - is the unknown
the first reflection in a metaphysical sense
reveals the unknown
01/07/06
the view from logical space
thought is reflection
the reality of mind is thought
mind is reflection
the idea of the idea - in Spinoza's terms - is mind - is consciousness
therefore mind is a fact of nature -
it is nature-knowing - nature
or just the fact of knowing - to be strict
what is known - the object of knowledge - is a reflective issue
the world is neither mind nor matter per se
the world is unknown
mind and matter are constructions -
reflective constructions
it is not 'I think therefore I am'
it is 'I reflect therefore I reflect'
thus it is a statement - not of substance
it is in fact a statement of no - substance
it is a presupposition
a ground statement
that is the assertion of mind
not that mind is this or that
but the fact of it in a logical sense
existence - the concept is not from this point of view - fundamental -
it follows on
it is a deduction
an unnecessary deduction
existential statements of the form
'x exists' -
are statement where the pure existential statement is given before its assertion
it is a statement of the obvious
existence is presupposed
in every statement
every statement in so far as it asserts
existence is assertion
existence is therefore not in question
what is in question is knowledge -
can we know -
or is what exists is unknown?
so
existence
is the logical space of reflection
the ground reflection covers
it is the domain
in a logical sense
it is logical space
actual existence is a theory of logical space
a characterization of it
we assert
'what' is asserted is a substantial representation - of the assertion
and this is important - a picture - not of what is asserted - but of the assertion
it is to 'object' - ify the reflection
the act of mind
this is what any ontological statement is
a giving of form to reflection
it is the realization of reflection
the presentation of it
an idea of it - as object
that is outside -
reflection proposes itself - outside of itself
or proposes - its proposals - as outside
it posits - it reflects-out
p.s.
and this is all Anselem's ontological argument is
the objectification of reflection
'nothing greater' -
if you want to say 'that which nothing greater can be thought'
the conclusion of the argument
denies the premises
'nothing greater' is a relational notion
'that which nothing greater can be thought'
only makes sense as an assertion of the limit - that there is a limit to thought -
beyond what can be thought - known - is what?
the unknown
the unknown as God
you do not find existence on the other side of knowledge
what you find is the unknown
and unlike Anselem's God - or Spinoza's - it has no power - no substance - no
attributes - no modes
it is a logical state
that which is not known
the object of knowledge
the focus of mind
the ground of reflection
02/07/06
other worlds
we see out
we see in
but not behind
or beyond
all knowing is reflective
knowledge of the inside
being conscious of consciousness - is reflective
outside knowledge - surface knowledge can be rational and structured or
impressionistic
science is reasoned organized reflection
reflection per se - inside or outside is simply an operation
and as such it can be performed repeatedly -
meta reflection -
reflection on reflection is the logical end of reflection
it is the reflection that reveals reflection as its own basis
the reflection that reveals reflection as the essence of reflection
the idea that you can reflect beyond this - outside of reflection
is a logical error
a logical error that leads to the conception of other worlds
non-reflective realities
it is believed that such conceptions provide foundation to the mind - to the world
such notions lead astray
they lead astray if understood as metaphysical
if understood for what they are - illogical
they can be the source of pleasure
they can be the source of inspiration
illogical thinking is imaginative thinking
the imagination creates
the imagination creates other worlds
creativity begins where reality ends
03/07/06
the infinity of attributes
where is the plus in arguing for the infinity of attributes?
according to Spinoza substance expresses itself as extension and mind
extension and mind are all we can know - all we do know
why argue there are an infinite number of attributes - we do not cannot know?
how do we know that - even if we cannot know what - they are
substance - is infinite - unlimited
so to argue that it is exhausted by two attributes - suggests limitations - the limitation
of two
OK -
so let's say attributes are a question of knowledge -
intellectual perception
as Spinoza does
what we perceive is what is - extension and mind
on what basis is it to be argued that we know - of substance - beyond this?
it's the argument of infinity
infinite substance
we know substance as infinite
OK - this is a conceptual argument
about the concept
surely it can be argued that the attributes of consciousness and extension
define the limit of our perception
and that beyond this what we cannot know -
we can only know what we know
the world beyond this is not known
and for that reason irrelevant -
effectively - non-existent
the conception of substance
substance
is really an exercise in definition
definition of infinity
the definition of that which is not limited
a definition of limitlessness
infinity for Spinoza
is the concept that is logically unbounded
the unbound concept
whether such a concept can be applied to anything - is another question
a logical exercise is just -
it is not a statement about what exists
it is a statement of concept - not existence
and it is a question whether logically such a notion - such a concept - 'the unbound
concept' makes any sense
the notion of concept seems to entail limits
Spinoza proposes I think - a concept that is not limited
on the face of it - this is a contradiction
statements about attributes - the attributes of mind and extension - however fall into
the existential category - in the sense they are statements about what exists
or descriptions of what exists
Spinoza wants to argue that mind and extension are expressions of a single unity
is his theory of substance the only option here?
mind and extension expressions of what?
how to describe the unity?
the concept of this unity is what?
where does it come from?
it is really just a proposal - a bald metaphysical proposal - to explain this apparent
diversity
what underlies
can I suggest that what underlies - whether you describe this in terms of Spinoza's
attributes or not - is not known
therefore the relation mind and extension is not known
we simply don't know
it could well be argued that this issue is the sharp focus of the unknown
speculative metaphysical theories abound in response to this matter
why?
perhaps wonder is the answer
and clearly they play a central role in human thinking
it can be argued they have great heuristic value
materialism - one response to the mind-body problem - has as one of its outcomes
modern science
idealism - it can be said has played a major role in the spiritual life of human beings
all such proposals speak of human beings - of human need
they are not statements of what is -
Spinoza's conception of substance is elegant and logical - quite beautiful in its
simplicity -
but nevertheless - not what he thinks it is -
it is not an account of how the world is - not that is objective - and objective in his
sense is finally sub specie aeternitatis -
it is rather how he imagined - beyond what is known
how to correctly describe reality -
any reflection - idea of - if you like - is true
but true in what sense?
the problem is we don't know what a correct description is
the problem is theory of description
this is metaphysics
what view to take?
there is no answer here
there is only the answer of circumstance (if that)
and at best the detailing - the description of circumstance
concerns - needs - expectations - prejudices etc. -
ultimately all we describe it seems to me is description
what makes for a good view of the world? - perhaps concepts - like elegance -
consistency - order - essentially logico / mathematical ideas
perhaps
anyway the great diversity of answers - perhaps here is the true infinite - the great
beauty of human being
we live always in our conceptions
there is no release
no non-conceptual point of view
no non-conceptual place
no substance - in Spinoza's sense
the desire for such
is the desire for freedom
but it is not a rational hope
the trap of concept is where we live
it defines our existence
freedom on such a view is what we don't and can't have
it is what we don't know
and to understand this is what?
to know that you don't know
yes
is this freedom?
it is freedom from illusion -
perhaps
p.s.
you might argue that Spinoza's concept of substance is really an anti-concept
it is the concept of the denial of concept
it is a destruction of concept
and what follows
its reconstruction
such is the 'Ethics'
the concept of the absence of concept?
the definition of that which is undefined - has no definition
as the basis of all definition
?
04/07/06
the self denying concept
yes
the concept of concept
what are the logical characteristics of a concept -
when is a concept not a concept?
following on somewhat from Spinoza
a concept as an act of mind
and action of rather than an affect on
what is it to conceive?
I think of it as defining -
marking out
what?
a state of affairs -
my question is - can we conceive of marking out - in thought - everything?
what about the idea of everything?
we seem to have it
the concept of God - substance - everything
what is it to conceive that which has no limit?
what I have in mind is that to define is to set limits
to mark out - to classify
so
conception is to set limits
so what of the concept that negates limits
is this truly a conception?
or is it rather to appear to conceive - but really to deny conception?
is it the conception that denies conception?
I tend to think so
and if so -
it is a self-denying concept -
this is a little closer to what I was trying to get at in the last post
that Spinoza's concept of substance - or for that matter any such 'concept' - is false
it is the denial of the concept of conception
so on my analysis it is a meta argument
posing as a non-meta argument - let's say philosophical argument
it is fundamentally wrong
logically impossible
to have a concept that denies the concept of concept
nothing is asserted
05/07/06
Spinoza would argue
Spinoza would argue that his concept of substance - is not just a theory about the idea
of concept
he might well agree that you cannot have a concept of 'no concept' - or a concept that
denies concept -
he would say this is not what he is on about
his argument? - that the idea of substance is not an idea about the logic of concept -
but rather about the nature of reality -
that the real question is about the object of the concept -
it is the object that is limitless - not the concept -
so perhaps here for Spinoza a distinction between the concept of substance and
substance
but how does Spinoza establish the existence of the object of the concept -
how does Spinoza establish the existence of substance?
his argument is that substance is conceived through itself - a conception that is not
dependent on any other conception
so what is its basis - and how does it come about?
my point is - in terms of Spinoza's definition of substance -
there is no object of consciousness
that which is outside of it -
Spinoza states just this
so it is a conception conceived through itself
if this - I say it is a theory about concept
and then my argument of the previous post follows
but it is true Spinoza is not just - putting a theory of concept here
in fact I think he thinks he is not doing this at all
in this he is mistaken
he thinks he is making a substantial claim
a claim of substance
that his concept - of substance - just does - correspond to - a non-conceptual reality
that this concept - when understood - is understood to refer to - what it refers to -
in fact Spinoza argues that the concept itself entails existence
so if you have a concept of limitlessness and it is well formed - logical
what it refers to - must as a 'fact of logic' - exist
so there is a confusion here - in Spinoza between logic and existence
logical statements do not refer to what exists -
they are statements of the relations of ideas
Spinoza comes back here and says -
yes but ideas exist -
yes but do they exist as Spinoza would have it -
as extended things do - out there - objectively -
or are they rather just the way we think about - what is out there - objectively?
06/07/06
concept
the point is whether a concept is something or nothing
just how to define concept -
is any thought a concept or does a concept have a formal status -
so we can say what is - what is not -
what it does - what it does not do?
Spinoza says only that we know the mind in an active and passive modes
a concept - or the formation of concept is an active function of mind
(E.pt. II. def. III.)
beyond this Spinoza has I think nothing specific to say on the logic of concept
my argument is that a concept at the very least defines -
if you like a class of entities
and that therefore you cannot have a concept that does not discriminate -
and for this reason -
you cannot have a concept of everything
it's a false concept - regardless of how you define it
therefore the concept of substance cannot be formed
07/07/07
stepping out
I have suggested that the concept of concept cannot be used in an unrestricted sense
the point is we cannot have a concept of everything
if so Spinoza's concept of substance cannot be legitimately put -
the idea of everything does not discriminate
what else is there?
what else that is to distinguish everything from?
the problem with this is that it puts in doubt any discussion of the totality - of the
universal
I think we can say that - though we cannot conceive everything
we can speak of everything in a negative sense
as that which cannot be conceived -
and what is this?
the conception - of - what cannot be conceived
is what -
not really a conception
it is rather the - negative of concept
can we entertain the negative of concept?
that which is outside of concept - is to recognize the limits of conception
this is essential to the idea of a concept
that is on a meta level
what is in - what is out
I think this is OK -
it doesn't help Spinoza though
he wants substance as a positive conception
not as that which is outside of conception
so in my view - all such positive representations - are misrepresentations
and another way to see it is to say a concept is always within a domain
what of the domain
can we conceive domain?
yes - in a sense - domain is defined by the concept - within it
a concept of x -
the domain of x?
-x?
yes
-x may be the subject of another concept - y
and the domain of y?
-y
so there is no logical limit to conception
the domain of a concept is just its negative
for Spinoza there is no not-substance
therefore the concept of substance is not within a domain
it has no domain
therefore it cannot be formed
Spinoza wants to argue that the concept of substance
is the foundation concept
good idea
except that the concept - that concept cannot be formed
is illogical
and the point is there is no foundation concept
of any kind
there cannot be
no ultimate concept
'ultimate' is stepping over the mark
stepping out of the game
the delusion of stepping out of reality and looking back
the God delusion
perhaps
the mistake of thinking
a negative asserts
08/07/06
reasoning and doubt
reasoning is essentially a process of intellectual embrace - and integration
its characteristics are elegance simplicity unity
it requires nothing but clear thought
and the clear operation of thought
this process does not require input from the world - outside of mind
in fact successful thinking requires an internal - not external focus
reasoning is the mind at work
at work with itself
experience?
shall we say the raw stuff of reasoning?
yes
that which is to be identified - categorized - formalized - in short organized
if you wish the point of reasoning -
it is that which comes to us - presents as un-reasoned
one's conceptual world is defined by reason
the appearance of new experience - of phenomena
perhaps not new in kind - rather 'in res' - in the act - is always a challenge to the given
conceptual arrangement -
and the question is embrace or rejection
or a change in the conceptual view -
the world view
this may simply mean - something like a change of priority in principle
or perhaps a change of principle
indeed possibly the introduction of a new way of seeing
and hence new status to dominant ideas - and their relations
for always everything is presented - comes before the court of conception -
and is decided upon one way or another -
if absorbed - it is absorbed - either as presented - or as modified
a balance is always looked for
the stability of the system - always a presupposition of reason
we might think that with a comprehensive enough conceptual scheme
nothing is a threat to the order of knowledge
this is indeed the rational quest - to find such - an all embracing - and final
comprehensiveness
and to hold to it - in a rational security -
everyone from your bigot to your free thinker falls in here
the point is -
there are no guarantees -
and this is the true beauty of experience
that experience is essentially - undefined - quite anarchistic -
even in the face of reason and its constructions
constructions which by the way are as thin as air
platforms based on nothing designed to hold everything
(no wonder we don't have much luck)
this may be too harsh -
the basis is finally need - no matter how we dress it up
the complexity of need is the story of reason
(need it seems on first acquaintance to be quite discreet - and definable - even
eminently manageable - this however is only the illusion of anguish
need is without origin or end
it is a desolate wind in a desolate place)
even so - the thing is - it is quite foolish to hold too hard to one's epistemic framework
to one's deepest held beliefs
(you need a sense of humor here - it is a metaphysical necessity - for survival in the
face of collapse)
true - a core is the fact of it - in the day to day dealings of motion and breadwinning
however it is a core based not on some extra-experiential foundation -
it is a core based on function
we maintain whatever view we have - so long as it serves what we regard as our most
important concerns
(to do otherwise - to persist in a belief or belief system in the face of its failure to
address our central issues - is to court disaster
run the risk of ruin - mental and physical
it is epistemologically speaking - in severe form - the origin of madness)
always wise to regard doubt - doubt of self - and of course the world -
as the first principle
(this is how you breathe)
here I suggest is true openness
as a guiding - thought
10/07/06
relief
the fact of consciousness
consciousness is known as immediate - only on reflection
this is the base paradox of consciousness
immediacy is a product of reflection -
to understand this requires a higher order reflection -
reflection on consciousness as such
consciousness as the object of consciousness
here is found the self
this though is no solution to the dilemma of how the immediate is not immediate - it is
just a restatement of it in terms of the self - the immediate self a construct of
reflection?
consciousness comes off here as essentially - irrational -
as it were the stuff - we begin with - before reason
analysis is the task set for - this 'urstoff' -
and here - the metaphysical origin of hope -
a belief that consciousness can resolve itself - of paradox -
this though is really the attempt - the belief - to make consciousness - what it is not
we have as a consequence - the notion of science - empirical science
the world as one dimensional - and out there
this is all very well - depending on how it is viewed
the physical world - the surface world - is indeed - out there
the fact is though - it is only known - from the inside
and you cannot resolve the dilemma of consciousness - by projection
projection and denial
consciousness into the surface - and denial of the internal
this does not work - at least on an intellectual level - and for this reason -
it cannot even be sustained imaginatively -
you cannot be rid of consciousness
the question then is why?
why does such a matter arise -
does it?
well at the least it can - and much of human activity - if not all can be regarded as a
response the problem of consciousness - reconciling itself - to what?
to itself -
the thing is we don't know what this would be - what it could be - what it would look
like
and every attempt at it is futile -
we cannot step outside - and see
so what is to be done?
I think there is only relief
no solution - no resolution
and relief - from the paradox of being - is not I think necessarily good or bad
it is an option
a question of how to be -
explore the paradox - or seek relief
and of this relief?
my hunch is immersion -
and immersion in consciousness -
immersion in activity -
reflection will always be - to some extent - a dimension of any act
the secret I think is to minimize reflective experience - to as it were weight activity in
favour of the non-reflective
the immersion of self in self
be clear this is not knowledge -
this is relief - metaphysical / psychological -
and I think the moment of delight
everyone should indulge
at least - to refresh - before going back to the fray
and the great secret of it all is there is no secret -
any pursuit can be - to varying degrees - non-reflective
it is - for children - as natural as the day
for adults - not as easy
mostly it requires some discipline - the learning of how to enjoy
spontaneously - non-reflectively - non-critically
it is learning - how to un-learn -
so even here - a possible resolution - or what I call relief -
presupposes - paradox
no escaping - only moments of not-knowing
12/07/06
the resting place
the point is here
the place of not-knowing - is a place of peace
and this is the natural resting place of consciousness
it is too - no diversion from reality - no manufacture of other worlds -
or indeed no inauthentic move or act of bad faith
this is a place of truth
the problem of falsity - is the problem of knowledge
in the sense that - it is only the belief that I know - that leads to metaphysical
contortion - or indeed perversity
true - we cannot and do not live in a state of ignorant bliss
this is not the point
it is rather that - we move further from the natural state - the natural metaphysical
state - with each claim of knowledge
indeed to negotiate this world - we must know
assume knowledge -
assume it as a tool - a functioning necessity -
the difficulty arises when the means is confused with end
the torture of minds - the disarray and chaos of political implementations is finally a
result of 'belief in'
modern life - for that matter ancient - is the war of knowledge - the epistemic war
we have no guarantees - no final solutions to being
being is not that which can be defined - let alone - the next step - resolved
it is not a problem
it is just the space of the mind and its object (the world)
still we do have the capacity to step back
to shed our reasons - to begin again
this is the core of renewal - the possibility of change - the chance of clarity
it is an option that presupposes a metaphysical humility
which is nothing more than recognizing
the truth of the absence of knowledge
it is the great business of un-learning -
and in so doing - knowing
you do not need to sit in a certain way - to breath evenly and deeply - read sacred texts
- make offerings - sacrifices to gods - or live a good life
you just need to think
and to realize - all thinking is without foundation
all action without end
this is the resting place
13/07/06
mind and body
what is the relation between the inside (consciousness) and the outside (the non-
conscious)?
for Descartes the problem of the mind-body relation was a question of interaction
- this issue does not arise on my view
two dimensions of the one entity -
does it make any sense to speak of an inside interacting with its outside or visa versa?
consciousness is the inside - it's surface - the body - is the outside of consciousness
'sensation' - if you like - has two dimensions - it is conscious and its is non-conscious
- it is the outside - it is the inside
the unity - the totality - as such - is without description - it is the unknown - it is
nameless
13/07/ 06
thought and action
consciousness is the inside of the world
the surface is physicality - externality
the unity - the totality - 'that' which is inside and out -
can only be described in terms of its dimensions
beyond this it is unknown
there is no total view - only the totality -
and within this totality - there is a view
there is a view from inside
mind is the seeing of ____
the seeing of the outside - what happens
the seeing of the inside - reflection
the unity that is a person manifests in action and thought
the unity in itself is nameless
it can only be described in terms of thought and action
thought is the reflection of action
action the extension of thought
14/07/06
stillness
the way of doing philosophy is to begin in the absence
(to begin here is to have already found - therefore there is no method)
and in the moment of embrace - the discovery - the knowing of absence
to see - everything is - a reflection of this
the actuality of possibility is only a moment of reflection - on a reflection of a moment
even the categories 'moment' - 'reflection' - creations out of nothing
creation is necessary - it is the necessity of being - in stone and breath
the unknown - the empty place is stillness
the source and the end
the beautiful heart - unrevealed
(c) greg. t. charlton. 2006.
All rights reserved
Killer Press
